scholarly journals The Rationally Supererogatory

Mind ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 129 (515) ◽  
pp. 917-938
Author(s):  
Claire Benn ◽  
Adam Bales

Abstract The notion of supererogation—going above and beyond the call of duty—is typically discussed in a moral context. However, in this paper we argue for the existence of rationally supererogatory actions: that is, actions that go above and beyond the call of rational duty. In order to establish the existence of such actions, we first need to overcome the so-called paradox of supererogation: we need to provide some explanation for why, if some act is rationally optimal, it is not the case that we are rationally required to carry out that act. We argue that a response to this ‘paradox’ can be found by reflecting on normative conflicts: cases where what is best according to some normative domain is different from what is best according to some other normative domain.

1997 ◽  
Vol 42 (11) ◽  
pp. 990-991
Author(s):  
Isaac Prilleltensky

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Katharina Spälti ◽  
Mark John Brandt ◽  
Marcel Zeelenberg

People often have to make trade-offs. We study three types of trade-offs: 1) "secular trade-offs" where no moral or sacred values are at stake, 2) "taboo trade-offs" where sacred values are pitted against financial gain, and 3) "tragic trade-offs" where sacred values are pitted against other sacred values. Previous research (Critcher et al., 2011; Tetlock et al., 2000) demonstrated that tragic and taboo trade-offs are not only evaluated by their outcomes, but are also evaluated based on the time it took to make the choice. We investigate two outstanding questions: 1) whether the effect of decision time differs for evaluations of decisions compared to decision makers and 2) whether moral contexts are unique in their ability to influence character evaluations through decision process information. In two experiments (total N = 1434) we find that decision time affects character evaluations, but not evaluations of the decision itself. There were no significant differences between tragic trade-offs and secular trade-offs, suggesting that the decisions structure may be more important in evaluations than moral context. Additionally, the magnitude of the effect of decision time shows us that decision time, may be of less practical use than expected. We thus urge, to take a closer examination of the processes underlying decision time and its perception.


1995 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 496-517
Author(s):  
Abdullah Saeed

The prohibition of riba (interest) in Islam has been a hotly discussedissue among contemporary Muslims since the 1960s. Since rihd is perceivedby a considerable number of Muslims to be bank interest, andalmost all banking systems in the world, including those of the Muslimworld, are based on interest, many Muslims are concerned whether it islawful. For those who regard bank interest as rihd, any increase in a loantransaction over and above the principal is rihd because it involves anincrease over and above the principal. They contend that the fiqhi interpretationof riba is the interpretation and must be followed. For otherMuslims, the prohibition of riba is related closely to the “exploitation” ofthe needy and poor by the relatively well-off, an element that, for them,may or may not exist in modem bank interest. These Muslims have arguedthat the fiqhi interpretation given to riha is inadequate and does not takeinto consideration the moral emphasis associated with the prohibition.This paper looks at a) the overall context of the Qur’anic prohibitionof rihd; b) how the term is used in the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and in thefiqhlliterature; and c) the lack of moral emphasis in the current debate.Riba and the Qur’an: The Context of ProhibitionThe Qur’an’s condemnation and ultimate prohibition of riba was precededby its condemnation of several other morally unacceptable forms ofbehavior toward the socially and economically weaker strata of theMakkan community. From the very beginning of the Prophet’s mission, ...


Author(s):  
John Oberdiek

Chapter 2 takes up the complex task of formulating a conception of risk that can meet the twin desiderata of practicality and normativity. Though neither an unreconstructed subjective nor objective account of risk can, on its own, play the role we need it to play in a moral context, the accounts can be combined to take advantage of their respective strengths. Much of the chapter is therefore devoted to explaining how to overcome this recalibrated perspective-indifference. The chapter defends the perspective of a particular interpretation of the reasonable person, well-known from tort law, as a way of bringing determinacy to the characterization of risk. Defending this evidence-relative perspective while criticizing competing belief- and fact-relative perspectives, the chapter argues that it has the resources to meet the twin desiderata of practicality and normativity.


Author(s):  
Robin Banerjee ◽  
Gail D. Heyman ◽  
Kang Lee

Children come to recognize that the impressions one makes on other people can be controlled and managed. In this chapter, the authors situate the development of such “self-presentation” in the moral context, with attention to a range of relevant social, cultural, cognitive, motivational, and emotional processes. Children’s appreciation of self-presentational tactics such as self-promotion, modesty, and ingratiation is reviewed before turning specifically to the factors involved in deception and truth-telling. The authors analyze the emergence of children’s self-presentational competencies in shaping both their own individual reputations and the reputations of the social groups with which they identify, especially in contexts where moral and social-conventional rules have been transgressed. Key goals for future research that illuminates the nature and implications of children’s moral self-presentation are identified.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig A. Harper ◽  
Darren Rhodes

The moral foundations theory (MFT) is an influential multifactorial model that posits how decision-making in the moral context originates from a set of six intuitive moral foundations: care, fairness, authority, loyalty, purity, and liberty. The established measure of these foundations – the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) – has been used extensively in a range of empirical projects. However, recent analyses of its factor structure and the internal consistency of the each of the foundation clusters have called its validity into question. In this paper, data from a large sample of British voters was used to re-examine the component structure of the MFQ. As opposed to a six-component structure, only three meaningful clusters emerged in an exploratory principal components analysis (Study 1; N = 428): traditionalism, compassion, and liberty. This structure was broadly confirmed in an independent sample (Study 2; N = 322). Concurrent validity was established via correlations with measures of ‘social change’ and ‘systemic inequality’ insecurities (Study 1) and voting behavior and preferences (Study 2). Significant differences on each of the three components of the revised MFQ (MFQ-r) were observed between the voters of different political parties (Study 1) and sides of the Brexit issue (Study 2). Implications for moral foundations theory and its measurement are discussed.


Studia Logica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 108 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-83
Author(s):  
Albert Anglberger ◽  
Johannes Korbmacher
Keyword(s):  

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