scholarly journals Knowledge as Property Rights Under the Ratchet Effect of Innovation

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (5) ◽  
pp. 2677-2714 ◽  
Author(s):  
Teck Yong Tan

Abstract This paper studies how reduced oversight creates an incentive for process innovation. With incomplete contracts, tight monitoring of workers creates a ratchet effect of innovation. Under reduced oversight, a worker accrues private knowledge about his innovation, which serves as a substitute for its inalienable property rights. The resulting asymmetric information generates an information rent for the worker, which feeds back as an innovation incentive ex ante. A weak early production incentive is required to complement it. Innovations are generally underutilized ex post, and mildly successful innovations are not distinguished from failed innovation attempts.

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 525-551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jooho Lee

ABSTRACTEntrepreneurs should act as stewards of entrepreneurial rent. Entrepreneurial rent is the difference between the ex post value of a venture and its ex ante costs. It is the result of competition among buyers and sellers within the market process rather than the sole efforts of the entrepreneur. As a result, entrepreneurs should allocate entrepreneurial rent for the benefit of other market participants rather than consuming it for themselves. The moral obligation to steward entrepreneurial rent is consistent with traditional bases of property rights and the norm of social welfare maximization, and it applies to corporations and their shareholders, as well as individual entrepreneurs.


2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 692-707 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kojun Hamada

This article theoretically investigates how different ownership structures of patents affect ex ante and ex post incentives for innovation by applying a property rights approach. We explore a model in which two research laboratories invest in R&D to obtain an innovative patent, and after successfully obtaining the patent they determine an ownership structure for the patent. The two parties consider how the determined patent ownership would affect their noncontractible relation-specific investments for commercialisation. We demonstrate that joint ownership of a patent between two parties is optimal. More concretely, if a selfish (altruistic) relation-specific investment is more important than an altruistic (selfish) investment, a joint ownership with no (bilateral) veto is optimal to maximise the joint value. Moreover, when both parties do not commit themselves to joint ownership in advance, they have greater incentive to invest in R&D than committing, even if they understand that joint ownership is desirable ex post.


Author(s):  
Susheng Wang

In a model with internal and external risks together with incentive problems, this paper investigates the role of a risky environment on contractual incompleteness. We consider a typical employment contract with an extra control option. This option is contractable ex ante, exercisable ex post, and good for incentives. But, the employer may choose not to have it in a contract. We identify some interesting circumstances under which the option is not in the optimal contract. Our main findings are that (1) external risks determine contractual incompleteness, and (2) a complete contract can better handle incentives, while an incomplete contract can better handle external risks. Hence, our analysis of incomplete contracts is somewhat consistent with Williamson's (1985) idea of low-powered incentives inside the firm and high-powered incentives outside the firm.


2021 ◽  
pp. 001573252098151
Author(s):  
Tanu M. Goyal

International trade agreements are incomplete contracts. The international environment is non-stationary, and technological progress affects both the nature of services and modes of service delivery. This creates uncertainty about future developments in technology-based services. In the presence of transactions costs and due to limited foresight, it is difficult to specify all contingencies within trade agreements ex ante, resulting in contractual incompleteness. This article investigates the design of India’s services agreements to assess the approach followed while listing the ex ante commitment and its implication on technology-based services. It also discusses the ex post mechanism under these agreements to address the gaps in the commitments with respect to new services, and the enforcement mechanism to facilitate the inclusion of these services. It is found that India’s bilateral agreements leave the inclusion of services that may not be technically feasible, ex ante, at the discretion of the trading partners, ex post. Some of India’s agreements also institute a governance mechanism for facilitating this inclusion. The article argues that there is a need for addressing the issue of technology uncertainty both at an international-trade-policy level and under bilateral agreements. Internationally, efforts are underway for a technology-neutral classification of services. Bilateral agreements must include a robust mechanism within the scope of the Agreement for filling gaps that may arise with technological advancements. For furthering the objective of trade agreements, these mechanisms must be backed by sound governance structure. JEL Codes: L80, L84, L86, F13, K33, F53, F55


CFA Digest ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 8-9
Author(s):  
Ann C. Logue
Keyword(s):  
Ex Post ◽  

1993 ◽  
Vol 108 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-138
Author(s):  
Pierre Malgrange ◽  
Silvia Mira d'Ercole
Keyword(s):  
Ex Post ◽  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document