Discrete Bids and Empirical Inference in Divisible Good Auctions

2011 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 974-1014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakub Kastl
Keyword(s):  
Divisible Good Auctions

scholarly journals When Less (Potential Demand) Is More (Revenue): Asymmetric Bidding Capacities in Divisible Good Auctions

2006 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
Orly Sade ◽  
Charles Schnitzlein ◽  
Jaime F. Zender
Keyword(s):  
Potential Demand ◽  
Divisible Good Auctions

Divisible Good Auctions with Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Examination

2013 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 1271-1300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Morales-Camargo ◽  
Orly Sade ◽  
Charles Schnitzlein ◽  
Jaime F. Zender
Keyword(s):  
Uniform Price Auction ◽  
Bidding Behavior ◽  
Uniform Price ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Symmetric Information ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Divisible Good Auctions ◽  
Average Revenue ◽  
Auction Formats ◽  
Discriminatory Auctions

AbstractAn experimental approach is used to compare bidding behavior and auction performance in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when there is incomplete information concerning the common value of the auctioned good. In a symmetric information environment, the different auction formats provide the same average revenue. However, when information is asymmetric the discriminatory auction results in higher average revenue than the uniform-price auction. The volatility of revenue is higher in the uniform-price auctions in all treatments. The results, therefore, provide support for the use of the discriminatory format. Subject characteristics and measures of experience in recent auctions are found to be useful in explaining bidding behavior.

Divisible-Good Auctions: The Role of Allocation Rules

2004 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilan Kremer ◽  
Kjell G. Nyborg
Keyword(s):  
Allocation Rules ◽  
Divisible Good Auctions
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