Political Purposes, Anti-entrenchment and Judicial Protection of the Democratic Process

The legality of decisions made for political purposes is a recurring issue in administrative law. In this article, it will be argued that generalisations should not be made about ‘political’ decisions as a single category. Instead, there are different types of political consideration, which raise different issues when assessing the legality of a decision. This article singles out a particular type of political decision for condemnation: decisions made to gain a political advantage by deliberately changing the systems of democratic accountability. Examples include the engineering of the electoral system to produce favourable results, the use of public power to punish critics and the use of public resources to publish partisan propaganda. The article will argue that the legality of such political decisions should not be assessed solely within the ordinary administrative law framework, but under a constitutional principle of anti-entrenchment and process protection.

On the Moral Impact Theory of Law

Mark Greenberg argues that legal obligations are those moral obligations created by the actions of legal institutions in the legally proper way (Moral Impact Theory of Law, MITL). Here I defend three main claims. First, I argue that, although very often misunderstood, Joseph Raz is also a defender of MITL. Secondly, I argue that while both Greenberg and Raz are committed to MITL, they disagree about the conditions under which a moral obligation can be said to be created in the legally proper way. Finally, I argue that Raz’s variant of MITL is better than Greenberg’s. It rests on a more plausible account of authority and it avoids one of the crucial defects threatening Greenberg’s view, namely, its overinclusiveness.

A New Philosophy for the Margin of Appreciation and European Consensus

The article advances an anti-foundationalist account of the key doctrines of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): the margin of appreciation (MoA) and European consensus (EuC). The first part of the article argues that anti-foundationalism, which understands the existence of human rights as ultimately dependent on social practices and their justification as based on a plurality of values, is a credible conception of human rights grounds. The second part contends that anti-foundationalism offers the best explanation of the MoA and EuC, without making the ECtHR’s practice less normatively appealing. These arguments challenge the dominant critiques of the MoA and EuC, which often assume, but rarely explicitly defend, a foundationalist understanding of human rights. While the ECtHR’s use of the MoA and EuC can be inadequate, this is not because it is mistaken about the grounds of human rights.

Between Constituent Power and Constituent Authority†

This review article offers a critical appraisal of Joel Colón-Ríos’s Constituent Power and the Law. It argues that while Colón-Ríos’s book is undoubtedly a major advance in scholarship on constituent power, it leaves the reader wanting more illumination in its treatment of the relationship between the descriptive and the normative dimensions of the concept.

A Written Constitution: A Case Not Made

Whether the UK needs a written constitution is a staple of British constitutional debates. Over the years, the fault lines have shifted from whether to incorporate a Bill of Rights to much deeper disagreement with respect to the people and the central power of the state. In this article I neither endorse the conservative case against a written constitution nor argue for the existing constitution to be codified. Instead, I first assess the content of various proposals for a written constitution. I then problematise the process of constitution making by asking not whether the UK constitution should be codified, but by relating the constitution to the people as the authors and to the state as its object.