Competing views

2021 ◽  
pp. 170-188
Author(s):  
Sven Rosenkranz
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Possibility ◽  
Metaphysical Possibility ◽  
Propositional Justification ◽  
Present Account ◽  
Doxastic Justification ◽  
The Third ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Rule Out

The present account, which construes justification as a kind of epistemic possibility of knowing, or of being in a position to know, competes with three recently advanced theories of justification. Of these competitors, the first two construe doxastic justification as the metaphysical possibility of knowing. While they differ in some details, these views share certain problematic features: they fail to yield a corresponding account of propositional justification, have trouble vindicating an intuitive principle of closure for justified belief, and fail to comply with the independently plausible principle that if one has a justified belief, one is in no position to rule out that one has knowledge. The present account does not have these problematic features. According to the third competitor, |φ‎| is propositionally justified in one’s situation just in case it would be abnormal—and so require explanation—if |φ‎| were to be false in the presence of the evidence that one possesses in that situation. This normic theory of justification validates the principle that propositional justification agglomerates over conjunction, and in so doing, violates the constraint that propositions of the form ⌜φ‎ & ¬Kφ‎⌝ never be justified. It likewise contradicts the independently plausible principle that whenever |φ‎| is propositionally justified all things considered, |¬Kφ‎| is not. The present account does not face these problems, since it rejects the relevant agglomeration principle and treats the condition encoded by ⌜¬K¬Kφ‎⌝ as luminous.

Outline of a theory of justification

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Sven Rosenkranz
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Epistemic Possibility ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Metaphysical Possibility ◽  
Propositional Justification ◽  
Normal Modal Logic ◽  
Present Account ◽  
Internal Condition ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Negative Introspection

Core theses of the novel account of justification to be developed are first stated: one has propositional justification for p just in case one is in no position to know that one is in no position to know p; and one has doxastic justification for p just in case one is in no position to know that one does not know p. Unlike other theories that conceive of justification in terms of the metaphysical possibility of knowing, the present account thus construes it as a distinctive kind of epistemic possibility. It treats propositional justification as non-factive, both its presence and its absence as luminous conditions, and by assuming a weak non-normal modal logic for knowledge and being in a position to know, validates principles of positive and negative introspection for it. The account thereby attributes features to justification that internalists care about. But it does so without construing justification as an internal condition. The account allows one to systematically distinguish between the condition of being justified and the metaphysical grounds for its obtaining, thereby heeding externalist insights into the difference between the good cases and the bad cases envisaged by radical scepticism. Lines of argument that show the account’s potential, e.g. in dealing with the preface and lottery paradoxes, are previewed, and so are lines of defence against challenges and objections, including prominent anti-luminosity arguments.

scholarly journals Justificação, coerência e circularidade

2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Júlio César Burdzinski
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Propositional Justification ◽  
Fourth Section ◽  
Doxastic Justification ◽  
Inferential Justification ◽  
The Third ◽  
Non Linear

Este artigo está organizado do seguinte modo: na primeira seção, apresento as raízes histórico-filosóficas dos problemas do conhecimento e da justificação; na segunda, traço a distinção entre verdade e justificação epistêmica; a terceira seção é dedicada ao problema da circularidade, problema tradicionalmente imputado ao coerentismo; na quarta seção, apresento uma noção heterodoxa de justificação, a justificação sistêmica; na quinta, apresento e critico uma outra noção heterodoxa de justificação, a justificação inferencial não-linear; na sexta seção, apresento mais algumas distinções importantes e destaco as formas proposicional e doxástica da justificação; o exame destas formas é desenvolvido subseqüentemente na sétima seção; concluo o artigo com uma reflexão acerca da natureza e dos limites de minha proposta. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Conhecimento. Coerentismo. Circularidade. Justificação epistêmica. Justificação proposicional. Justificação doxástica. ABSTRACT This paper has the following structure: on the first section, I report on the historical and philosophical roots of the problems of knowledge and justification; on the second, I lay out the distinction between truth and epistemic justification; the third section is devoted to the problem of circularity, a problem often attributed to coherentism; on the fourth section, I introduce an unorthodox notion of justification, systemic justification; on the fifth, I present and criticize another unorthodox notion of justification, non-linear inferential justification; on the sixth, I discuss a few other distinctions and focus on the propositional and doxastic forms of justification; the examination of those forms is subsequently developed on the seventh section; I conclude with a reflection on the nature and limits of my proposal. KEY WORDS – Knowledge. Coherentism. Circularity. Epistemic justification. Propositional justification. Doxastic justification.

