Endorsement of the ‘Crossed’ Test for Alleged Margin Squeeze as an Abuse of Collective Dominance (Spain)

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 267-273
Author(s):  
Pablo González de Zárate Catón
Keyword(s):  
2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (14) ◽  
pp. 125-144
Author(s):  
Ksenia Smyrnova

This paper follows a comparative approach to the analysis of collective dominance doctrine and practice in the EU and the enforcement practice in Ukraine. The aim of this paper is to assess the compliance of the Ukrainian competition authority’s (AMCU) analysis of the national electricity market with EU law enforcement practice. The latter arises from Ukraine’s wider duty to fulfil its international law obligation to comply with EU competition rules, based on Article 18 of the Treaty establishing the Energy Community also taking into account the interpretative criteria developed in EU case law (according to Article 94 of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU). Article 255 of the Association Agreement, which clearly provides for the use of the principle of transparency, non-discrimination and neutrality when complying with the procedures of fairness, justice and the right of defence, also illustrates the necessity of carrying out research in this field. The paper examines notions such as: the dominance doctrine, market power definition, economic strength and collective dominance in the EU enforcement practice. Special attention is placed on enforcement practice in the electricity market. Since the scrutinised market inquiry constitutes the first investigation into the Ukrainian electricity market, there is no national practice on this issue yet. For this reason, the analysis follows a wide comparative approach towards the principles of collective dominance in the electricity market in Ukraine. The paper concludes that the AMCU’s approach to the regulation of the electricity market in Ukraine confirms the necessity to reform the system of state regulation in the wholesale electricity market and in the market of services for electricity transmission. In order to develop competition in the electricity market, it is also necessary to change the system for tariff and pricing policy formation on the part of the National Energy and Utilities Regulatory Commission of Ukraine and the Ministry of Energy and Coal-Mining Industry of Ukraine. Stressed is also the necessity to follow the approach and criteria of EU competition law with regard to the determination of market dominance. This requirement is stipulated by Ukraine’s international legal obligations arising from Articles 18 and 94 of the Treaty establishing the Energy Community and Article 255 of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine.


2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-378
Author(s):  
Olivier Billard ◽  
Marc Ivaldi ◽  
Sebastien Mitraille
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
pp. 68-88
Author(s):  
A. E. Shastitko ◽  
K. A. Ionkina

The paper defines the features of the collective dominance institute in Russia as well as the relation between collective dominance and oligopoly in the spheres of law and economic theory. The article evaluates the grounds and consequences of the collective dominance legal norm application; it suggests an approach to examining the relation between effects and expected results of this legal norm application and outlines the potential ways to harmonize the best international practices of the collective dominance norm application with the existing economic standards of product market analysis for the purpose of competition law enforcement. Results of the oligopoly theory and the Russian version of collective dominance institution key elements comparison show: the collective dominance institution concept is inadequately applied to identify individual abuse of dominant position due to possible law enforcement errors. The Russian version of collective dominance institution reflects one fundamental tendency intrinsic to Russian antitrust: examined more closely, law enforcement, which is de jure aimed at protecting competition, appears to be economic regulation, which de facto can lead to competition restriction. One of the possible structural alternatives for the collective dominance institution reforming is based on presumption of the need to analyze the joint impact exerted by a group of undertakings on the market.


Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter describes how competition law addresses oligopoly, tacit collusion and collective dominance. This chapter is concerned with the related topics of oligopoly, tacit collusion and collective dominance. Oligopoly exists where a few firms between them supply all or most of the goods or services on a market without any of them having a clear ascendancy over the others. This chapter begins with discussion of the theory of oligopolistic interdependence and of the possible ways of dealing with the ‘oligopoly problem’. It then considers the extent to which Articles 101 and 102 can be used to address that problem. The chapter also discusses UK law and, in particular, the possible use of market investigations to address market failure that may arise in oligopolies.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document