The Prospects of a Theory of Criminal Culpability: Mens Rea and Methodological Doubt

1994 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. LAING
1980 ◽  
Vol 25 (7) ◽  
pp. 524-525
Author(s):  
SALEEM A. SHAH
Keyword(s):  

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nidhi Vaidya ◽  
Raghvendra Singh Raghuvanshi
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Gideon Yaffe

This chapter offers and defends a theory of criminal culpability according to which to be criminally culpable for a wrongful act is for the act to manifest faulty dispositions for recognizing, weighing, or responding to the legal reasons to refrain from the act. The chapter clarifies this position by explaining what such dispositions are, what it is for them to be faulty, and the conditions under which they are manifested in an act. Under the position presented here, there is a distinction between criminal culpability and moral culpability corresponding to the distinction between legal and moral reasons to refrain from an act. The chapter also distinguishes the view proposed from both character theories of responsibility and quality of will theories.


Author(s):  
Richard Holton

This paper develops an account of core criminal terms like ‘murder’ that parallels Williamson’s account of knowledge. It is argued that while murder requires that the murderer killed, and that they did so with a certain state of mind, murder cannot be regarded as the conjunction of these two elements (the action, the actus reus, and the associated mental element, the mens rea). Rather, murder should be seen as a primitive notion, which entails each of them. This explains some of the problems around criminal attempt. Attempted murder cannot be seen simply as involving the state of mind of murder minus success; rather, it has to be seen as a self-standing offence, that of attempting to commit the murder.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (S4) ◽  
pp. 112-118
Author(s):  
Joseph Blocher ◽  
Bardia Vaseghi

Does the Second Amendment protect those who threaten others by negligently or recklessly wielding firearms? What line separates constitutionally legitimate gun displays from threatening activities that can be legally proscribed? This article finds guidance in the First Amendment doctrine of true threats, which permits punishment of “statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individual.” The Second Amendment, like the First, should not be read to protect those who threaten unlawful violence. And to the degree that the constitution requires a culpable mental state (mens rea) in such circumstances, the appropriate standard should be recklessness.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
Kevin Jon Heller

Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse, & Nzirorera. Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73(C). Decision on Prosecutor's Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice. At <http://www.ictr.org>.International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Appeals Chamber, June 16, 2006.In an interlocutory appeal in Prosecutor v. Karemera, the appeals chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) held that the commission of genocide against the Tutsis in 1994 is a “fact of common knowledge” of which trial chambers must take judicial notice (Appeals Decision, paras. 35, 38). The decision represents a significant reversal in ICTR practice: although some trial chambers have been willing to take notice of “widespread and systematic attacks” against Tutsis in Rwanda, they have uniformly insisted that the question of whether the attacks amounted to genocide is so fundamental that formal proof is required.As noted in the indictment, Edouard Karemera and Jospeh Nzirorera were minister-level officials in the Rwanda’ interim government (Indictment, paras. 1, 3) and served, along with Mathieu Ngirumpatse, as the national executive leadership of the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND) (id., para. 9). They are charged with, inter alia, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, genocide, and—alternatively—complicity in genocide (id.). The prosecution alleges that they created, recruited, and organized the Interahamwe, the vicious youth wing of the MRND; provided members of the Interahamwe with weapons and military training; and helped formulate and implement policies of the interim government of April 8, 1994, that were intended to incite, encourage, and abet killings of Tutsis (id., para. 14).


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