scholarly journals Jaws of a large belemnite and an ammonite from the Aalenian (Middle Jurassic) of Switzerland

2020 ◽  
Vol 139 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Klug ◽  
Walter Etter ◽  
René Hoffmann ◽  
Dirk Fuchs ◽  
Kenneth De Baets
Keyword(s):  
Middle Jurassic ◽  
Opalinus Clay ◽  
Northern Switzerland ◽  
The Third ◽  
Large Size ◽  
Upper Jaw ◽  
Rule Out

AbstractAlthough belemnite rostra can be quite abundant in Jurassic and Cretaceous strata, the record of belemnite jaws was limited to a few specimens from Germany and Russia. Here, we describe and figure three cephalopod jaws from the Middle Jurassic Opalinus Clay of northern Switzerland. Although flattened, the carbonaceous fossils display enough morphological information to rule out an ammonoid, nautiloid or octobrachian origin of the two larger jaws. Their similarities to belemnite jaws from Germany and Russia conforms with our interpretation of these specimens as belemnite jaws. Based on their rather large size, we tentatively assign these two jaws to the megateuthidid Acrocoelites conoideus. The third jaw is a rather small upper jaw of an ammonoid. Since Leioceras opalinum is by far the most common ammonite in this unit in northern Switzerland, we tentatively suggest that the upper jaw belongs to this species.

The Place of Reasons in Epistemology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurt Sylvan ◽  
Ernest Sosa
Keyword(s):  
Building Block ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Middle Ground ◽  
Theoretic Property ◽  
Propositional Justification ◽  
Doxastic Justification ◽  
The Road ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

This chapter defends a middle ground between two extremes in the literature on the place of reasons in epistemology. Against members of the “reasons first” movement, we argue that reasons are not the sole grounds of epistemic normativity. We suggest that the virtue-theoretic property of competence is rather the key building block. To support this approach, we note that reasons must be possessed to ground central epistemic properties, and argue that possession is grounded in competence. But while we here diverge with reasons-firsters, we also distance ourselves from those who deem reasons unimportant. Indeed, we hold that having sufficient epistemic reasons is necessary and sufficient for propositional justification, and that proper basing on them yields doxastic justification. But since possession and proper basing are grounded in competence, reasons are not the end of the road: competence enables them to do their work, putting them—and us—in the middle.

Propositional and doxastic justification

2021 ◽  
pp. 107-137
Author(s):  
Sven Rosenkranz
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Situation ◽  
Propositional Justification ◽  
Doxastic Justification

Drawing on the results of previous chapters, the proposal is made to interpret the complex operator ⌜¬K¬K⌝ as encoding propositional justification and the complex operator ⌜¬K¬K⌝ as encoding doxastic justification—where in each case justification is understood to be justification all things considered. Accordingly, not only propositional but also doxastic justification is construed as a feature of one’s epistemic situation rather than a feature of one’s beliefs. On this view, both types of justification are non-factive. The proposed account is defended against a number of putative counterexamples, the allegation that it confuses epistemic permissibility with epistemic blamelessness, and the charge that it fails to heed plausible reliabilist constraints on justification. At crucial junctures this defence relies on the availability of theorems governing the aforementioned complex operators that were proved in chapter 5.

scholarly journals Attenuation of lipopolysaccharide anorexia by antagonism of caudal brain stem but not forebrain GLP-1-R

2004 ◽  
Vol 287 (5) ◽  
pp. R1190-R1193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harvey J. Grill ◽  
Jill S. Carmody ◽  
L. Amanda Sadacca ◽  
Diana L. Williams ◽  
Joel M. Kaplan
Keyword(s):  
Food Intake ◽  
Brain Stem ◽  
Third Ventricle ◽  
Cerebral Aqueduct ◽  
Relative Importance ◽  
The Third ◽  
Native Peptide ◽  
Glucagon Like Peptide ◽  
Glucagon Like Peptide 1 ◽  
Rule Out

