Kempster, Hon. Michael Edmund Ivor, (21 June 1923–28 May 1998), a Justice of Appeal, Court of Appeal, Bermuda, since 1993; a Justice of Appeal, 1984–93, Vice-President, 1993, of the Supreme Court of Hong Kong (a Judge of the Supreme Court, 1982–84)

2007 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Vice President ◽  
Appeal Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Court Of Appeal

scholarly journals The evasion of Section 187(1)(c) of the Labour Relations Act: National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Aveng Trident Steel (a division of Aveng Africa Proprietary Ltd) (JA25/18) [2019] ZALAC 36; (2019) 40 ILJ 2024 (LAC); [2019] 9 BLLR 899 (LAC)

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 642-650
Author(s):  
Rasheed Keith-Bandath
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
National Union ◽  
Labour Relations ◽  
Appeal Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
First Time ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Conditions Of Employment

Section 187(1)(c) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA), has over the years proven to be a controversial section. At the heart of the controversy is the question as to whether an employer may terminate employees’ contracts of employment based on operational requirements in circumstances where they refuse to accept changes to terms and conditions of employment. This question came before the courts on a number of occasions and answered in the affirmative by the Labour Appeal Court in Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA ((2003) 21 ILJ 133 (LAC)), and confirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court of Appeal in National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd (2005 (5) SA 433 (SCA)). However, the LRA has since been amended with the Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 of 2014 (LRAA). Whether an employer may, in light of the amendments, adopt this approach, was recently considered by the LabourAppeal Court in National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Aveng Trident Steel (a division of Aveng Africa Proprietary Ltd) ((JA25/18) [2019] ZALAC 36; (2019) 40 ILJ 2024 (LAC); [2019] 9 BLLR 899 (LAC) (13 June 2019) (Aveng case (LAC)). The judgment is noteworthy as it is the first time that the Labour Appeal Court (LAC) delivered judgment relating to section 187(1)(c) of the LRA post-amendment, thus providing a degree of judicial certainty on the interpretation to be accorded to the amended section.

scholarly journals Contentious Issues Arising from Payments made in Full and Final Settlement

2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 153
Author(s):  
R Ismail
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Discussion ◽  
Trial Court ◽  
Appeal Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Final Settlement ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Specific Amount ◽  
Made In

Payments made in full and final settlement have on several occasions presented interpretative difficulties for our judiciary, as will become apparent from this case discussion: Be Bop A Lula Manufacturing & Printing v Kingtex Marketing 2008 3 SA 327 (SCA). The Supreme Court of Appeal reversed the judgments of the trial court and the appeal court (full bench of the Cape Provincial Division) which were in favour of the creditor. In such cases, the essential enquiry is whether an agreement of compromise exists. A transactio or compromise (in the form of a legal agreement) exists where the relevant parties agree to settle previously disputed or uncertain obligations. Like any other agreement, a compromise is based on the contractual rules of offer and acceptance. The first material enquiry in this case wherein the debtor delivered the cheque payment to the creditor (in full and final settlement of the account), is whether 1) an intended offer of compromise exists; or 2) did the debtor merely intend to make payment towards an admitted liability. The court in the Be Bop (SCA) case came to the correct finding that an offer of compromise existed. Whilst the judgment is brief, the finding itself gives practical recognition to the principle that admission of liability for a specific amount, accompanied by payment (in full and final settlement), may still be accompanied by an intended offer of compromise, instead of merely making payment towards an admission of liability. 

Criminal Law in Internal Conflict of Laws in Malaŵi

1985 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matembo Nzunda
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Internal Conflict ◽  
Appellate Court ◽  
Criminal Jurisdiction ◽  
Appeal Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government ◽  
Appeal Courts ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Malaŵi has two sets of courts which run completely parallel to each other. One set forms the Judicial Branch of the Government and consists of magistrates’ courts (which have original civil and criminal jurisdiction only), the High Court (which has unlimited original and appellate civil and criminal jurisdiction) and the Supreme Court of Appeal (which has original criminal jurisdiction for contempt of court but otherwise has appellate civil and criminal jurisdiction). The Supreme Court of Appeal is a final appellate court in this set of courts. These courts are here called Received Courts because they apply the received (English) common law as the basic law.The other set of courts is a section of the Ministry of Justice (which is part of the Executive Branch of the Government). The set consists of Traditional Courts of Grades A and B, the Traditional Appeal Courts (which hear and determine appeals from Traditional Courts of Grades A and B), District Traditional Courts, Regional Traditional Courts and the National Traditional Appeal Court (which hears and determines appeals from Traditional Appeal Courts, District Traditional Courts and Regional Traditional Courts). The civil and criminal jurisdiction of Traditional Courts is set out in the warrant establishing the Court and is supplemented from time to time by published ministerial orders under the authority of the Traditional Courts Act (the 1962 Act). The National Traditional Appeal Court is a final appellate court in this set of courts.

scholarly journals Extending The Scope Of Proprietary Remedies To Recovery Of Pure Profits From Successful Investment Of Bribes: The Endgame In Lister V Stubbs

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aiman Nariman Mohd Sulaiman ◽  
Mohsin Hingun
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Fiduciary Duty ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Fiduciary Duties ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Harsh Reality

For more than a century Lister v Stubbs (1890) 45 Ch D 1 stood as authoritative Court of Appeal judgment denying the recovery of profits acquired from the successful investment of gains obtained in breach of fiduciary duties. The rule was rationalized on the basis that while the claimant was entitled to the proceeds so unlawfully obtained, he lacked any form of proprietary title to the profits accumulated by the defaulting fiduciary. The harsh reality of the rule produced an unfair outcome to the claimant and the Privy Council refused to apply it in Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324. The rule also fell out of favour in other leading commonwealth jurisdictions and recently the English courts at all levels had the opportunity to reassess its relevance when the Supreme Court in FHR European Ventures LLP and others v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] 4 All ER 79 consigned it to oblivion. The objective of this paper is to analyse the merits and the deficiencies of the rule and show how the judges of the English courts were prepared to act on policy ground, in comity with other common law jurisdictions in upholding justice in a borderless world. Keywords: breach of Fiduciary duty; Accounts of profits; Proprietary interests; Recovery of pure profits.

PROPRIETARY REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

2014 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 490-493
Author(s):  
Matthew Conaglen
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
Informed Consent ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Fiduciary Duty ◽  
Fiduciary Duties ◽  
Trade Finance ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
English Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal

FHR bought a long lease for €211.5 million. Cedar Capital conducted the negotiations on FHR's behalf, but also received a €10 million commission from the vendor. On becoming aware of this commission, FHR sought to recover it from Cedar Capital. As its negotiating agent, Cedar Capital owed fiduciary duties to FHR, and had not obtained FHR's fully informed consent to the commission. Cedar Capital therefore had to account to FHR for the commission. However, applying the Court of Appeal's decision in Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd. v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd. [2011] EWCA Civ 347, [2012] Ch. 453, Simon J. held that the remedy was purely personal; FHR could not assert a proprietary constructive trust over the €10 million: FHR European Ventures LLP v Mankarious [2011] EWHC 2999 (Ch). The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal as to remedy, distinguishing the facts from those in Sinclair v Versailles, but also casting some doubt on the correctness of that decision: [2013] EWCA Civ 17, [2014] Ch. 1. The Supreme Court was thus required to pass judgment on the voluminous debate as to whether English law should follow Lister & Co. v Stubbs (1890) 45 Ch.D. 1, or Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 A.C. 324.

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