Learning to Deal with Rejection: The International Criminal Court and the United States

2004 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
w. M. Reisman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Criminal Court

The United States, the International Criminal Court, and Afghanistan: The Rupturing of Mutual Accommodation

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1068-1107
Author(s):  
Kevin S. Robb ◽  
Shan Patel
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
National Security ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Strategic Approach ◽  
Chief Prosecutor ◽  
The U.S

Abstract In September 2018, then U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton delivered a speech that ushered in a new, more aggressive era of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis the International Criminal Court (icc). Washington’s disapprobation over the icc’s interest in the alleged crimes of U.S. personnel in Afghanistan has been seen as the cause for this change. While this is certainly partly true, little attention has been paid to Fatou Bensouda’s prosecutorial behaviour as an explanatory factor. Using the framework from David Bosco’s Rough Justice, this article demonstrates that a distinct shift in prosecutorial behaviour occurred when Fatou Bensouda took over as Chief Prosecutor. In contrast to Luis Moreno Ocampo’s strategic approach, avoidant of U.S. interests, Bensouda’s apolitical approach directly challenged the U.S. This shift in prosecutorial behaviour ruptured the ‘mutual accommodation’ that previously characterised the icc-U.S. relationship and, in turn, produced the shift in U.S. policy that now marginalises the Court.

The United States and the International Criminal Court: Avoiding Jurisdiction Through Bilateral Agreements in Reliance on Article 98

2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 1-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Bogdan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Legislative History ◽  
Bilateral Agreements ◽  
General Obligation ◽  
History Of ◽  
Treaty Interpretation

AbstractState-parties to the International Criminal Court Statute have a general obligation to cooperate with the Court. The duty to cooperate represents the functional cornerstone of the Court's existence. A narrow exception to this duty is contained in Article 98 of the Statute, which provides for limited circumstances in which the Court must refrain from seeking a surrender of an individual to the Court. Following rules of treaty interpretation, as well as an examination of the legislative history of the ICC Statute, the article explores the scope of Article 98, the provision the United States relied on in concluding a series of bilateral agreements that are primarily aimed at preventing the surrender of any U.S. nationals to the ICC. The article considers the issue of what impact, if any, the agreements have in the context of extradition, and the U.S.' legal ability to fulfill the commitments made in the "Article 98" agreements.

Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 573-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUDITH KELLEY
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Not Given ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
International Commitments ◽  
The Creation

What do countries do when they have committed to a treaty, but then find that commitment challenged? After the creation of the International Criminal Court, the United States tried to get countries, regardless of whether they were parties to the Court or not, to sign agreements not to surrender Americans to the Court. Why did some states sign and others not? Given United States power and threats of military sanctions, some states did sign. However, such factors tell only part of the story. When refusing to sign, many states emphasized the moral value of the court. Further, states with a high domestic rule of law emphasized the importance of keeping their commitment. This article therefore advances two classic arguments that typically are difficult to substantiate; namely, state preferences are indeed partly normative, and international commitments do not just screen states; they also constrain.

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