The central glucagon-like peptide-1 (GLP-1) system has been implicated in the control of feeding behavior. Here we explore GLP-1 mediation of the anorexic response to administration of systemic LPS and address the relative importance of caudal brain stem and forebrain GLP-1 receptor (GLP-1-R) for the mediation of the response. Fourth-intracerebroventricular delivery of the GLP-1-R antagonist exendin-(9–39) (10 μg) did not itself affect food intake in the 24 h after injection but significantly attenuated the otherwise robust (∼60%) reduction in food intake obtained after LPS (100 μg/kg) treatment. This result highlights a role for caudal brain stem GLP-1-R in the mediation of LPS anorexia but does not rule out the possibility that forebrain receptors also contribute to the response. Forebrain contribution was addressed by delivery of the GLP-1-R antagonist to the third ventricle with the caudal flow of cerebrospinal fluid blocked by occlusion of the cerebral aqueduct. Exendin-(9–39) delivery thus limited to forebrain did not attenuate the anorexic response to LPS. These data suggest that LPS anorexia is mediated, in part, by release of the native peptide acting on GLP-1-R within the caudal brain stem.

scholarly journals D-Dimer Concentrations in Normal Pregnancy: New Diagnostic Thresholds Are Needed

2005 ◽  
Vol 51 (5) ◽  
pp. 825-829 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey A Kline ◽  
Ginger W Williams ◽  
Jackeline Hernandez-Nino
Keyword(s):  
Fetal Loss ◽  
Pregnant Patient ◽  
Normal Pregnancy ◽  
Progressive Increase ◽  
Third Trimester ◽  
The Third ◽  
Diagnostic Thresholds ◽  
Turbidimetric Assay ◽  
D Dimer ◽  
Rule Out

Abstract Background: Pregnancy is known to increase the D-dimer concentration above the conventional normal threshold of 0.50 mg/L, leading to an increased false-positive D-dimer test when venous thromboembolism (VTE) is clinically suspected in a pregnant patient. Our aim was to determine the effect of normal pregnancy on the D-dimer concentration. Methods: Healthy women who were seeking to become pregnant and had no preexisting condition known to increase the D-dimer concentration were identified. Quantitative D-dimer measurements (MDA turbidimetric assay) and fibrinogen assays were performed before conception, at each trimester, and at 4 weeks postpartum. Patients were excluded for fetal loss or preeclampsia. Results: A total of 50 women were enrolled in the study, and blood samples were obtained at preconception and all trimesters from 23 women. The mean (SD) preconception D-dimer concentration was 0.43 (0.49) mg/L, and 79% of women had a D-dimer concentration <0.50 mg/L. D-Dimer increased with each trimester such that only 22% of women in the second trimester and none (of 23) in the third trimester (95% confidence interval, 0–14%) had a D-dimer concentration <0.50 mg/L. We found no correlation between either the D-dimer and fibrinogen concentrations or between the increases in D-dimer and fibrinogen with pregnancy. Conclusions: Normal pregnancy causes a progressive increase in circulating D-dimer. The D-dimer test has no use in ruling out VTE in the third trimester if a cutoff of 0.50 mg/L is used. A large management study is needed to establish new thresholds for the D-dimer to rule out VTE in each trimester.

