scholarly journals International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda—genocide—conspiracy to commit genocide—complicity in genocide—mens rea—judicial notice

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
Kevin Jon Heller

Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse, & Nzirorera. Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73(C). Decision on Prosecutor's Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice. At <http://www.ictr.org>.International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Appeals Chamber, June 16, 2006.In an interlocutory appeal in Prosecutor v. Karemera, the appeals chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) held that the commission of genocide against the Tutsis in 1994 is a “fact of common knowledge” of which trial chambers must take judicial notice (Appeals Decision, paras. 35, 38). The decision represents a significant reversal in ICTR practice: although some trial chambers have been willing to take notice of “widespread and systematic attacks” against Tutsis in Rwanda, they have uniformly insisted that the question of whether the attacks amounted to genocide is so fundamental that formal proof is required.As noted in the indictment, Edouard Karemera and Jospeh Nzirorera were minister-level officials in the Rwanda’ interim government (Indictment, paras. 1, 3) and served, along with Mathieu Ngirumpatse, as the national executive leadership of the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND) (id., para. 9). They are charged with, inter alia, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, genocide, and—alternatively—complicity in genocide (id.). The prosecution alleges that they created, recruited, and organized the Interahamwe, the vicious youth wing of the MRND; provided members of the Interahamwe with weapons and military training; and helped formulate and implement policies of the interim government of April 8, 1994, that were intended to incite, encourage, and abet killings of Tutsis (id., para. 14).

2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed Elewa Badar

AbstractEven though more than a decade has passed since the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the law of the most fundamental concept in international criminal law – mens rea – remains unsettled. Through its jurisprudence, the Yugoslavia Tribunal has made enormous efforts to assign different degrees of mens rea for different categories of crimes under its Statute. The present study is an attempt to clarify several issues with regard to the law of mens rea as developed in the case law of the Yugoslavia Tribunal. Among these issues are the following: what precisely is to be understood by the terms "specific intent", "special intent", "dolus specialis", or "surplus intent"? Similarly, what are the precise meanings of the terms "deliberately", "intention", "intent", "intentionally", "wilful or wilfully", "knowledge", and "wanton" as provided for in the ICTY Statute or as employed by the Chambers within its judgments.


2002 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 623-639 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken Roberts

The various Trial Chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia have advanced potentially inconsistent definitions of the crime of persecution under Article 5 of the Tribunal's Statute. The Trial Chamber in the Krnojelac case, in attempting to reconcile these different approaches, has undertaken a comprehensive analysis both of the actus reus and mens rea elements constituting this offence. In the context of the Tribunal's jurisprudence, this article analyses these elements and briefly discusses other issues related to the crime of persecution.


2007 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 885-898 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nina HB Jørgensen

AbstractJudicial notice has become a widely used tool in the practice of international criminal tribunals but its use has always been constrained by the fair trial rights of the accused. This article considers the possible impact on those rights of the decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Appeals Chamber to take judicial notice of the genocide in Rwanda as a notorious fact against the backdrop of the legal requirements for judicial notice as a fact of common knowledge and as an adjudicated fact. The question whether it would have been more appropriate to notice the Rwandan genocide as an adjudicated fact is addressed in the context of the implications for other instances of genocide, for example Srebrenica.


1970 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Mohammed

The road to developing an international institutional capacity to prosecute crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide has been a long one, and has in many ways concluded with the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). By looking at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), as well as the ICC, this paper traces the evolution of the concept of individual criminal responsibility to its present incarnation. It argues that while the ICC presents its own unique ‘added value’ to the prosecution of international criminals, its application of justice continues to be biased by the influence of powerful states.


Author(s):  
William A. Schabas

Today’s elaborate system of international criminal justice originates in proposals at the end of the First World War to try Kaiser Wilhelm II before an international criminal tribunal. In the weeks following 11 November 1918, the British, French, and Italian Governments agreed on a trial. Lloyd George campaigned for re-election on the slogan ‘Hang the Kaiser’. The Kaiser had fled to the Netherlands, possibly after receiving signals from the Dutch Queen that he would be welcome. Renegade US soldiers led by a former Senator failed in a bizarre attempt to take him prisoner and bring him to Paris. During the Peace Conference, the Commission on Responsibilities brought international lawyers together for the first time to debate international criminal justice. They recommended trial of the Kaiser by an international tribunal for war crimes, but not for starting the war or violating Belgian neutrality. The Americans were opposed to any prosecution. However, President Wilson changed his mind and agreed to trial for a ‘supreme offence against international morality’. This became a clause in the Treaty of Versailles, one of the few that the Germans tried to resist. Although the Allies threatened a range of measures if the former Emperor was not surrendered, the Dutch refused and the demands were dropped in March 1920. The Kaiser lived out his life in a castle near Utrecht, dying of natural causes in June 1941. Hitler sent a wreath to the funeral.


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 1261-1278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Milan Kuhli ◽  
Klaus Günther

Without presenting a full definition, it can be said that the notion of judicial lawmaking implies the idea that courts create normative expectations beyond the individual case. That is, our question is whether courts' normative declarations have an effect which is abstract and general. Our purpose here is to ask about judicial lawmaking in this sense with respect to international criminal courts and tribunals. In particular, we will focus on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). No other international criminal court or tribunal has issued so many judgments as the ICTY, so it seems a particularly useful focus for examining the creation of normative expectations.


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