Justification as Ignorance

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sven Rosenkranz
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Epistemic Possibility ◽  
Metaphysical Possibility ◽  
Internal Condition ◽  
Modal Epistemic Logic

Justification as Ignorance offers an original account of epistemic justification as both non-factive and luminous that vindicates core internalist intuitions, without construing justification as an internal condition. The account conceives of justification, in its doxastic and propositional varieties, as a kind of epistemic possibility of knowing, and of being in a position to know, respectively. It thus contrasts with other recently proposed views that characterize justification in terms of the metaphysical possibility of knowing. In developing his account, Rosenkranz devises a suitable non-normal multi-modal epistemic logic for knowledge and being in a position to know that respects the finding that these notions create hyperintensional contexts, defends his conception of justification against well-known anti-luminosity arguments, shows that the account allows for fruitful applications and principled solutions to the lottery and preface paradoxes, and provides a metaphysics of justification, and of its varying degrees of strength, that is compatible with core assumptions of the knowledge-first approach and disjunctivist conceptions of mental states.

Outline of a theory of justification

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Sven Rosenkranz
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Epistemic Possibility ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Metaphysical Possibility ◽  
Propositional Justification ◽  
Normal Modal Logic ◽  
Present Account ◽  
Internal Condition ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Negative Introspection

Core theses of the novel account of justification to be developed are first stated: one has propositional justification for p just in case one is in no position to know that one is in no position to know p; and one has doxastic justification for p just in case one is in no position to know that one does not know p. Unlike other theories that conceive of justification in terms of the metaphysical possibility of knowing, the present account thus construes it as a distinctive kind of epistemic possibility. It treats propositional justification as non-factive, both its presence and its absence as luminous conditions, and by assuming a weak non-normal modal logic for knowledge and being in a position to know, validates principles of positive and negative introspection for it. The account thereby attributes features to justification that internalists care about. But it does so without construing justification as an internal condition. The account allows one to systematically distinguish between the condition of being justified and the metaphysical grounds for its obtaining, thereby heeding externalist insights into the difference between the good cases and the bad cases envisaged by radical scepticism. Lines of argument that show the account’s potential, e.g. in dealing with the preface and lottery paradoxes, are previewed, and so are lines of defence against challenges and objections, including prominent anti-luminosity arguments.

Competing views

2021 ◽  
pp. 170-188
Author(s):  
Sven Rosenkranz
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Possibility ◽  
Metaphysical Possibility ◽  
Propositional Justification ◽  
Present Account ◽  
Doxastic Justification ◽  
The Third ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Rule Out

The present account, which construes justification as a kind of epistemic possibility of knowing, or of being in a position to know, competes with three recently advanced theories of justification. Of these competitors, the first two construe doxastic justification as the metaphysical possibility of knowing. While they differ in some details, these views share certain problematic features: they fail to yield a corresponding account of propositional justification, have trouble vindicating an intuitive principle of closure for justified belief, and fail to comply with the independently plausible principle that if one has a justified belief, one is in no position to rule out that one has knowledge. The present account does not have these problematic features. According to the third competitor, |φ‎| is propositionally justified in one’s situation just in case it would be abnormal—and so require explanation—if |φ‎| were to be false in the presence of the evidence that one possesses in that situation. This normic theory of justification validates the principle that propositional justification agglomerates over conjunction, and in so doing, violates the constraint that propositions of the form ⌜φ‎ & ¬Kφ‎⌝ never be justified. It likewise contradicts the independently plausible principle that whenever |φ‎| is propositionally justified all things considered, |¬Kφ‎| is not. The present account does not face these problems, since it rejects the relevant agglomeration principle and treats the condition encoded by ⌜¬K¬Kφ‎⌝ as luminous.

What’s wrong with internalism?

