scholarly journals Symmetries and Explanatory Dependencies in Physics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven French ◽  
Juha Saatsi
Keyword(s):  
Counterfactual Dependence

Many important explanations in physics are based on ideas and assumptions about symmetries, but little has been said about the nature of such explanations. This chapter aims to fill this lacuna, arguing that various symmetry explanations can be naturally captured in the spirit of the counterfactual-dependence account of Woodward, liberalized from its causal trappings. From the perspective of this account symmetries explain by providing modal information about an explanatory dependence, by showing how the explanandum would have been different, had the facts about an explanatory symmetry been different. Furthermore, the authors argue that such explanatory dependencies need not be causal.

DISCONNECTION AND RESPONSIBILITY

Legal Theory ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Schaffer
Keyword(s):  
Blood Flow ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Counterfactual Dependence ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Michael Moore

In Causation and Responsibility, Michael Moore offers an integrated conception of the law, morality, and metaphysics, centered on the notion of causation. I contest Moore's claim that causation cannot relate absences and show how accepting absence causation would improve Moore's view. For denying absence causation drives Moore to a disjunctive account of legal and moral responsibility in order to handle cases such as negligence. It forces him into denying that beheading someone can cause them to die, since the route from beheading to death involves the absence of blood flow to the brain. And it leads him into allowing that responsibility can arise from mere correlation with a crime, given that counterfactual dependence can still hold between correlates.

The Problem of Counterfactual Isomorphs

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Menzies
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Counterfactual Dependence ◽  
Actual Causation

Counterfactual isomorphs are pairs of systems where: (1) the pattern of counterfactual dependence among the variables is isomorphic; but (2) the relations of actual causation need not be. Counterfactual isomorphs present a prima facie challenge to any theory of actual causation that is framed in terms of counterfactuals. Menzies responds to this problem by proposing that actual causation be defined in terms of counterfactual dependence under ideal coonditions. Determination of what constitute ideal conditions is motivated by the intuition that actual causation should depend only on the intrinsic process consisting of the events connecting the cause and the effect. Since counterfactual isomorphs need not have isomorphic ideal conditions, they can differ with respect to relations of actual causation.

scholarly journals Counterfactual Dependence and Arrow

Noûs ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 453-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Kroedel ◽  
Franz Huber
Keyword(s):  
Counterfactual Dependence

scholarly journals Asymmetry of counterfactual dependence and defense of Lewis's argument

2015 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 21-42
Author(s):  
Nenad Filipovic
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Second Law Of Thermodynamics ◽  
Counterfactual Dependence ◽  
Second Law ◽  
Counterfactual Analysis ◽  
Arrow Of Time ◽  
The Third ◽  
Time Problem ◽  
The Status ◽  
Future Work

Arrow of time is well known problem in physics and concerns explanation of the status of the second law of thermodynamics. The problem, however, soon made noise in various philosophical discussions: on knowledge, causality, etc. David Lewis, partially motivated by his counterfactual analysis of causality, introduced the problem of arrow of time in discussion on counterfactuals. After his article in which he had tried to ground asymmetry of counterfactuals in the second law of thermodynamics, there were numerous reactions on such kind of project. In the first part, I will introduce Lewis' theory in detail, and in the second part I will introduce some of the main critiques of such a view, focusing on Elga's critique. The third part will be saved for Loewer's and Albert's argument in favor of a very broad view of Lewis' project. In the part four, I will present strengthening of their argument, while explaining how we could apply it closer to Lewis' original view. Finally, I will make some concluding remarks regarding possible confusion on argument for supporting Lewis, as well as the additional requirements for any future work in that direction. Also, because of the nature of the mentioned arguments, in the appendix I will, very briefly, present an overview of the arrow of time problem from the perspective of physics.

Causation and Counterfactual Dependence Reconsidered

Noûs ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Hausman
Keyword(s):  
Counterfactual Dependence
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