Part IV Vitiation, 13 Duress

Author(s):  
Andrews Neil

A coerced agreement can be set aside, in accordance with a Common Law doctrine of duress which has acquired generality during the last fifty years (although it remains customary to divide the topic into three sectors, duress as to person, duress as to goods, and economic duress, that is the threat to break a contract). The four elements of duress are: (i) pressure or a threat; (ii) which is (a) unlawful or (b) illegitimate (despite being lawful); (iii) objectively there was enough pressure so that the coerced party’s submission was not an instance of undue fragility; and instead the coerced party had no real or practical choice other than to submit; and (iv) the coerced party was in fact induced by the duress to enter the contract or agree to its variation or termination. The current controversy is when a threat to do something which is lawful can be characterized as ‘illegitimate’.

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 326-337
Author(s):  
Steve Hedley

In this article, Professor Steve Hedley offers a Common Law response to he recently published arguments of Professor Nils Jansen on the German law of unjustified enrichment (as to which, see Jansen, “Farewell to Unjustified Enrichment” (2016) 20 EdinLR 123). The author takes the view that Jansen's paper provided a welcome opportunity to reconsider not merely what unjust enrichment can logically be, but what it is for. He argues that unjust enrichment talk contributes little of value, and that the supposedly logical process of stating it at a high level of abstraction, and then seeking to deduce the law from that abstraction, merely distracts lawyers from the equities of the cases they consider.


2000 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
WDH Sellar

This article is the revised text of the lecture delivered to the Stair Society at its Annual General Meeting in November 1997. It defends the proposition that Scots law, from the time of its emergence in the Middle Ages, has been a “mixed” system, open to the influence of both the English Common Law and the Civilian tradition. It also compares and contrasts the Reception of the Anglo-Norman law with that of Roman law. The former was quite specific as regards both time and substantive legal content. The Reception of Roman law, on the other hand, took place over a considerable period of time, and its effects were complex and diffuse. Above all, the Civilian tradition and the wider ius commune provided an intellectual framework against which to measure Scots law. Both Receptions exercised a profound influence on the continuing development of Scots law.


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