2021 ◽  
pp. 229-263
Author(s):  
Sven Rosenkranz
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Structural Features ◽  
Present Account ◽  
Standard Version ◽  
Internal Condition

Extant internalists are either accessibilists or mentalists. Accessibilists standardly claim that whenever p is justified, one is in a position to know this fact by reflection alone or else this fact has grounds that are accessible in this way. The argument for this claim assumes that one ought to believe p only if p is justified; that therefore, grounds for justification must be luminous; and that only facts accessible by reflection fit the bill. It founders already because too few conditions are luminous. A non-standard version of accessibilism avoids this problem by conceiving of the grounds for justification as facts about what one is in a position to know by reflection alone. The argument marshalled in its favour fails to show why they cannot be facts about what one is in a position to know by other means. Mentalists claim that whenever p is justified this fact is grounded in facts about one’s mental states. One argument contends that only mentalism can account for certain structural features of justification. It founders because the present account explains these features equally well. Another argument contends that only mentalism heeds our intuitions about sceptical cases. It founders because mental states can help to confer justification only if they are arrived at in certain ways—a fact not itself determined by such states. Accessibilism and mentalism lack sufficient support and incur costs internalists do better without. The present account delivers all the goods that internalists should wish for, without making justification an internal condition.

Accessibilism

2019 ◽  
pp. 223-253
Author(s):  
Declan Smithies
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Evil Demon ◽  
New Evil Demon Problem

Chapter 7 answers the explanatory challenge by combining phenomenal mentalism with accessibilism to yield phenomenal accessibilism. Section 7.1 defines accessibilism as the thesis that epistemic justification is luminous in the sense that you’re always in a position to know which propositions you have epistemic justification to believe. Section 7.2 argues that phenomenal mentalism is part of the best explanation of accessibilism: if accessibilism can be motivated on independent grounds, then phenomenal mentalism is supported by inference to the best explanation. Sections 7.3 and 7.4 use accessibilism to motivate the intuitions about cases that support phenomenal mentalism—namely, clairvoyance, super-blindsight, and the new evil demon problem. Finally, section 7.5 answers the explanatory challenge for phenomenal mentalism: epistemic justification is determined by your current phenomenally individuated mental states because they are luminous by introspection.

Mentalism

2019 ◽  
pp. 192-220
Author(s):  
Declan Smithies
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Evil Demon ◽  
Problem Section ◽  
Epistemic Role ◽  
New Evil Demon Problem

Chapter 6 develops a theory of epistemic justification designed to capture the epistemic role of phenomenal consciousness: namely, phenomenal mentalism. Section 6.1 defines epistemic justification within the framework of evidentialism. Section 6.2 defines mentalism about epistemic justification and explores its connection with evidentialism. Section 6.3 argues for phenomenal mentalism, the thesis that epistemic justification is determined solely by your phenomenally individuated mental states, by appealing to intuitions about clairvoyance, super-blindsight, and the new evil demon problem. Section 6.4 argues for a phenomenal conception of evidence, which says that your evidence is exhausted by facts about your current phenomenally individuated mental states, and defends it against Timothy Williamson’s arguments for the E = K thesis. Finally, section 6.5 outlines an explanatory challenge for phenomenal mentalism, which sets the agenda for the second part of the book.

When Mother Earth Rises Up

2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 271-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simona Sacchi ◽  
Paolo Riva ◽  
Marco Brambilla
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Natural Disasters ◽  
Natural Disaster ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Disaster Victims ◽  
Willingness To Help ◽  
Mother Earth

Anthropomorphization is the tendency to ascribe humanlike features and mental states, such as free will and consciousness, to nonhuman beings or inanimate agents. Two studies investigated the consequences of the anthropomorphization of nature on people’s willingness to help victims of natural disasters. Study 1 (N = 96) showed that the humanization of nature correlated negatively with willingness to help natural disaster victims. Study 2 (N = 52) tested for causality, showing that the anthropomorphization of nature reduced participants’ intentions to help the victims. Overall, our findings suggest that humanizing nature undermines the tendency to support victims of natural disasters.

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