scholarly journals Higher Risk Taking and Impaired Probability Judgment in Behavioral Addiction

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (10) ◽  
pp. 662-672 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yui Asaoka ◽  
Moojun Won ◽  
Tomonari Morita ◽  
Emi Ishikawa ◽  
Yukiori Goto

Abstract Background Accumulating evidence suggests that deficits in decision-making and judgment may be involved in several psychiatric disorders, including addiction. Behavioral addiction is a conceptually new psychiatric condition, raising a debate of what criteria define behavioral addiction, and several impulse control disorders are equivalently considered as types of behavioral addiction. In this preliminary study with a relatively small sample size, we investigated how decision-making and judgment were compromised in behavioral addiction to further characterize this psychiatric condition. Method Healthy control subjects (n = 31) and patients with kleptomania and paraphilia as behavioral addictions (n = 16) were recruited. A battery of questionnaires for assessments of cognitive biases and economic decision-making were conducted, as was a psychological test for the assessment of the jumping-to-conclusions bias, using functional near-infrared spectroscopy recordings of prefrontal cortical (PFC) activity. Results Although behavioral addicts exhibited stronger cognitive biases than controls in the questionnaire, the difference was primarily due to lower intelligence in the patients. Behavioral addicts also exhibited higher risk taking and worse performance in economic decision-making, indicating compromised probability judgment, along with diminished PFC activity in the right hemisphere. Conclusion Our study suggests that behavioral addiction may involve impairments of probability judgment associated with attenuated PFC activity, which consequently leads to higher risk taking in decision-making.

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-63
Author(s):  
Tetiana Kononovych ◽  
Petro Myasoid

The purpose of the research was to test the prospects theory of Nobel Prize winner in economics D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, which describes the heuristics of economic decision-making, to the adoption of a decision by a concrete person. The method of the study is the Single Case Study, which is the most basic form of case-oriented research. The empirical material was obtained using the Melbourne decision-making questionnaire. The presence of cognitive biases in the decision-making process was determined based on the framing effect. Many methods were used to test the decision-making style of the research participant N and the components of intellectual-personal potential determined. It shows that there are deviations in the process of concrete economic decision making, which are not the result of heuristics, characterized by D. Kahneman and A. Tversky. The decision of the research participant is based on the rational style of this process and the analytical system of reasoning. There is an interaction between cognitive systems 1 and 2 with the evident dominance of the latter. This system blocks cognitive biases and ensures the achievement of results. At the same time, there is an influence from the properties of the intellectual-personal potential of the research participant, such as rationality, intolerance to un-certainty, emotional intelligence. In conclusion, the prospects theory explains the decision-making process in the case study, but the "systematic errors" which D. Kahneman and A. Tversky speak about are not observed. Therefore, there is an opportunity to continue studying the role of individuality in economic behavior. Keywords: behavioral economics, cognitive systems, decision-making style, prospects theory, sin-gle case study.


Author(s):  
Elena Reutskaja ◽  
Johannes Pulst-Korenberg ◽  
Rosemarie Nagel ◽  
Colin F. Camerer ◽  
Antonio Rangel

2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (5) ◽  
pp. 693-700
Author(s):  
Qin WANG ◽  
Xue-Jun BAI ◽  
Long-Jian GUO ◽  
De-Li SHEN

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