Naturalistic Moral Realism and Evolutionary Biology

Perhaps the most familiar understanding of “naturalism” derives from Quine, understanding it as a continuity of empirical theories of the world as described through the scientific method. So, it might be surprising that one of the most important naturalistic moral realists, Philippa Foot, rejects standard evolutionary biology in her justly lauded Natural Goodness. One of her main reasons for this is the true claim that humans can flourish (eudaimonia) without reproducing, which she claims cannot be squared with evolutionary theory and biology more generally. The present argument concludes that Foot was wrong to reject evolutionary theory as the empirical foundation of naturalized eudaimonist moral realism. This is based on contemporary discussion of biological functions and evolutionary fitness, from which a definition of “eudaimonia” is constructed. This gives eudaimonist moral realism an empirically respectable foundation.

Intention and Wrongdoing

According to the principle of double effect, there is a strict moral constraint against bringing about serious harm to the innocent intentionally, but it is permissible in a wider range of circumstances to act in a way that brings about harm as a foreseen but non-intended side effect. This idea plays an important role in just war theory and international law, and in the twentieth century Elizabeth Anscombe and Philippa Foot invoked it as a way of resisting consequentialism. However, many moral philosophers now regard the principle with hostility or suspicion. Challenging the philosophical orthodoxy, Joshua Stuchlik defends the principle of double effect, situating it within a moral framework of human solidarity and responding to philosophical objections to it. His study uncovers links between ethics, philosophy of action, and moral psychology, and will be of interest to anyone seeking to understand the moral relevance of intention.

Facts and Values

This chapter introduces the first of the four main subjects of the book, Philippa Foot, as well as sketching the philosophical outlook against which all four would argue in later years. A young Foot, recently returned to Oxford, confronts for the first time the horrors of the Nazi regime, through a newsreel exposing conditions in the concentration camps. For Foot, this moment encapsulated a major failing of philosophical ethics in the mid-twentieth century: its inability to grapple with real evil. The contemporary philosophy against which Foot and her friends would revolt depended on a background picture, the “billiard-ball” picture of the universe as nothing but inert, value-free matter. A fact–value dichotomy was grounded in this picture, positing that no ethical propositions can validly derive from fact statements; these together led to what Lipscomb calls the “Dawkins sublime”—the Romantic view that adults must bravely face this harsh and denuded world.

The Women Are Up to Something

This book tells two intertwined stories, centered on twentieth-century moral philosophers Elizabeth Anscombe, Mary Midgley, Philippa Foot, and Iris Murdoch. The first is the story of four friends who came up to Oxford together just before WWII. It is the story of their lives, loves, and intellectual preoccupations; it is a story about women trying to find a place in a man’s world of academic philosophy. The second story is about these friends’ shared philosophical project and their unintentional creation of a school of thought that challenged the dominant way of doing ethics. That dominant school of thought envisioned the world as empty, value-free matter, on which humans impose meaning. This outlook treated statements such as “this is good” as mere expressions of feeling or preference, reflecting no objective standards. It emphasized human freedom and demanded an unflinching recognition of the value-free world. The four friends diagnosed this moral philosophy as an impoverishing intellectual fad. This style of thought, they believed, obscured the realities of human nature and left people without the resources to make difficult moral choices or to confront evil. As an alternative, the women proposed a naturalistic ethics, reviving a line of thought running through Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas, and enriched by modern biologists like Jane Goodall and Charles Darwin. The women proposed that there are, in fact, moral truths, based in facts about the distinctive nature of the human animal and what that animal needs to thrive.

Natural Goodness, Sex, and the Perverted Faculty Argument

There is a longstanding and widely held view, often associated with Catholicism, that intrinsically nonprocreative human sex acts are intrinsically immoral. Some philosophers who hold this view, such as Edward Feser, claim that they can defend the view on purely philosophical grounds by relying on the perverted faculty argument. This paper argues that Feser's defense of the perverted faculty argument does not work because Feser fails to recognize the full implications of the species-dependence of natural goodness. By drawing on the work of Peter Geach and Philippa Foot, this paper presents a view of natural goodness that adequately accounts for the species-dependence of such goodness. Using this adequate account, the paper argues that at least some intrinsically nonprocreative human sex acts contribute to human flourishing.

On Restoring the Centrality of Prudentia (Phronēsis) for Living Well: Pathways and Contemporary Relevance

The aftermath of the Second World War saw some radical rethinking in both theology and philosophy on what it is to live well as a human being. In philosophy two of the key thinkers were Elizabeth Anscombe and Philippa Foot. In theology two key thinkers were Thomas Deman, a French Dominican, and somewhat later an English Dominican, Herbert McCabe. A key feature in all four thinkers was a recovery of the work of Aristotle and Aquinas, in particular the concept of phronēsis (prudentia). The paper’s close analysis of the virtue of prudentia demonstrates the insufficiency of modern moral philosophies that are committed to portraying morality as a moral code. A correlative argument is made within theology: the virtue of prudentia fortified by the gift of counsel is central for good Christian living.

