Appearance without Reduction

Author(s):  
Jean-Yves Lacoste ◽  
Oliver O’Donovan

Husserl understood “reduction” as the method with which scientific philosophy achieved a more exact description of things by bracketing out the question of their real existence. To this the chapter replies that even in the “natural attitude” there is reduction; perception is always concerned with the essence of phenomena, not with their existence. Yet there are some phenomena that are not susceptible of description by reduction, since agnosticism about their existence would falsify the appearance. Other people appear irreducibly, and so does speech itself. If we are to claim that God appears, we must assert that his appearance, too, is irreducible.

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
László Kocsis ◽  
Adam Tamas Tuboly

AbstractOur main goal in this paper is to present and scrutinize Reichenbach’s own naturalism in our contemporary context, with special attention to competing versions of the concept. By exploring the idea of Reichenbach’s naturalism, we will argue that he defended a liberating, therapeutic form of naturalism, meaning that he took scientific philosophy (or philosophy of nature, Naturphilosophie) to be a possible cure for bad old habits and traditional ways of philosophy. For Reichenbach, naturalistic scientific philosophy was a well-established form of liberation. We do not intend to suggest that Reichenbach acted as an inventor of naturalism; nonetheless, invoking the term and the idea of ‘naturalism’ is more than a simple rhetorical strategy for rehabilitating Reichenbach as a forerunner of this field. We think that his ideas can make a valuable contribution to contemporary debates, and that he presents an interesting case among the other scientifically oriented proponents of his time. After presenting a short reconstruction of the meaning of naturalism—or, more appropriately, naturalisms—in order to be able to correctly situate Reichenbach within his own as well as a systematic context, we discuss Reichenbach’s naturalism against the background of his scientific philosophy, his views on the relation of common-sense knowledge to science, and his efforts at popularization. To delve deeper into this topic, we present a case study to show how Reichenbach argued that in both scientific and philosophical discussions (assuming their naturalistic continuity), it is necessary to move from the request and value of truth to probability. And, finally, we argue that the liberation of knowledge and nature was a socio-political program for Reichenbach, who talked about his own scientific philosophy as “a crusade.” By emphasizing this aspect of Reichenbach’s naturalism, we may be in a better position to situate him in the history of analytic philosophy in general, and in the yet-to-be-written narrative of the naturalistic movement in particular.


1886 ◽  
Vol s7-I (26) ◽  
pp. 517-517
Author(s):  
William E. A. Axon
Keyword(s):  

1988 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Suppes

In his published work and even more in conversations, Tarski emphasized what he thought were important philosophical aspects of his work. The English translation of his more philosophical papers [56m] was dedicated to his teacher Tadeusz Kotarbiński, and in informal discussions of philosophy he often referred to the influence of Kotarbiński. Also, the influence of Leśniewski, his dissertation adviser, is evident in his early papers. Moreover, some of his important papers of the 1930s were initially given to philosophical audiences. For example, the famous monograph on the concept of truth ([33m], [35b]) was first given as two lectures to the Logic Section of the Philosophical Society in Warsaw in 1930. Second, his paper [33], which introduced the concepts of ω-consistency and ω-completeness as well as the rule of infinite induction, was first given at the Second Conference of the Polish Philosophical Society in Warsaw in 1927. Also [35c] was based upon an address given in 1934 to the conference for the Unity of Science in Prague; [36] and [36a] summarize an address given at the International Congress of Scientific Philosophy in Paris in 1935. The article [44a] was published in a philosophical journal and widely reprinted in philosophical texts. This list is of course not exhaustive but only representative of Tarski's philosophical interactions as reflected in lectures given to philosophical audiences, which were later embodied in substantial papers. After 1945 almost all of Tarski's publications and presentations are mathematical in character with one or two minor exceptions. This division, occurring about 1945, does not, however, indicate a loss of interest in philosophical questions but is a result of Tarski's moving to the Department of Mathematics at Berkeley. There he assumed an important role in the development of logic within mathematics in the United States.


Mind ◽  
1882 ◽  
Vol os-VII (28) ◽  
pp. 461-495
Author(s):  
FRANCIS ELLINGWOOD ABBOT

2008 ◽  
Vol 24 (13) ◽  
pp. i295-i303 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. N. Soldatova ◽  
W. Aubrey ◽  
R. D. King ◽  
A. Clare
Keyword(s):  

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