Scots Law: Mixed from the Very Beginning? A Tale of Two Receptions

2000 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
WDH Sellar

This article is the revised text of the lecture delivered to the Stair Society at its Annual General Meeting in November 1997. It defends the proposition that Scots law, from the time of its emergence in the Middle Ages, has been a “mixed” system, open to the influence of both the English Common Law and the Civilian tradition. It also compares and contrasts the Reception of the Anglo-Norman law with that of Roman law. The former was quite specific as regards both time and substantive legal content. The Reception of Roman law, on the other hand, took place over a considerable period of time, and its effects were complex and diffuse. Above all, the Civilian tradition and the wider ius commune provided an intellectual framework against which to measure Scots law. Both Receptions exercised a profound influence on the continuing development of Scots law.

Author(s):  
Thomas Kuehn

The period between the mid-14th and the mid-17th centuries saw the consolidation of both major European legal traditions. One was based on Roman and canon law and held sway as a common law (ius commune) on much of the European Continent. The other was rooted in royal writs and judgments that constituted the “common law” of England. The Romano-canonical law was based on venerable texts, chiefly those of the Corpus iuris civilis, compiled at the behest of the Emperor Justinian in the early 6th century, and the Corpus iuris canonici, assembled in the course of the Middle Ages by legal teachers and popes, with the process of assembly ending in the early 14th century. These texts served as the basis for a highly sophisticated and technical education in law in the medieval universities of Italy and southern France, whose graduates spread throughout Europe. The establishment of new universities from the 14th century—in Italy but also spreading to Germany, Spain, and elsewhere—only served to foster the geographical reach of the Romano-canonical law. This was also the point at which the teaching methods in the universities changed from the logical elaboration of authoritative texts (the so-called school of the glossators) in the direction of contemporary issues and practices (the era of the post-glossators and commentators). The greatest exponent of this trend was Bartolus of Sassoferrato (b. 1313–d. 1357), whose influence was such that it was said that to be a jurist was to be a “bartolist” (nemo iurista nisi bartolista) (see Jurisprudence and Legal Methodologies). The English law consisted of royal writs, Parliamentary statutes, customs, and precedents set in courts. These became in some regards increasingly rigid by the 14th and 15th centuries, but flexibility was introduced by means of the Royal Court of Chancery, which drew to some degree on Roman law notions. This was the so-called law of equity. The influence of royal courts and their remedies led to the waning of manorial and other local courts. The trend toward legal centralization in England was further fueled by the Crown’s break with Catholicism. By the 17th century the common law tradition, including much of the intervening developments in equity, served as the bastion of those who would resist the pretensions of the Stuart monarchs, especially Charles I (b. 1600–d. 1649). Developments in the commercial economy of Europe, intellectual and cultural trends, and religious turmoil would all pose problems in areas such as property law, contracts, marital relations and family prerogatives, and judicial procedures, and would call forth adjustments to resolve them.


Author(s):  
Emanuele Conte

In this article I wish to show how history of legal doctrines can assist in a better understanding of the legal reasoning over a long historical period. First I will describe the nineteenth century discussion on the definition of law as a ‘science’, and some influences of the medieval idea of science on the modern definition. Then, I’ll try to delve deeper into a particular doctrinal problem of the Middle Ages: how to fit the feudal relationship between lord and vassal into the categories of Roman law. The scholastic interpretation of these categories is very original, to the point of framing a purely personal relationship among property rights. The effort made by medieval legal culture to frame the reality into the abstract concepts of law can be seen as the birth of legal dogmatics.


1953 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 378-388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Tierney

Maitland once observed that, in the Middle Ages, “Law was the point where life and logic met.” This aphorism of the master must serve as my apology for including in one essay two topics so diverse, according to some opinions, as abstract political theory and concrete constitutional problems. It may be that the mediaeval jurists can provide a link between the two spheres, for their reflections on mediaeval government were not mere philosophical abstractions. They were rooted in real life. An essential ingredient of the jurists' raw material was a practical experience of the workings of mediaeval society. It is not surprising, therefore, that eminent historians on both sides of the Atlantic have called attention to the need for legal studies as a basis for further advance in mediaeval constitutional research, and that, in recent years, we have heard a great deal about the importance of feudal law and folk law, of Roman law and English common law in the formation of mediaeval ideas and institutions. My task will be to state briefly the case for the canonists.


2000 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-53
Author(s):  
Raoul van Caenegem

Medieval lawsuits from the highest courts of England and France show the concern of authorities for even minor issues involving ordinary people – a democratic and modern trait. In comparing the English Court of Common Pleas to the Parlement of Paris, it can be seen that classical Roman law made a great impact on France, while the English Court ignored Roman law and applied English customary law and acts of Parliament. The Parlement of Paris also had to apply local customs, but its judges had all studied Roman and no customary law at the university; however, for political reasons they were not allowed to refer openly to the Roman law in which they had been educated. The jury was a major medieval contribution to modern democratic thinking, as was the political idea that matters concerning the whole community ought to be decided by all its members. The American power-sharing system, between President and Congress, continues the late medieval balance between King and Parliament. English common law was one of the great creations of the Middle Ages and the only system of comparable importance is continental civil law (with Germanic and Roman roots). This paper considers the chances of the elaboration in the 21st century of a common European law combining elements from both traditions.