Target Centred Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics in its contemporary manifestation is dominated by neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics primarily developed by Rosalind Hursthouse. This version of eudaimonistic virtue ethics was groundbreaking but by now has been subject to considerable critical attention. The time is ripe for new developments and alternatives. The target centred virtue ethics proposed in this book (TVE) is opposed to orthodox virtue ethics in two major ways. First, it rejects the ‘natural goodness’ metaphysics of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics owed to Philippa Foot in favour of a ‘hermeneutic ontology’ of ethics inspired by the Continental tradition and McDowell. Second, it rejects the well-known ‘qualified agent’ account of right action made famous by Hursthouse in favour of a target-centred framework for assessing rightness of acts. The target-centred view, introduced in Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (VEP), is much more developed in TVE with discussions of Dancy’s particularism, default reasons and thick concepts, codifiability, and its relation to the Doctrine of the mean (suitably interpreted). TVE retains the pluralism of VEP but develops it further in relation to a pluralistic account of practical reason. Besides the pluralism TVE develops other substantive positions including the view that target centred virtue ethics is developmental, suitably embedded in an environmental ethics of “dwelling”; and incorporates a concept of differentiated virtue to allow for roles, narrativity, cultural and historical location, and stage of life.

John Rawls and Oxford Philosophy

Scholarship historicizing John Rawls has put paid to the view that his work was without precedent. This article sets out to find out why, then, A Theory of Justice stirred such philosophical excitement, even among British philosophers in a position to recognize its antecedents. I advance the view that his work is helpfully understood as fulfilling the promise of the “naturalist” revival in ethics begun at Oxford by Philippa Foot and Elizabeth Anscombe. After briefly surveying the development of analytic philosophy, I argue that Rawls's contribution was to reconceive ethics so that it was an investigation neither of an independent ethical reality nor of the logic of moral language. Rather, it was concerned with a class of facts about ourselves. Rawls's practice of ethics adopts as its central focus the ongoing human practice of justification. I place Rawls's turn from religious faith to justification between persons alongside similar shifts in Plato's Euthyphro and in the biographies of Kant and Sidgwick. I try to show the distinctiveness of Rawls's focus by contrasting his search for human self-understanding with the project of R. M. Hare, his most prominent non-naturalist critic, who charged Rawls with offering an inadequate account of the authority of ethics.

Mary Midgley

Mary Beatrice Midgley (née Scrutton; b. 13 September 1919–d. 10 October 2018) wrote twenty philosophical books that use an engaging style and surprisingly domestic metaphors to convey profound thought about a diverse range of topics, including human nature, animals, environmentalism, ethics, science, gender, and the practice of philosophy itself. Her first book was the influential Beast and Man, published in 1978, and her last was What Is Philosophy For?, a defense of the need for philosophical thinking, published just before her death at the age of ninety-nine. Midgley has recently garnered more philosophical attention and is now widely recognized as an original and incisive voice in philosophy. The daughter of a pacifist curate, Midgley was born in Dulwich, London, before moving to Cambridge, Greenford, and Kingston. A nature-loving child, with passions for drama and poetry, she was educated at Downe House School near Newbury, before reading Classics and Greats at Somerville College, Oxford, between 1938 and 1942. Here she met her fellow members of the wartime Quartet of women philosophers (see the separate Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy articles on “G. E. M. Anscombe,” “Philippa Foot,” and “Iris Murdoch”). The four became great friends and influenced each other throughout their working lives. Their connections include a frustration with the narrowness of the systematic philosophy that was in vogue during their formative years, and the revival of virtue in moral philosophy. Unlike her contemporaries, Midgley published little work until her fifties, after she had raised children and left academic philosophy. As Midgley said, “I wrote no books until I was a good 50, and I’m jolly glad because I didn’t know what I thought before then.” For this reason, Midgley’s writing is striking in its consistency. Articles of this kind often chart changes of mind and theoretical revisions. While Midgley’s thought undoubtedly developed and expanded, there are no early or late periods, marked by stark differences of view. One of Midgley’s criticisms of her predecessors concerned their neglect of the history of ideas. Midgley holds that to understand a philosophical system, we must understand the context in which it arose. Philosophy and culture are interconnected: the great thinkers of any era are influenced by their historical circumstances, and the patterns of thought within a culture are, whether we realize it or not, profoundly philosophical. Philosophy, she argues, is indispensable, because it allows us to make sense of our current predicaments and—where necessary—make changes to our patterns of thought.

Moral Realism

Reinhold Niebuhr’s moral realism can be confusing, as he draws upon multiple categories that are often in tension in contemporary discussions of moral reality. This chapter lays out three frameworks Niebuhr used to discuss moral reality: naturalism, moral ideals, and divine nature and command. It argues that these frameworks are mutually supportive in Niebuhr’s thought and locates each in the context of contemporary discussions in moral philosophy. In relation to naturalism, Niebuhr’s thought is compared with the neo-Aristotelian thought of Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse. Concerning ideals, Niebuhr is put in dialogue with philosophers such as W. D. Ross, Martha Nussbaum, and Isaiah Berlin. Niebuhr’s treatment of divine command and nature is compared with the work of Robert M. Adams.