9. The end of life

2021 ◽  
pp. 156-176
Author(s):  
Jo Samanta ◽  
Ash Samanta

This chapter deals with key legal and ethical issues surrounding end-of-life decisions, with particular reference to physician-assisted death, such as euthanasia. Suicide and assisted suicide, administration of pain relief, and futility are considered. Relevant legislation such as the Suicide Act 1961 (as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009), the Human Rights Act 1998, and the Mental Capacity Act 2005 are discussed. The chapter examines several bioethical principles, including sanctity-of-life and quality-of-life debates; autonomy, beneficence, and medical paternalism; personhood, palliative care, and the double effect doctrine. Finally, it considers human rights issues, treatment requests, incompetent patients, prolonged disorders of consciousness, and locked-in syndrome. Recent cases are considered.

Author(s):  
Jo Samanta ◽  
Ash Samanta

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter deals with key legal and ethical issues surrounding end-of-life decisions, with particular reference to physician-assisted death such as euthanasia. Suicide and assisted suicide, administration of pain relief, and futility are considered. Relevant legislation such as the Suicide Act 1961 (as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009), the Human Rights Act 1998, and the Mental Capacity Act 2005 are discussed. The chapter examines several bioethical principles, including sanctity-of-life and quality-of-life debates; autonomy, beneficence, and medical paternalism; personhood, palliative care, and the double effect doctrine. Finally, it considers human rights issues, treatment requests, incompetent patients, and the concept of the minimally conscious state and locked-in syndrome. Recent cases are cited.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 256-270
Author(s):  
Clark Hobson

This commentary reviews the High Court Decision in Conway v. Secretary of State for Justice. Mr Conway’s argument, that section 2(1) Suicide Act is incompatible with his right of respect for his private life under Article 8(1) European Convention on Human Rights, adopted as a Convention right for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, was dismissed. The comment discusses four themes arising from the case. First, it examines how the High Court attempts to distinguish claimants who can act to end their own lives, such as Mr Conway, from individuals who cannot carry out any act to commit suicide. This distinction is arguably morally arbitrary and runs counter to principles of equal concern and respect. Second, Mr Conway puts forward an alternative statutory scheme with specific procedural criteria, designed to safeguard relevant competing legitimate interests; to protect the weak and vulnerable while legalizing assisted suicide in certain circumstances. However, the nature of Mr Conway’s argument regarding this alternative statutory scheme misses the point. It is possible for a court to find the current legislative measure, section 2(1) Suicide Act, to disproportionately interfere with a claimant’s Article 8(1) right in principle, without having to be satisfied there is a future legislative measure that does better balance competing legitimate interests. Third, the comment shall consider the High Court’s reasoning behind holding that Nicklinson was not binding insofar as deciding Mr Conway’s case. Finally, the ethical nuance of the court’s consideration of the aim of section 2 shall be considered briefly.


2010 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 187-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Curtice ◽  
Charlotte Field

SummaryAssisted suicide is an emotive issue that will undoubtedly continue to grab media headlines, especially as medical science is able to prolong survival in chronic medical disorders. The law in the UK as applied under the Suicide Act 1961 is currently very sympathetic to cases of assisted suicide, whereby the individual has travelled abroad to a country where it is lawful to end their life, in that people assisting them and thus committing an offence have not been prosecuted. This article analyses a recent High Court case pertaining to the Suicide Act 1961 demonstrating the central importance of the Human Rights Act 1998 in such cases. It then discusses implications for clinicians and the future of the Suicide Act itself.


Author(s):  
Hugh Markus ◽  
Anthony Pereira ◽  
Geoffrey Cloud

The chapter on ethical issues in stroke care sets out an ethical framework incorporating patient autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice to inform patient-centred stroke care. It covers a broad range of legal information as relevant to stroke care in the United Kingdom such as the European Law of Human Rights, The Human Rights Act 1998, The Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2007, and Deprivation of Liberty safeguards (DoLS). It covers widely applicable guidance around consent, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, artificial nutrition and hydration, and withholding treatment and withdrawing medical treatment. A section is included to review the various types of Prolonged Disorders of Consciousness which are rare but devastating complication of stroke. An approach to end of life or palliative care in the stroke patient is also discussed.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (14) ◽  
pp. 17
Author(s):  
Austen Garwood-Gowers

<p>The Mental Capacity Act 2005 generally exhibits a stronger ethos of protecting the incapable in intrusive research than the last but one version of the Bill. However, sections 31(5) and 6 of the Act replicate clauses 31(4) and 31(5) of that version. As I noted in Part 1 of this article, these clauses are difficult to reconcile with the primary principle. Here I examine what effect, if any, they will have both on the process of authorising research projects involving intrusive research upon the incapable adult and on the ultimate use of the incapable adult in such research. This will involve analysis of the Act’s provisions in the light of both ordinary rules of statutory interpretation and the interpretative obligation imposed by section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998.</p>


2008 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 170-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Gale

Apart from an awareness of shameful treatment to some shell-shocked soldiers on active duty in the First World War, the subjects of military discipline in general and courts-martial in particular are unlikely to permeate the consciousness of the public at large or, indeed, the vast majority of criminal lawyers. This article explores some of the history of both, the current position in relation to courts-martial and the planned reforms under the Armed Forces Act 2006. That the Human Rights Act 1998 exposed some of the anomalities and worst practices of courts-martial is undeniable. It seems equally likely that the 1998 Act was at least a catalyst for the wholesale review and modernisation of military discipline carried out by the 2006 Act.


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