Author(s):  
Reinhard Zimmermann

What is today referred to as ‘compulsory portion’ or ‘forced heirship’ was subject to a very complex regulation in Roman law. The development went from family succession to freedom of testation and subsequently led to the establishment of a balance between the testator’s freedom of disposition over his property and the ‘natural claims’ of his closest relatives to benefit at least to some extent from the estate. In the process, the Roman lawyers developed a number of interesting ideas, among them, in particular, protection of descendants by means of form requirements; the availability of a querela inofficiosi testamenti (complaint concerning an undutiful will); and the establishment of a minimum quota to which a testator had to appoint his closest relatives (‘legitima’) as well as the introduction of an actio ad supplendam legitimam for cases where the testator had failed to do so. Justinian also saw the necessity to provide for the testator’s widow; she could, under certain circumstances, demand one quarter of the estate by way of statutory legacy. Unfortunately, Justinian, in his Novel 115, failed in his attempt to simplify and streamline the law. From its inception in the High Middle Ages, therefore, legal scholarship based on the ius commune was faced with considerable difficulties in the application of the Roman rules.


2001 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 130-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
William M Gordon

This article is a revised version of an address given at the Annual General Meeting of the Stair Society on 6 November 1999. It explores three issues relating to the use of the Civil Law in Scotland. The first is the distinction to be drawn between Roman Law and the Civil Law and the use that can be made of the Civil Law as distinct from Roman Law. The second is the issue of reception of another legal system, the reception of the Civil Law in Scotland in particular, and the countervailing influence of English law. The third is the place of Roman Law and the Civil Law in legal education in Scotland.


Global Jurist ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Luigi Crema

Abstract The possibility for private entities interested in international trials but without the legal requirements to participate as a party was precluded, in a classical vision of international law made for states and addressed to states. At present, however, with some notable exceptions, several international jurisdictions allow for the submission of amicus curiae briefs. These briefs were introduced to international courts by common law lawyers. Legal literature generally identifies it as an institution of classical Roman law. This paper will show that this assumption is, however, doubtful. An examination of the sources cited by an important dictionary and other decades-old legal scholarship relied upon today as establishing the Roman origins of amicus curiae, and a fresh study of Roman and later continental European primary sources reveal a different picture: in reality, there is neither a basis for grounding the amicus curiae in Roman law, nor is there a basis for grounding it in the medieval continental ius commune. The primary source is most likely English common law and, not surprisingly, it was common law lawyers who introduced the briefs into international litigation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-37
Author(s):  
Paulina Święcicka

The history and formation of the European legal culture that had been developing and taking shape since the Middle Ages when universalism manifested itself as ius commune and seemed to be a satisfactory solution, has been marked with the appearance of a trend called ‘legal humanism’ which developed in response to the humanistic Renaissance postulates. While humanism itself pertained to arts and science of the Renaissance period, legal humanism that emerged centuries later, challenged the medieval interpretation of Justinian texts and postulated the rejection of the mos italicus methods described as praemitto, scindo, summo casumque figuro – praelego, casus, commodo, obiicio (Math. Grib. De meth, 3.94-98). The supporters of the new humanistic jurisprudence advocated recognition of Roman law as an element of the research into the Antiquity. As a result, ancient texts underwent a certain ‘purification’ and were subsequently used for the teaching of Roman law based on subsequent „Glosses and Commentaries”. Critical reviews of the fundamental sources of law as well as the first translations of till then unknown Greek texts were also attempted. That all was possible because the jurists of that new era had a much more comprehensible education and linguistic skills and were able to read texts in Greek and finally break away with the medieval impasse Graeca sunt, non leguntur, going beyond the „judicial Bible” of the compilation of Justinian texts only, searching for new and often multi-aspect meanings and a true understanding of the Ancient World. This new approach to Roman law had also changed the attitude to legal studies which ceased to be seen as merely updating the existing laws i.e. serving the practice. Roman law was finally recognised as a historic phenomenon, a product of its times that evolved together with the changing world, and the study of Roman law became an aim and objective of its own. Such an approach quickly found followers in all Western Europe and replaced the exegetic commentaries with a new form – a treaty that compared the theory of law with the existing laws on the basis of its historic context. An author of a legal academic paper was no longer a mere executor and commentator of ius scriptum, but, being a jurist of humanistic views, transformed into a searcher of pure law, an expert of both the Antiquity and the contemporary World. As François Baudouin put it: sine historia caeca est iurisprudentia (De Institutione historiae universae, I, 609).


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Woelki

In medieval legal commentaries, comparisons of religions served—above all—as an egress from structural imbalance: numerous regulations pertaining to Jews and heretics are contrasted by only a few regulations regarding Gentiles and Muslims. Lawyers applied three main criteria of comparison: a dogmatic proximity to Christianity; a weighing up of the guilt of sin; and the implications for the social order. Depending on the criterion, the results of these comparisons could be varied. The dogmatic proximity of Judaism to Christianity and the social compatibility of Jewish with Christian life continued to be emphasized until early modern times. The privileged position of the Jews, inherited from Roman law, was however ultimately replaced by a comparatively better social position of the Muslims. In the process, fragments of theological discourse were selectively adopted. A special dynamic of legal development can be observed on the Iberian peninsula in particular.


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