Tindemans, Leo, (16 April 1922–26 Dec. 2014), Member (Christian Democratic Party), House of Representatives, Belgium, 1961–89

Res Publica ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 607-622
Author(s):  
Patrick Senaeve

The method for calculating the distribution of seats in Belgium in local elections (called the Imperiali-method) is known as a method that favours stronger lists of candidates and is prejudicial to weaker lists. An exhaustive comparison was made between the results - in terms of distribution of seats - of the local elections of 10 October, 1976 and those that would have resulted from a distribution based upon the D'Hondt-method (which is used for all other elections in Belgium). This comparison shows that the distribution of seats would differ in more than two thirds of the communes. In more than one fourth of the communes parties do not obtain any representative under the present system, whereas they would under the D'Hondt system. Local and leftist parties are primarily prejudiced by the present system, whereas the big christian-democratic party is hardly hampered by it. The court of mayor and aldermen - the commune' s executive - is elected by the local councillors, and as a consequence, the majority in the council obtains all seats in the court. At present, these courts consist of representatives of one single list in 61 % of the communes and of representatives of two or more lists (executive coalition) in 39 % of the communes. On the basis of the D'Hondt-method, existing homogeneous ( i.e., one party-)courts would have to be replaced by coalitions between parties in more than 10 % of the communes.


1996 ◽  
Vol 90 (3) ◽  
pp. 534-554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol Mershon

Governments in Italy both change and remain the same. From 1946 to 1992 the Christian Democratic Party always held governing power. But almost no cabinet stayed in office more than a few years, and many governments collapsed after only a few months. How can instability coexist with stability in this way? How can governments break up at such low cost and with so little effect on alternation? These questions are rooted in—but not resolved by—the available game-theoretic literature on coalitional behavior. My answer is that politicians' purposive actions can reduce the costs of coalition. I argue that the costs of making, breaking, and maintaining coalitions depend on political institutions and on the array of parties and voters in policy space. Institutional and spatial conditions structure politicians' opportunities and attempts to lower costs. Under some conditions, as I show, coalitions are cheap, and politicians can easily make coalitions even cheaper. The inference is that this framework comprehends both Italy's extremes and the degrees of stability found in other parliamentary democracies.


2013 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 917-938 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Pablo Luna ◽  
Felipe Monestier ◽  
Fernando Rosenblatt

Significance Candidates ranged in their responses, from non-committal on their use of tariffs to criticism of President Donald Trump’s tariff use. The Democratic Party is in the midst of a debate about the direction of trade policy, including whether to pass the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and how to conduct and prioritise trade policy should their nominee win the presidency in November 2020. Impacts The House of Representatives may vote on the USMCA in coming months. If the House does not vote on the USMCA before December 2019, the next window would likely be November-December 2020. The Trump administration will try to show progress in trade talks with China before November 2020, hoping to gain votes.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yusaku Horiuchi ◽  
Daniel M. Smith ◽  
Teppei Yamamoto

Representative democracy entails the aggregation of multiple policy issues by parties into competing bundles of policies, or “manifestos,” which are then evaluated holistically by voters in elections. This aggregation process obscures the multidimensional policy preferences underlying a voter’s single choice of party or candidate. We address this problem through a conjoint experiment based on the actual party manifestos in Japan’s 2014 House of Representatives election. By juxtaposing sets of issue positions as hypothetical manifestos and asking respondents to choose one, our study identifies the effects of specific positions on the overall assessment of manifestos, heterogeneity in preferences among subgroups of respondents, and the popularity ranking of manifestos. Our analysis uncovers important discrepancies between voter preferences and the portrayal of the election results by politicians and the media as providing a policy mandate to the Liberal Democratic Party, underscoring the potential danger of inferring public opinion from election outcomes alone.


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