The Remainder

Author(s):  
Ori J. Herstein

This chapter suggests that we should question whether private law is genuinely about legal wrongs. It argues that the correction of wrongs ordinarily leaves a normative remainder. In morality, these remainders can provide, for example, reason for ongoing regret and remorse over one’s wrongdoing, and shows that corrective action taken subsequent to a wrong is, at most, a second-best way of responding to the reasons one has to comply with the violated moral duty. This chapter considers that the existence of a normative remainder is condition requisite to the characterization of faulty conduct as a wrong. It also claims that remainders must track the character of the wrong: moral wrongs leave moral remainders, and legal wrongs leave legal remainders. Thus, this chapter argues that whether private law is concerned with legal wrongs properly so-called depends on whether legal remedies leave a legal remainder. Doubting that such legal remainders obtain, the chapter raises a challenge to viewing private law as a law of legal wrongs.

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hironao KANEKO
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 547-594
Author(s):  
Spencer Bastani ◽  
Sören Blomquist ◽  
Luca Micheletto

Abstract We provide a full characterization of a two-type optimal nonlinear income tax model where the single-crossing condition is violated due to an assumption that agents differ both in terms of market abilities and in terms of their needs for a work-related good. We set up a Pareto-efficient tax problem and analyze the entire second-best Pareto-frontier, highlighting several non-standard results, such as the possibility of income re-ranking relative to the laissez-faire and gaps in the Pareto-frontier.


2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 479-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sinéad Agnew

AbstractThis article argues that the idea of conscience can play a useful, albeit limited and highly general, explanatory role in private law, if we have regard to two distinctive contexts in which it is used. First, it tells us something about how equitable obligations arise and reminds us that they directly enforce moral duties. Second, it conveys the message that the courts are reluctant to impose primary liabilities which restrict the exercise of legal rights absent a past or prospective breach of moral duty by the defendant. Without further explanation, the indiscriminate invocation of conscience in both contexts can lead to confusion and uncertainty, but if the distinction between obligation and liability is observed, the explanatory force of conscience in relation to each becomes clearer, and it plays a valuable role in bolstering the authority of private law.


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