Moral Importance
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2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 405
Maide Barış

Germline genetic intervention (GGI) has been one of the most discussed topics within the bioethics literature since 2012, when the programming of CRISPR/Cas9 for a specifically targeted gene region has become possible. While some authors are optimistic about what GGI may offer, others strongly disagree and refute the use of this technology for different reasons. This paper will aim to examine one of the most widespread arguments against GGI, namely “heritability” argument, comprehensively. Firstly, it will aim to examine the moral importance of the germline. Secondly, it will try to understand three possible assumptions of the heritability argument. Then it will try to respond to these assumptions and argue that they are neither scientifically supportable nor rationally solid for rejecting GGI altogether.International Journal of Human and Health Sciences Vol. 05 No. 04 October’21 Page: 405-411

Bajo Palabra ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 123-140
Elisabeth Rain Kincaid

In this paper, I argue that the work of Vitoria, Soto, and Suárez presents a sustained tradition arguing that the proper end of civil law is formation in true virtue of the citizens, making citizens capable of achieving natural happiness. Although this development in virtue may prepare citizens to obtain the supernatural happiness made possible ultimately by God’s grace, it still contains its own integrity and moral importance.

Michael McNichol ◽  
Jenn Laskosky

In this short introduction, the co-chairs of the 2021 FIP Conference discuss the effect the pandemic had on the conference, the importance of theory to practice, and the moral importance of theory to librarianship. 

Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen

This chapter provides the motivation for the book by arguing for a need to address the question of the role and status of moral philosophy in light of the criticisms directed against the theory-based understanding of moral philosophy of the twentieth century. The chapter also presents the three main aims of the book, to discuss what form of moral theory—if any—can be a fruitful part of moral philosophy; to investigate the moral importance of the particular; and to offer an alternative descriptive, pluralistic, and elucidatory conception of moral philosophy. In addition, it identifies the context of the discussion which is that of contemporary analytical moral philosophy, broadly conceived, and it determines the central categories of the book, moral philosophy, moral theory, and moral life; all chosen to avoid the ambiguity of ‘ethics’ which covers both moral philosophy and what is investigated in moral philosophy, the moral. Finally, the chapter clarifies the philosophical approach adopted in the book which is modelled on an understanding of the dialogical structure and the conception of philosophy found in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later writings. The final section of the chapter offers a short summary of the remaining chapters and an overview of the overall argument of the book.

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-173
Julian Culp

This article explores the contribution of Jürgen Habermas’ discourse theory of morality, politics, and law to theorizing educational justice. First, it analyzes Christopher Martin’s discourse-ethical argument that the development of citizens’ discursive agency is required on epistemic grounds. The article criticizes this argument and claims that the moral importance of developing discursive agency should be justified instead on the basis of moral grounds. Second, the article examines Harvey Siegel’s critique of Habermas’ moral epistemology and suggests that Siegel neglects that the epistemic justification of moral claims proceeds differently from the epistemic justification of assertoric claims. Finally, the article presents a discourse-theoretic conception of educational justice that defends the importance of discursively justifying norms of educational justice through properly arranged structures of justification.

2020 ◽  
pp. 95-114
Larry R. Churchill

This chapter and the chapter that follows define and explore a select number of concepts that are central to ethics. The emphasis is on how these concepts operate in moral life, their uses, misuses, and limitations. A lifespan approach to these concepts is important to keep in mind. Concepts that seem remote at one life stage, such as death, take on central importance at a later stage. The concepts discussed in chapter 6 are the anchoring value of truth; forgiveness and freedom; the varieties of love; the moral uses of spirituality; and the persistence of hope. Forgiveness is described as a gateway to a less encumbered life. The varieties of love are enumerated and their relevance to various dimensions and stages of life explored. Spirituality, including religious beliefs and practices, is explored for its moral importance. Hope is distinguished from optimism and does not require an object or something hoped for.

Torbjörn Tännsjö

The rationale behind prioritarianism is the idea that suffering has a special moral importance. This means that a person who momentarily suffers has a special moral claim for improvement of her hedonic situation. It is the other way around with happiness. Prioritarianism is seen as a possible amendment to utilitarianism. Since suffering takes place at a definite time, momentary suffering, not suffering within an entire life, is what matters, according to prioritarianism. While the maximin/leximin theory gives absolute priority to those who are worst off prioritarinism presents a more nuanced view. Some special weight is given to an amount of happiness/unhappiness depending on where it falls, on a happy or on a miserable moment. There are many ideas, however, about how to specify the exact weight which should be given to an instant of happiness/unhappiness depending on where it appears on the hedonistic scale. This means that prioritarianism presents us with a family of theories rather than with one theory in particular. They all agree on the claim, however, that what should be maximized is a weighted sum of happiness rather than the sum total of happiness.

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-93 ◽  
Oswaldo Pereira Lima Júnior ◽  
Edna Raquel Hogemann

The suppression of the moral and juridical status of the woman is discussed hereby, as an extension of the process of depersonification of the human being in the work The Handmaid’s Tale, by Margaret Atwood. Offred’s story unfolds in a dystopian future where women are the main victims of a new political order. In a United States transformed into the Gilead dictatorship, in the face of eventual loss of fertility by the female population, women are divided into castes and practically lose their rights over themselves, becoming the property of men. Personalization means more than observing rights to the biological being, it is a dialectical process in which individuality and rationality flirt with the inscription of moral importance. This process, being built in the instances of practical philosophy, is prior to the definitions of Law, characterizing itself as a moral construct. Personally, the human being happens to be accepted as the impregnable subject of the Law, which has precisely in the entity of the person its nucleus and the very meaning of its existence. This essay works with the idea of person as a complex being, as in the works by Immanuel Kant (1785), Lucien Sève (1994), Raquel Hogemann (2015) and Oswaldo Pereira de Lima Junior (2017).

John Basl

According to the ethic of life, all living organisms are of special moral importance. Living things, unlike simple artifacts or biological collectives, are not mere things whose value is entirely instrumental. This book articulates why the ethic is immune to most of the standard criticisms raised against it, but also why such an ethic is untenable, why the domain of moral concern does not extend to all living things; it argues for an old conclusion in an entirely new way. To see why the ethic must be abandoned requires that we look carefully at the foundations of the ethic—the ways in which it is tightly connected to issues in the philosophy of biology and the sorts of assumptions it must draw on to distinguish the living from the nonliving. This book draws on resources from a variety of branches of philosophy and the sciences to show that the ethic cannot survive this scrutiny, and it articulates what the death of the ethic of life means in a variety of areas of practical concern, including environmental ethics, biomedical ethics, ethics of technology, and in philosophy more generally.

2019 ◽  
pp. 66-83
Dan Moller

This chapter argues that private property constrains what the state may do. Figures like John Rawls, Thomas Nagel, and G. A. Cohen have advanced views according to which ownership is not a consideration that significantly hems in the content of just institutions. But this chapter shows that private property has independent weight that must be acknowledged in organizing a just society. A social contract that ignores the independent moral importance of private property is not one that should command our respect. This raises the question of whether it is ever permissible to take someone’s property by force, without which we would arguably be left with anarchy. The answer sketched relies on an anti-free-rider principle that permits us to compel people to contribute to projects we cannot reasonably forgo, which people benefit from and could opt out of, and which they may otherwise free-ride on.

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