On the Conceptual Mismatch Argument

Shifting Concepts ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198803331.003.0011 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 190-212

Author(s):

E. Díaz-León

Keyword(s):

Biological Properties ◽

Sort It ◽

Socially Constructed ◽

Normative Considerations

According to ‘conceptual mismatch’ arguments, if there is a conceptual mismatch between the descriptions associated with an ordinary concept and some features of the alleged referent, then that entity cannot be the referent. This idea has been used in the metaphysics of race in order to develop arguments against realist theories of race. In particular, K. Anthony Appiah and Joshua Glasgow, among others, have argued that there are no real properties in the vicinity of our talk about race that can satisfy the descriptions that we associate with the term ‘race’, and therefore the most plausible candidates, such as certain biological properties or certain socially constructed properties, cannot be the referent of ‘race’, so we must conclude that the term ‘race’ is empty. This chapter examines the structure and prospects of conceptual mismatch arguments of this sort. It opines that these arguments point to some crucial methodological questions, such as how much divergence between our descriptions and the nature of the referent can be allowed, and suggests a new answer to this question, in terms of an appeal to normative considerations, which can be very helpful and even indispensable in order to settle matters of reference.

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Generics designate kinds but not always essences

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences ◽

10.1073/pnas.1900105116 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 116 (41) ◽

pp. 20354-20359 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Alexander Noyes ◽

Frank C. Keil

Keyword(s):

Causal Structure ◽

Biological Properties ◽

Causal Beliefs ◽

Socially Constructed ◽

Spontaneous Production ◽

Adult Participants ◽

Cultural Properties ◽

Generic Language ◽

Causal Structures ◽

Inductive Potential

People believe that some categories are kinds with reliable causal structure and high inductive potential (e.g., tigers). Widely endorsed theories propose that people are biased to assume kinds are essential, and so naturally determined by internal causal properties. Generic language (e.g., “men like sports”) is 1 mechanism thought to evoke this bias. We propose instead that generics principally designate that categories are kinds. Participants can entertain diverse causal structures in the presence of generics: Hearing that biological properties generalize to a category (e.g., “men grow beards”) prompts participants to infer essential structure, but hearing neutral or social properties (“women are underpaid”) generalized prompts other causal beliefs. Thus, generics induce essentialism only in interaction with cues that reasonably prompt essentialist explanation. We tested our model with adult participants (n = 739 total), using measures that disentangle essentialist beliefs from kind beliefs. In study 1, we replicate prior methods with our new measures, and find that generics influence kind beliefs more than essentialism. In study 2, we vary property content (biological vs. cultural properties), and show that generics only increase essentialism when paired with biological properties. In study 3, we show that generics designate kinds but not essentialism when neutral properties are used across animals, tools, and people. In study 4, we show that believing a category is a kind increases the spontaneous production of generic statements, regardless of whether the kind is essential or socially constructed. Generics do not necessitate essentialist beliefs. Participants were flexible in their reasoning about kinds.

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Generics designate kinds but not always essences

10.31234/osf.io/4faek ◽

2019 ◽

Author(s):

Alexander Noyes ◽

Frank Keil

Keyword(s):

Causal Structure ◽

Biological Properties ◽

Causal Beliefs ◽

Socially Constructed ◽

Spontaneous Production ◽

Adult Participants ◽

Cultural Properties ◽

Generic Language ◽

Causal Structures ◽

Inductive Potential

People believe that some categories are kinds with reliable causal structure and high inductive potential (e.g., Tigers). Widely endorsed theories propose that people are biased to assume kinds are essential, and so naturally determined by internal causal properties. Generic language (e.g., “Men like sports”) is one mechanism thought to evoke this bias. We propose instead that generics principally designate that categories are kinds. Participants can entertain diverse causal structures in the presence of generics: Hearing that biological properties generalize to a category (e.g., “Men grow beards”) prompts participants to infer essential structure, but hearing neutral or social properties (“Women are underpaid”) generalize prompts other causal beliefs. Thus, generics induce essentialism only in in interaction with cues that reasonably prompt essentialist explanation. We tested our model with adult participants (N = 739 total), using measures that disentangle essentialist beliefs from kind beliefs. In Study 1, we replicate prior methods with our new measures, and find that generics influence kind beliefs more than essentialism. In Study 2, we vary property content (biological vs. cultural properties), and show that generics only increase essentialism when paired with biological properties. In Study 3, we show that generics designate kinds but not essentialism when neutral properties are used across animals, tools, and people. In Study 4, we show that believing a category is a kind increases the spontaneous production of generic statements, regardless of whether the kind is essential or socially constructed. Generics do not necessitate essentialist beliefs. Participants were flexible in their reasoning about kinds.

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Three Dimensional structure and organization of diploid chromosomes by optical section microscopy

Proceedings, annual meeting, Electron Microscopy Society of America ◽

10.1017/s0424820100127608 ◽

1987 ◽

Vol 45 ◽

pp. 633-635

Author(s):

David A. Agard ◽

Yasushi Hiraoka ◽

John W. Sedat

Keyword(s):

Dimensional Space ◽

Three Dimensional ◽

Developmental State ◽

Mitotic Cell ◽

Biological Properties ◽

Dimensional Structure ◽

Specific Gene ◽

Three Dimensional Structure ◽

Complementary Techniques ◽

Dynamic Structures

In an effort to understand the complex relationship between structure and biological function within the nucleus, we have embarked on a program to examine the three-dimensional structure and organization of Drosophila melanogaster embryonic chromosomes. Our overall goal is to determine how DNA and proteins are organized into complex and highly dynamic structures (chromosomes) and how these chromosomes are arranged in three dimensional space within the cell nucleus. Futher, we hope to be able to correlate structual data with such fundamental biological properties as stage in the mitotic cell cycle, developmental state and transcription at specific gene loci.Towards this end, we have been developing methodologies for the three-dimensional analysis of non-crystalline biological specimens using optical and electron microscopy. We feel that the combination of these two complementary techniques allows an unprecedented look at the structural organization of cellular components ranging in size from 100A to 100 microns.

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Membrane–cytoskeleton interactions in cholesterol-dependent domain formation

Essays in Biochemistry ◽

10.1042/bse0570177 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 57 ◽

pp. 177-187 ◽

Cited By ~ 9

Author(s):

Jennifer N. Byrum ◽

William Rodgers

Keyword(s):

Biological Properties ◽

Membrane Rafts ◽

Membrane Domains ◽

Biological Functions ◽

Membrane Cytoskeleton ◽

Heterogeneous Structures ◽

Integral Role ◽

Model Cell ◽

Actomyosin Cytoskeleton ◽

Dependent Domain

Since the inception of the fluid mosaic model, cell membranes have come to be recognized as heterogeneous structures composed of discrete protein and lipid domains of various dimensions and biological functions. The structural and biological properties of membrane domains are represented by CDM (cholesterol-dependent membrane) domains, frequently referred to as membrane ‘rafts’. Biological functions attributed to CDMs include signal transduction. In T-cells, CDMs function in the regulation of the Src family kinase Lck (p56lck) by sequestering Lck from its activator CD45. Despite evidence of discrete CDM domains with specific functions, the mechanism by which they form and are maintained within a fluid and dynamic lipid bilayer is not completely understood. In the present chapter, we discuss recent advances showing that the actomyosin cytoskeleton has an integral role in the formation of CDM domains. Using Lck as a model, we also discuss recent findings regarding cytoskeleton-dependent CDM domain functions in protein regulation.

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