Antyamerykańska trauma i nostalgia za komunizmem we włoskiej wojnie o pamięć na przykładzie twórczości Giorgia Gabera

Anti-American Trauma and Nostalgia for Communism in the Italian Memory War as Presented in Giorgio Gaber’s Work Although the contemporary Italian memory war originally stems from a debate around the trauma of the 1943-1945 civil war between Italian Fascists and the Resistance, it’s almost equally crucial aspect remains that of the two conflicting narratives of the early Cold War period (1945-1948). One of those is the dominant memory pattern, imposed by the ruling Christian Democratic Party (pro-American and anti-Communist), opposed by the alternative and marginalized view promoted by the Communists (anti-American and pro-Communist). Giorgio Gaber (1939-2003), a famous Italian cantautore (singer-songwriter), is one the exponents of anti-American trauma and nostalgia for communism within the latter narrative. In his two famous texts, America and Some used to be Communists, he offers precious insights into these aspects of his generation’s own memory and their ancestors’ post-memory of the post-war period.

Los esfuerzos de la democracia cristiana alemana para favorecer la transición española, 1975-1977 = The Efforts of the German Christian Democracy to Favor the Spanish Transition to Democracy, 1975-1977

El presente artículo analiza la ayuda que el partido demócrata cristiano alemán, la Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU) y la fundación política alemana de ideología afín, la Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, otorgaron a sus homólogos españoles desde los últimos meses del franquismo hasta las primeras elecciones democráticas en junio de 1977. Para ello se utilizan principalmente los fondos del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, los fondos del Archivo Federal, los del Arxiu Nacional de Catalunya y los archivos personales de José María Gil Robles, Iñaki Anasagasti y Josef Thesing, todo ello complementado con prensa alemana y española de la época. Las conclusiones resaltan varios aspectos: que el apoyo alemán a sus homólogos comenzó temprano porque en principio la CDU tenía identificados a los demócrata cristianos españoles que eran socios de la UEDC desde 1965; tanto la Cancillería como la democracia cristiana alemana desplegaron una batería de recursos para apoyar la democratización de España; a pesar del esfuerzo político y económico realizado, los alemanes no cosecharon el éxito deseado en su voluntad por conseguir en España la consolidación de un partido de centro –a falta de un partido netamente democristiano– que integrara a la democracia cristiana; y sin embargo, que el triunfo electoral de la UCD –que contaba con un importante sector democristiano– en las elecciones del 15 de junio de 1977, abría una nueva esperanza para los objetivos de la CDU en España.AbstractThis article analizes the support that the German Christian democratic party, Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU) and the German Christian democratic foundation, Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, provided to their Spanish counterparts from the end of Francoism until the first democratic elections held on June 1977. The primary sources for this work have been records from the German Foreign Office, the Federal Archive, the National Archive of Catalonia, as well as the private archives of José María Gil Robles, Iñaki Anasagasti and Josef Thesing. All of this complemented with Spanish and German press of that time. The conclusions highlight several aspects: the first one, that the German Christian democratic support to its Spanish counterpart began early due to the participation of the Spanish Christian democrats in the European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU) since 1965; both the Chancellery as well as the German Christian democracy deployed a battery of resources to support the Spanish democratization; despite the political and economic effort, the Germans did not achieve their objective of a consolidated centre party –in the absence of a great purely Christian Democratic party– that integrated all the Christian democrats; and nevertheless, the electoral triumph of UCD –which had an important Christian Democratic sector– in the elections held on 15 June 1977, opened a new hope for the objectives of the CDU in Spain.

The Presidential Candidacy of Radomiro Tomic

This chapter assesses the presidential candidacy of Radomiro Tomic. Shortly after assuming the presidency, Eduardo Frei Montalva appointed his old friend and fellow Christian Democratic leader Radomiro Tomic to the ambassadorship in Washington. The decision, apparently made after consulting with the appointee, clearly looked toward the 1970 presidential election. Tomic, as it was widely known, was second only to Frei in the Christian Democratic leadership, and his nomination as the candidate of the party for the next presidential election was all but preordained. As the country's representative in the most important center of power in the Western Hemisphere, Tomic's image and standing in Chile would be shielded from the potentially negative consequences of being actively involved in domestic politics. At the same time, Tomic would be able to forge links with the Washington establishment, a more than precious asset for someone whose main political goal was to become president of Chile. Ultimately, Tomic was one of the historic leaders of the Christian Democratic Party. Besides his left-leaning political position, what identified Tomic and distinguished him from most politicians of his generation was his charisma.

The United States and the Last Two Years of the Frei Administration

This chapter addresses the congressional election of 1969, which took place in a landscape substantially different from that of 1965. Most political forces had endured transformative changes that led to the birth of new organizations, further internal polarization, or outright fragmentation. The Christian Democratic Party had suffered a predictable decrease in its popularity after four and a half years in government, during which many promises had been delivered on but no truly revolutionary change had been implemented. As shown by the internal fights of 1967–1968 and the attitude of its most likely presidential candidate for 1970, Radomiro Tomic, the Christian Democratic Party had lost the unity of purpose that had accounted for so much of its electoral success a few years earlier. Nevertheless, Eduardo Frei's personal popularity and the party's electoral following still allowed the Christian Democratic Party to stand as the strongest party in Chilean politics. The Radical Party had also been weakened by internal divisions; since 1967, the party had moved decisively, although not without conflict, to the left. