Chimera of domestic antitrust: Institute of collective dominance in Russia

The paper defines the features of the collective dominance institute in Russia as well as the relation between collective dominance and oligopoly in the spheres of law and economic theory. The article evaluates the grounds and consequences of the collective dominance legal norm application; it suggests an approach to examining the relation between effects and expected results of this legal norm application and outlines the potential ways to harmonize the best international practices of the collective dominance norm application with the existing economic standards of product market analysis for the purpose of competition law enforcement. Results of the oligopoly theory and the Russian version of collective dominance institution key elements comparison show: the collective dominance institution concept is inadequately applied to identify individual abuse of dominant position due to possible law enforcement errors. The Russian version of collective dominance institution reflects one fundamental tendency intrinsic to Russian antitrust: examined more closely, law enforcement, which is de jure aimed at protecting competition, appears to be economic regulation, which de facto can lead to competition restriction. One of the possible structural alternatives for the collective dominance institution reforming is based on presumption of the need to analyze the joint impact exerted by a group of undertakings on the market.

HARMFUL SIGNALS: CARTEL PROHIBITION AND OLIGOPOLY THEORY IN THE AGE OF MACHINE LEARNING

The traditional legal approach for distinguishing between illicit collusion and legitimate oligopoly conduct is to rely on criteria that relate to the means and form of how rivals interact, such as elements of “practical cooperation”, or on the finding of an anticompetitive intent. These criteria ultimately refer to the inner sphere of natural persons and its emanations in communicative acts. Some authors therefore conclude that the cartel prohibition of Article 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) or Section 1 of the U.S. Sherman Act is unable to capture collusion if it is achieved by autonomously acting computers relying on machine learning capabilities. It is instead suggested here to define collusion as parallel informational signals, which achieve a supracompetitive equilibrium, and to use the consumer welfare standard as a proxy for distinguishing between illicit collusion and legitimate oligopoly conduct. This approach is not tantamount to the idea of prohibiting tacit collusion as such. Rather, it is to check singular elements of communication, that is, “informational signals”, within an existing oligopolistic setting for their propensity to create consumer harm. This approach can help to close potential regulatory gaps currently associated with the surge of algorithmic pricing.

Zoltek

In 1996, the St. Louis-based manufacturer Zoltek launched a massive expansion of capacity to produce commercial-grade carbon fiber, a composite material used to produce a wide variety of end products ranging from sporting goods to windmill blades. Zoltek's goal was to become the dominant firm in a market whose growth was expected to be spectacular starting in the late 1990s. Describes Zoltek's major strategic moves in the mid-1990s and provides a possible example of the Stackelberg leadership model from oligopoly theory.To explore the economic logic of a major capacity commitment.

THE ORIGIN OF THE SYLOS POSTULATE: MODIGLIANI’S AND SYLOS LABINI’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO OLIGOPOLY THEORY

Paolo Sylos Labini’s Oligopoly Theory and Technical Progress (1957) is considered one of the major contributions to entry-prevention models, especially after Franco Modigliani’s formalization. Nonetheless, Modigliani neglected Sylos Labini’s aim when reviewing his work (1958), particularly his demonstration of the dynamic relation between industrial concentration and economic development. Modigliani addressed only Sylos Labini’s microeconomic analysis and the determination of the long-run equilibrium price and output, concentrating on the role played by firms’ anticipations. By doing so he shifted attention from Sylos Labini’s objective analysis to a subjective approach to the oligopoly problem. This paper discusses Sylos Labini’s and Modigliani’s differing approaches, derives the origin of the Sylos postulate, and sets Modigliani’s interpretation of Sylos Labini’s oligopoly theory in the context of his 1950s research into firms’ behavior under uncertainty.

The Behavior of the Post-Crises Indonesian Banking Industry (An Analysis Based on Oligopoly Theory and Dynamic Panel Data Econometrics)

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