Colour Categories in Context

It is agreed that colour categorization is context sensitive, and that context plays a role in why colour categories are the way they are. Yet, the way context is supposed to influence colour categorization is never spelled out in the literature, the focus of which has mostly been to identify mechanisms at play in colour categorization, either perceptual and cognitive or, alternatively, linguistic. This chapter steers away from the wealthy categorization literature, and takes a different starting point by asking the preliminary question of how we categorize colour in our everyday interactions. The answer to this question makes important use of the notion of colour space and subspace. It leads to a unified framework that makes room for context sensitivity, while also accounting for colour categorization.

Conceptual Fragmentation and the Use of ‘Race’ in Scientific Theorizing

This chapter defends two closely related theses. The first is that race is a fragmented concept with at least two divergent, yet theoretically important, meanings. One is a social race concept; the second is a population naturalist race concept. The second turns on the question of what to do in the face of conceptual fragmentation. Should a single theoretical term (‘race’) be used to refer to each concept? Or should ‘race’ be eliminated in one or more context(s)? Currently fashionable among race scholars is the idea that ‘race’ ought to be selectively eliminated and replaced with closely related terminology when the population naturalist concept is at work, but retained when a social race concept is at work. This chapter argues that this is not the right way to go and consider the pros and cons of ‘race’ pluralism and ‘race’ eliminativism.

On the Conceptual Mismatch Argument

According to ‘conceptual mismatch’ arguments, if there is a conceptual mismatch between the descriptions associated with an ordinary concept and some features of the alleged referent, then that entity cannot be the referent. This idea has been used in the metaphysics of race in order to develop arguments against realist theories of race. In particular, K. Anthony Appiah and Joshua Glasgow, among others, have argued that there are no real properties in the vicinity of our talk about race that can satisfy the descriptions that we associate with the term ‘race’, and therefore the most plausible candidates, such as certain biological properties or certain socially constructed properties, cannot be the referent of ‘race’, so we must conclude that the term ‘race’ is empty. This chapter examines the structure and prospects of conceptual mismatch arguments of this sort. It opines that these arguments point to some crucial methodological questions, such as how much divergence between our descriptions and the nature of the referent can be allowed, and suggests a new answer to this question, in terms of an appeal to normative considerations, which can be very helpful and even indispensable in order to settle matters of reference.

The Folk Concept of Race

This chapter examines whether and how concepts vary across and within individuals (inter- and intra-individual variation) by examining what constrains variation of concepts. To address this issue, the chapter focuses on an independently interesting case study: inter- and intra-individual variation in the concept of race. The case study contrasts two competing hypotheses about the concept of race: the biological and the social hypotheses. According to the first hypothesis, the concept of race is a biological concept that is constrained by folk biology; according to the second, it is the concept of a social category. The chapter shows that people’s folk biology constrains the concept of race and thus limits how much concepts of race can vary within and across individuals.

How to Make Psychological Generalizations When Concepts Differ

Children’s concepts differ systematically from those of adults, posing a conundrum in how to compare the ‘same’ concepts across ages. It also creates a problem in making psychological generalizations across ages, such as people’s preference for basic-level categories. For example, if children acquire the concept of chair before that of furniture, this seems to be an example of learning a basic-level concept before its superordinate. However, given that children’s concepts are not the same as adults and change throughout childhood, can we in fact draw conclusions about levels of categorization and other properties defined in terms of adult concepts? This chapter addresses levels of categorization as a case study in how to deal with the problem of individual differences in concepts, suggesting a focus on similar psychological principles and constraints rather than on conceptual content.

Mapping Thoughts to Words

Languages differ in how they apply labels to aspects of human experience. Because the world-to-word mapping is, in part, language-specific, monolingual children cannot rely entirely on pre-existing conceptualization of a domain to bootstrap their way into the word meanings of their language. For people exposed to two languages from birth or acquiring a second after a first, the challenge is increased by the fact that they must contend with two different languages’ mappings from the world to words. This chapter first considers how and why languages come to differ in the meanings encoded by the words of a domain. It then addresses the problem of acquisition for learners of one and two languages and considers how exposure to each language may influence the use of the other. It also considers where miscommunications may arise between speakers and why such miscommunications are not more common.

The Myth of the Common-sense Conception of Colour

Some philosophical theories of the nature of colour aim to respect a ‘common sense’ conception of colour: aligning with the common sense conception is supposed to speak in favour of a theory and conflicting with it is supposed to speak against a theory. This chapter argues that the idea of a ‘common sense’ conception of colour that philosophers of colour have relied upon is overly simplistic. By drawing on experimental and historical evidence, it demonstrates how conceptions of colour vary along several dimensions and how even supposedly ‘core’ components of the contemporary ‘common sense’ conception of colour are less stable than previously thought.

When Does Communication Succeed?

Concepts associated with general terms vary substantially between speakers, even between speakers of the same language. There can be differences even about topics as basic as whether the hand is part of the arm, i.e. about the meaning of ‘arm’. Still, such differences are rarely detected in normal communication. Two questions arise. The first is whether communication fails in the case of interpersonal conceptual differences, or whether there are differences that, depending on the relevant requirements of the context, don’t matter, so that communication (in some cases) succeeds despite the variation. To answer this, we need a model of communicative success. The second question is why even such basic differences as in the example typically fail to come to light. What mechanism of communication allows it to flow smoothly despite the variation? This chapter attempts to answer both these questions.

Variation in Natural Kind Concepts

Since Kripke’s and Putnam’s work in the 1970s, most philosophers have assumed that our natural kind concepts are externally individuated. However, both psychologists and philosophers have questioned this assumption, partly on empirical grounds. There is some evidence of systematic variation in how subjects apply natural kind terms; it has been argued that this shows that natural kind concepts are not as universally shared, or temporally stable, as many philosophers have been assuming. Yet, it is not clear exactly what kind of variation in subjects’ application of natural kind terms would seriously cast doubt on the view that natural kind concepts are externally individuated. Here, we take a detailed look at this question, and argue that the existing studies do not call for dramatic revisions to the externalist mainstream, and conclude by exploring some possible new directions for the experimental study of natural kind terms and concepts.

Amelioration vs Perversion

Words change meaning, usually in unpredictable ways. But some words’ meanings are revised intentionally. Revisionary projects are normally put forward in the service of some purpose—some serve specific goals of inquiry, and others serve ethical, political or social aims. Revisionist projects can ameliorate meanings, but they can also pervert. This chapter draws attention to the dangers of meaning perversions, and argues that the self-declared goodness of a revisionist project doesn’t suffice to avoid meaning perversions. The road to Hell, or to horrors on Earth, is paved with good intentions. Finally, and more importantly, it tries to demarcate what meaning perversions are, in the hope that it will help us assess the moral and political legitimacy of revisionary projects.