Towards a Characterization of Second-Best Pure Strategy Solutions to a Smooth and Symmetric Partnership Problem

2002 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-454
Author(s):  
Dragan Filipovich
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 547-594
Author(s):  
Spencer Bastani ◽  
Sören Blomquist ◽  
Luca Micheletto

Abstract We provide a full characterization of a two-type optimal nonlinear income tax model where the single-crossing condition is violated due to an assumption that agents differ both in terms of market abilities and in terms of their needs for a work-related good. We set up a Pareto-efficient tax problem and analyze the entire second-best Pareto-frontier, highlighting several non-standard results, such as the possibility of income re-ranking relative to the laissez-faire and gaps in the Pareto-frontier.


Author(s):  
Ori J. Herstein

This chapter suggests that we should question whether private law is genuinely about legal wrongs. It argues that the correction of wrongs ordinarily leaves a normative remainder. In morality, these remainders can provide, for example, reason for ongoing regret and remorse over one’s wrongdoing, and shows that corrective action taken subsequent to a wrong is, at most, a second-best way of responding to the reasons one has to comply with the violated moral duty. This chapter considers that the existence of a normative remainder is condition requisite to the characterization of faulty conduct as a wrong. It also claims that remainders must track the character of the wrong: moral wrongs leave moral remainders, and legal wrongs leave legal remainders. Thus, this chapter argues that whether private law is concerned with legal wrongs properly so-called depends on whether legal remedies leave a legal remainder. Doubting that such legal remainders obtain, the chapter raises a challenge to viewing private law as a law of legal wrongs.


2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1129-1142
Author(s):  
Ghislain-Herman Demeze-Jouatsa

AbstractThis paper analyzes the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of any finitely repeated game with complete information and perfect monitoring. The main result is a complete characterization of the limit set, as the time horizon increases, of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game. This model includes the special case of observable mixed strategies.


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