Narrow content and ur-content

Mapping Intimacies ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198785965.003.0004 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Juhani Yli-Vakkuri ◽

John Hawthorne

Keyword(s):

Hilary Putnam ◽

Tyler Burge ◽

Narrow Content ◽

Ordinary Notion

In Chapter 3 we explore how the question of whether the ordinary notion of content—what we call ‘ur-content’—is narrow, trying as best as we can, on behalf of the internalist, to fend off well-known objections that emerge from the work of Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge. Those objections turn out not to be completely decisive. However, the project of arguing that ur-content is narrow is portrayed as deeply unpromising.

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Narrow Content

10.1093/oso/9780198785965.001.0001 ◽

2018 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Juhani Yli-Vakkuri ◽

John Hawthorne

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Mind ◽

Mental Content ◽

Thought Experiments ◽

Hilary Putnam ◽

Central Topic ◽

Tyler Burge ◽

Narrow Content

Narrow mental content, if there is such a thing, is content that is entirely determined by the goings-on inside the head of the thinker. A central topic in the philosophy of mind since the mid-1970s has been whether there is a kind of mental content that is narrow in this sense. It is widely conceded, thanks to famous thought experiments by Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge, that there is a kind of mental content that is not narrow. But it is often maintained that there is also a kind of mental content that is narrow, and that such content can play various key explanatory roles relating, inter alia, to epistemology and the explanation of action. This book argues that this is a forlorn hope. It carefully distinguishes a variety of conceptions of narrow content and a variety of explanatory roles that might be assigned to narrow content. It then argues that, once we pay sufficient attention to the details, there is no promising theory of narrow content in the offing.

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Introduction

10.1093/oso/9780198785965.003.0001 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Juhani Yli-Vakkuri ◽

John Hawthorne

Keyword(s):

Thought Experiments ◽

Hilary Putnam ◽

Tyler Burge ◽

Narrow Content ◽

History Of ◽

To Come

The Introduction outlines the history of the narrow content debate. It introduces the famous thought experiments by Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge, discusses why the debate only came to prominence in the 1970s, and outlines what is to come.

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Hilary Putnam

10.1017/cbo9780511614187 ◽

2005 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Keyword(s):

Hilary Putnam

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Sincerity and the Reliability of Testimony

10.1093/oso/9780198743965.003.0005 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Peter J. Graham

Keyword(s):

A Priori ◽

Prima Facie ◽

Tyler Burge ◽

P Content ◽

Epistemology Of Testimony ◽

Content Preservation

“Content Preservation” by Tyler Burge is one of the most influential articles in the epistemology of testimony. Burge argues for three theses: (1) That we enjoy a prima facie entitlement to take testimony (presentations-as-true) at face value, (2) That this entitlement has an a priori basis, based in the nature of reason, and (3) That in some cases testimony-based beliefs are warranted a priori. Most of the debate in the testimony literature is over the truth of (1). Most of the criticism of Burge’s paper focuses on (3). Burge has since abandoned (3). What about (2)? Burge’s argument for (2) is compressed; the underlying nuts and bolts are difficult to understand. This chapter reconstructs Burge’s overall teleo-functional reliabilist framework and then reconstructs Burge’s overall argument for (2) in some detail. Three criticisms are then offered of the argument. Even granting (1), Burge’s argument does not establish (2).

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Truth-conditionality

10.1093/oso/9780198785965.003.0003 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Juhani Yli-Vakkuri ◽

John Hawthorne

Keyword(s):

Thought Experiments ◽

Truth Values ◽

Narrow Content ◽

Radical Form

In Chapter 2 we argue that internalists are committed to a kind of relativism, and that theirs is a particularly radical form of relativism. Thought experiments involving certain symmetries across space and/or time play a starring role. If the kinds of symmetries featured in them are possible, we argue, the truth values of narrow content must be relative to some very unusual parameters.

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Introduction

10.1093/oso/9780198803430.003.0001 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Simon Kirchin

Keyword(s):

Hilary Putnam ◽

Bernard Williams ◽

General Methodology ◽

Thick Concepts ◽

History Of ◽

Philippa Foot ◽

The Difference

This chapter introduces the distinction between thin and thick concepts and then performs a number of functions. First, two major accounts of thick concepts—separationism and nonseparationism—are introduced and, in doing so, a novel account of evaluation is indicated. Second, each chapter is outlined as is the general methodology, followed, third, by a brief history of the discussion of thick concepts, referencing Philippa Foot, Hilary Putnam, Gilbert Ryle, and Bernard Williams among others. Fourth, a number of relevant contrasts are introduced, such as the fact–value distinction and the difference between concepts, properties, and terms. Lastly, some interesting and relevant questions are raised that, unfortunately, have to be left aside.

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