14. Interim Applications—Common Types

2020 ◽  
pp. 249-277
Author(s):  
Lucilla Macgregor ◽  
Charlotte Peacey ◽  
Georgina Ridsdale
Keyword(s):  
Legal Representative ◽  
Summary Judgment ◽  
Default Judgment

This chapter considers the interim applications that a legal representative may most often come across in practice. It looks at the procedure for the specific interim application. Then it discusses the form of the evidence needed to make or oppose it. The interim applications considered here include an application to set aside default judgment; summary judgment; interim payment; an application for specific disclosure; an application for security for costs; and an application for an injunction.

14. Interim applications—common types

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Cunningham-Hill ◽  
Karen Elder
Keyword(s):  
Legal Representative ◽  
Summary Judgment ◽  
Default Judgment

This chapter considers the interim applications that a legal representative may most often come across in practice. It looks at both the procedure for the specific interim application, as well as the form of the evidence needed to make or oppose it. The interim applications considered here include: an application to set aside default judgment; summary judgment; interim payment; an application for specific disclosure; an application for security for costs; and an application for an injunction.

14. Interim Applications—Common Types

2019 ◽  
pp. 249-277
Author(s):  
Susan Cunningham-Hill ◽  
Karen Elder
Keyword(s):  
Legal Representative ◽  
Summary Judgment ◽  
Default Judgment

This chapter considers the interim applications that a legal representative may most often come across in practice. It looks at the procedure for the specific interim application. Then it discusses the form of the evidence needed to make or oppose it. The interim applications considered here include an application to set aside default judgment; summary judgment; interim payment; an application for specific disclosure; an application for security for costs; and an application for an injunction.

14. Interim Applications—Common Types

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Cunningham-Hill ◽  
Karen Elder
Keyword(s):  
Legal Representative ◽  
Summary Judgment ◽  
Default Judgment

This chapter considers the interim applications that a legal representative may most often come across in practice. It looks at the procedure for the specific interim application. Then it discusses the form of the evidence needed to make or oppose it. The interim applications considered here include an application to set aside default judgment; summary judgment; interim payment; an application for specific disclosure; an application for security for costs; and an application for an injunction.

14. Interim Applications—Common Types

2021 ◽  
pp. 249-277
Author(s):  
Lucilla Macgregor ◽  
Charlotte Peacey ◽  
Georgina Ridsdale
Keyword(s):  
Legal Representative ◽  
Summary Judgment ◽  
Default Judgment

This chapter considers the interim applications that a legal representative may most often come across in practice. It looks at the procedure for the specific interim application. Then it discusses the form of the evidence needed to make or oppose it. The interim applications considered here include an application to set aside default judgment; summary judgment; interim payment; an application for specific disclosure; an application for security for costs; and an application for an injunction.

Part I Commentary on the ICDR International Rules, 26 Article 26—Default

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gusy Martin F ◽  
Hosking James M
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Cause ◽  
Summary Judgment ◽  
Default Judgment

This chapter focuses on Article 26 of the ICDR Rules. Article 26 addresses the situation in which one party to a proceeding ‘defaults’, whether by failing to file a timely Answer, appear at a hearing, produce evidence, or otherwise contravene an order of the tribunal. Unsurprisingly, such a default occurs only where the errant party has been duly notified of the steps required and, in some cases, where the party fails to show sufficient cause to excuse its failure. In such circumstances, the tribunal may choose to proceed with the arbitration regardless of such failure. In contrast to litigation in many jurisdictions, this approach is preferred to issuing any sort of ‘summary judgment’ or ‘default judgment’. In other words, the claimant must still make out his or her case and the arbitrators must still review the legal and evidential record before making a final determination.

Medicaid & Medicare: D.C. Appellate Court Denies Claim for Medicare Reimbursement of GME Cost

1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-205
Author(s):  
choeffel Amy
Keyword(s):  
Medical Center ◽  
Federal District ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
University Of Pennsylvania ◽  
District Court ◽  
Appellate Court ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Department Of Health ◽  
Administrative Proceedings ◽  
Summary Judgment

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld, in Presbyterian Medical Center of the University of Pennsylvania Health System v. Shalala, 170 F.3d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1999), a federal district court ruling granting summary judgment to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in a case in which Presbyterian Medical Center (PMC) challenged Medicare's requirement of contemporaneous documentation of $828,000 in graduate medical education (GME) expenses prior to increasing reimbursement amounts. DHHS Secretary Donna Shalala denied PMC's request for reimbursement for increased GME costs. The appellants then brought suit in federal court challenging the legality of an interpretative rule that requires requested increases in reimbursement to be supported by contemporaneous documentation. PMC also alleged that an error was made in the administrative proceedings to prejudice its claims because Aetna, the hospital's fiscal intermediary, failed to provide the hospital with a written report explaining why it was denied the GME reimbursement.

EMTALA: Screening Can Satisfy EMTALA, Despite Misdiagnosis

2003 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hemanth Gundavaram
Keyword(s):  
Blood Pressure ◽  
Medical Treatment ◽  
Emergency Room ◽  
Urinary Retention ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Statutory Duty ◽  
Active Labor ◽  
Summary Judgment ◽  
De Medicina ◽  
The U.S

In Del Carmen Guadalupe v. Agosto, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a hospital fulfills its statutory duty to screen patiens in is emergency room if it provides for a “screening examination reasonably calculated to identify critical medical conditions” that may be afflicting symptomatic patients and if it “provides that level of screening uniformly to all those who present substantially similar complaints.” The First Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment to the hospital in a claim raised under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA).Maria del Carmen Guadalupe brought her husband, Narciso Figueroa, to the Hospital Interamericano De Medicina Avanzada, Inc., (HIMA) on October 3, 1998, with symptoms of urinary retention, edema in the legs, high blood pressure, pain, increased respiratory difficulty, a dry cough, fever, and drowsiness.

JUDGE LIFTS CALIFORNIA BAN ON IQ TESTS FOR BLACK CHILDREN

PEDIATRICS ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 93 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-31
Author(s):  
J. F. L.
Keyword(s):  
Learning Disabilities ◽  
Black Students ◽  
San Francisco ◽  
Minority Groups ◽  
Gifted Students ◽  
Black Children ◽  
Department Of Education ◽  
Iq Testing ◽  
Summary Judgment ◽  
Iq Tests

A federal judge in San Francisco ruled that any parent can arrange for the use of IQ testing in assessing students' learning disabilities, despite arguments that the tests discriminate against minorities. Judge Robert F. Peckham issued a summary judgment ruling in favor of the families of nine black schoolchildren in California. The families were challenging the constitutionality of a statewide ban on the use of standardized intelligence tests for black children in California special-education classes. The state Department of Education in 1986 banned the use of IQ tests for assessing black students, but the ban did not apply to students from other minority groups. Later, black students seeking access to programs for gifted students were exempted from the tests as well.

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