Reliabilism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alvin I. Goldman
Keyword(s):  
Visual Observation ◽  
Identical Twin ◽  
Psychological Process ◽  
Evil Demon ◽  
Relevant Alternatives ◽  
Twin Sister ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Visual Identification ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Rule Out

Reliabilism is an approach to the nature of knowledge and of justified belief. Reliabilism about justification, in its simplest form, says that a belief is justified if and only if it is produced by a reliable psychological process, meaning a process that produces a high proportion of true beliefs. A justified belief may itself be false, but its mode of acquisition (or the way it is subsequently sustained) must be of a kind that typically yields truths. Since random guessing, for example, does not systematically yield truths, beliefs acquired by guesswork are not justified. By contrast, identifying middle-sized physical objects by visual observation is presumably pretty reliable, so beliefs produced in this manner are justified. Reliabilism does not require that the possessor of a justified belief should know that it was reliably produced. Knowledge of reliability is necessary for knowing that a belief is justified, but the belief can be justified without the agent knowing that it is. A similar reliabilist account is offered for knowledge, except that two further conditions are added. First, the target belief must be true and, second, its mode of acquisition must rule out all serious or ‘relevant’ alternatives in which the belief would be false. Even an accurate visual identification of Judy does not constitute knowledge unless it is acute enough to exclude the possibility that it is her twin sister Trudy instead. One major virtue of reliabilism is its ability to secure knowledge against threats of scepticism. In place of excessive requirements often proposed by sceptics, reliabilism substitutes more moderate conditions. People do not need infallible or certainty-producing processes to have justified beliefs, according to reliabilism, only fairly reliable ones. Processes need not exclude radical alternatives like Descartes’ evil demon in order to generate knowledge; they need only exclude realistic possibilities like the presence of an identical twin.

scholarly journals The series spectrum of ionised carbon (C II)

1924 ◽  
Vol 105 (731) ◽  
pp. 299-310 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Theory ◽  
Atomic Structure ◽  
Essential Feature ◽  
Present Writer ◽  
Experimental Confirmation ◽  
Neutral Atoms ◽  
Present Account ◽  
The Third

For the development of the theory of atomic structure there would appear to be a special need for data relating to the series spectra of the lighter elements. It has, therefore, been thought desirable to publish the present account of the series of singly-ionised carbon without waiting for the completion of the investigation of the spectrum at other stages of ionisation. It is an essential feature of Bohr's quantum theory of spectra that while the series constant for neutral atoms is nearly the same as that for hydrogen, the value of this constant will be increased four times when the atom is singly ionised, nine times when it is doubly ionised, 16 times when it is trebly ionised, and so on. Evidence that a system of series represents a particular stage of ionisation is thus to be sought in the value of the series constant for the system in question. Experimental confirmation has been obtained as far as the second ionisation by Paschen in the case of aluminium,* and as far as the third ionisation by the present writer in the case of silicon.

scholarly journals Unilateral Nevoid Telangiectasia in a Healthy Man

2021 ◽  
pp. 330-335
Author(s):  
Kirley Küçük ◽  
Florence Bourlond ◽  
Nicolas Votquenne ◽  
Farida Benhadou
Keyword(s):  
Blood Test ◽  
Atrial Myxoma ◽  
Upper Extremities ◽  
Thyroid Disorder ◽  
Underlying Condition ◽  
The Third ◽  
Diagnostic Hypothesis ◽  
Rare Diagnosis ◽  
Thyroid Dysfunctions ◽  
Rule Out

We report the case of a healthy 26-year-old man presenting telangiectatic macules on the left thorax and arm since childhood. The main diagnostic hypothesis were unilateral nevoid telangiectasia (UNT), hereditary benign telangiectasia, atrial myxoma, segmental serpiginous angioma, circumscribed neviform angiokeratoma, and nevus vascularis mixtus. The diagnosis retained was UNT characterized by congenital or acquired telangiectasia distributed asymmetrically along the upper extremities, or the third or fourth cervical dermatomes. The congenital form is extremely rare, predominant in men, and persists in adulthood. The acquired form is most frequent, affects preferentially women, usually appears at puberty or during pregnancy and tends to disappear. Estrogen excess triggers the formation of telangiectasia. UNT is rarely associated with liver or thyroid disorder. Pulsed-dye lasers and normalization of estrogen are proposed as therapeutic options. We report a rare diagnosis of UNT in a young man with no other underlying condition. We would like to highlight that in the presence of unilateral telangiectasia, a complete clinical examination must be performed to rule out signs of hyperestrogenism in man, ocular or neurological abnormalities, a blood test to exclude pregnancy, hepatic and thyroid dysfunctions, and ultrasonography in case of suspicion of atrial myxoma.

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