The Partiality and Moral Importance of Empathy

2021 ◽  
pp. 67-106
Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson
Keyword(s):  

Paul Bloom and Jesse Prinz have argued that empathy is a poor guide to morality because it is partial, focused on individuals who are near and dear to us, present before our senses, and similar to us, etc. It is here conceded that this is true of spontaneous empathy, but that empathy can be voluntarily controlled and reflective because it consists in imagining what somebody else than ourselves at present is feeling. This means that we can counteract the partiality of our spontaneous empathy, though it is exceedingly difficult to overcome all partiality which is necessary for the kind of universal compassion envisaged by Schopenhauer. In this chapter an attempt is also made to make sense of his conception of the relation between such compassion and ascetic self-renunciation.

Author(s):  
John Basl

According to the ethic of life, all living organisms are of special moral importance. Living things, unlike simple artifacts or biological collectives, are not mere things whose value is entirely instrumental. This book articulates why the ethic is immune to most of the standard criticisms raised against it, but also why such an ethic is untenable, why the domain of moral concern does not extend to all living things; it argues for an old conclusion in an entirely new way. To see why the ethic must be abandoned requires that we look carefully at the foundations of the ethic—the ways in which it is tightly connected to issues in the philosophy of biology and the sorts of assumptions it must draw on to distinguish the living from the nonliving. This book draws on resources from a variety of branches of philosophy and the sciences to show that the ethic cannot survive this scrutiny, and it articulates what the death of the ethic of life means in a variety of areas of practical concern, including environmental ethics, biomedical ethics, ethics of technology, and in philosophy more generally.


Author(s):  
James Pattison

This chapter considers diplomatic measures, including diplomatic criticism (naming and shaming), dialogue and mediation, the cutting of diplomatic ties, and the denial of membership of an international body. The first part of the chapter focuses on diplomatic criticism, arguing that it can help to address the situation, contribute to morally valuable international norms, and even punish offenders. In doing so, it considers the objection that diplomatic criticism is too demanding and that states are not entitled to criticize others when they are being hypocritical. More broadly, the chapter establishes the moral importance of expressing condemnation and upholding morally valuable international norms. The chapter also generally defends the case for mediation, negotiation, and denial of membership, but rejects the utility of the cutting of diplomatic ties.


Author(s):  
Garrett Cullity
Keyword(s):  

From the foundational norms of morality, other moral norms can be derived. In one kind of derivation, recognized by Ross, a derived norm is subsumed under a more fundamental one. This chapter describes and illustrates two further derivation relations, which it labels ‘enabling’ and ‘responsive’, to be added to the subsumptive ones. Each of these three types of derivation is divided into further subtypes, and it is shown how derivations of these different kinds can be combined. The chapter concludes with an account of the role of rights and justice in morality, according to which their moral importance derives in all of these ways from all of the foundations of morality.


Author(s):  
Virginia L. Warren

This chapter explores the concept of moral disability, identifying two types. The first type involves disabling conditions that distort one’s process of moral reflection. Examples include the incapacity to consider the long-term future, to feel empathy for others, and to be honest with oneself. A noteworthy example of self-deception is systematically denying one’s own—and humanity’s—vulnerability to the power of others, to accidents, and to having one’s well-being linked to that of others and the eco-system. Acknowledging vulnerability often requires a new sense of self. The second type includes incapacities directly resulting from ‘moral injury’—debilitating, self-inflicted harms when one violates a deeply held moral conviction, even if trying to remain true to another moral value. Examining moral disabilities highlights the moral importance of self-identity. More progress may be made on controversial issues if we discuss who we are, how we connect, and how we can heal.


Dialogue ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-447
Author(s):  
MILLICENT CHURCHER

This paper critiques Jesse Prinz’s rejection of Adam Smith’s model of impartial spectatorship as a viable corrective to empathic bias. I argue that Prinz’s case is unconvincing, insofar as it rests on an underdeveloped account of Smith’s view of critical self-regulation. By presenting a more detailed and attentive reading of Smithean impartial spectatorship, and exploring Smith’s compelling account of structural supports for sympathetic engagement, this paper demonstrates how Smith’s work is able to constructively engage with contemporary concerns regarding empathy’s role in guiding moral behaviour.


Author(s):  
Knud Haakonssen

Richard Cumberland developed his ideas in response to Hobbes’ Leviathan. He introduced concepts of aggregate goodness (later used in utilitarianism), of benevolence (used in moral-sense theory), of moral self-obligation, of empirical proofs of providence and of the moral importance of tradition à la Burke. The philosophical basis for Cumberland’s views was a theory of natural law which was strongly anti-voluntarist and committed to objective moral values, but recognizing institutions such as governments of state and church as conventional or traditional. Cumberland was often seen as the third co-founder, with Pufendorf and Grotius, of modern natural law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (01) ◽  
pp. 27-51
Author(s):  
Macalester Bell
Keyword(s):  

Abstract:Resentment and other hard feelings may outlive their targets, and people often express a desire to overcome these feelings through forgiveness. While some see forgiving the dead as an important moral accomplishment, others deny that genuine forgiveness of the dead is coherent, let alone desirable or valuable. According to one line of thought, forgiveness is something we do for certain reasons, such as the offender’s expressed contrition. Given that the dead cannot express remorse, forgiveness of the dead is impossible. Others see the apparent coherence and moral importance of forgiving the dead as a reason to give up on the idea that forgiveness is conditional upon the offender’s remorse. According to these philosophers, forgiveness of the dead poses no special problems; forgiveness of the dead, like forgiveness of the living, is not contingent upon the offender’s contrition. I steer a path between these two positions in such a way as to bring out an important aspect of forgiveness that is not adequately addressed in the literature: I argue that forgiving the dead may be perfectly coherent and morally valuable even though the dead cannot ask for forgiveness or engage in reparative activities. A full appreciation of the relational character of forgiveness allows us to make sense of forgiving the dead.


Neuroethics ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson ◽  
Julian Savulescu
Keyword(s):  

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