scholarly journals Ambiguity, Monetary Policy, and Trend Inflation

Author(s):  
Riccardo M Masolo ◽  
Francesca Monti

ABSTRACT Allowing for ambiguity about the behavior of the policymaker in a simple New-Keynesian model gives rise to wedges between long-run inflation expectations, trend inflation, and the inflation target. The degree of ambiguity we measure in Blue Chip survey data helps explain the dynamics of long-run inflation expectations and the inflation trend measured in the US data. Ambiguity also has implications for monetary policy. We show that it is optimal for policymakers to lean against the households’ pessimistic expectations, but also document the limits to the extent the adverse effects of ambiguity can be undone.

2014 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 679-739 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guido Ascari ◽  
Argia M. Sbordone

Most macroeconomic models for monetary policy analysis are approximated around a zero inflation steady state, but most central banks target an inflation rate of about 2 percent. Many economists have recently proposed even higher inflation targets to reduce the incidence of the zero lower bound constraint on monetary policy. In this survey, we show that the conduct of monetary policy should be analyzed by appropriately accounting for the positive trend inflation targeted by policymakers. We first review empirical research on the evolution and dynamics of U.S. trend inflation and some proposed new measures to assess the volatility and persistence of trend-based inflation gaps. We then construct a Generalized New Keynesian model that accounts for a positive trend inflation. In this model, an increase in trend inflation is associated with a more volatile and unstable economy and tends to destabilize inflation expectations. This analysis offers a note of caution regarding recent proposals to address the existing zero lower bound problem by raising the long-run inflation target. (JEL E12, E31, E32, E52, E58)


2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Cogley ◽  
Giorgio E. Primiceri ◽  
Thomas J. Sargent

We estimate vector autoregressions with drifting coefficients and stochastic volatility to investigate whether US inflation persistence has changed. We focus on the inflation gap, defined as the difference between inflation and trend inflation, and we measure persistence in terms of short- to medium-term predictability. We present evidence that inflation-gap persistence increased during the Great Inflation and that it fell after the Volcker disinflation. We interpret these changes using a dynamic new Keynesian model that highlights the importance of changes in the central bank's inflation target. (JEL E12, E31, E52, E58)


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 142-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael U. Krause ◽  
Stéphane Moyen

What are the effects of a higher central bank inflation target on the burden of real public debt? Several recent proposals have suggested that even a moderate increase in the inflation target can have a pronounced effect on real public debt. We consider this question in a New Keynesian model with a maturity structure of public debt and an imperfectly observed inflation target. We find that moderate changes in the inflation target only have significant effects on real public debt if they are essentially permanent. Moreover, the additional benefits of not communicating a change in the inflation target are minor. (JEL E12, E31, E52, H63)


2017 ◽  
Vol 62 (01) ◽  
pp. 87-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
PIOTR CIŻKOWICZ ◽  
ANDRZEJ RZOŃCAZ

We survey the possible costs of the unconventional monetary policy measures undertaken by major central banks after the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008. We argue that these costs are not easily discernable in the new Keynesian (NK) model, which defines a theoretical framework for monetary policy. First, the costs may result from the effects of unconventional monetary policy measures on the intensity of restructuring and the persistence of uncertainty (which increased after the outbreak of the crisis). However, neither of these processes is considered in the new Keynesian model. Second, costs may be generated not only by distortions in the choices made by economic agents but may also be a result of the decisions made by governments, particularly in terms of the fiscal deficit level. However, the new Keynesian model does not consider the effects of unconventional monetary policy measures on the quality of fiscal policy. Without carefully considering the costs, there is a significant risk that unconventional monetary policy measures could become a conventional response to recurrent crises.


2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (1) ◽  
pp. 618-624 ◽  
Author(s):  
Troy Davig ◽  
Eric M Leeper

Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2009) (FWZ) show that a new Keynesian model with regime-switching monetary policy can support multiple solutions, appearing to contradict findings in Davig and Leeper (2007) (DL). The explanation is straightforward: FWZ derive solutions using a model that differs from the one to which the DL conditions apply. The FWZ solutions also require that the exogenous driving process is a function of private and policy parameters. This undermines the sharp distinctions among “deep parameters” typical of optimizing models and makes it difficult to ascribe economic interpretations to FWZ's additional solutions. (E12, E31, E43, E52)


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierpaolo Benigno ◽  
Gauti B. Eggertsson ◽  
Federica Romei

This paper proposes a postcrisis New Keynesian model that incorporates agent heterogeneity in borrowing and lending with a minimum set of assumptions. Unlike the standard framework, this model makes the natural rate of interest endogenous and dependent on macroeconomic policy. The main application is to study optimal monetary policy at the zero lower bound (ZLB). Such policy succeeds in raising the natural rate of interest by creating an environment that speeds up deleveraging and thus endogenously shortens the crisis and the duration of binding ZLB. Inflation should be front-loaded and should overshoot its long-term target during the ZLB episode. (JEL E12, E31, E32, E43, E52)


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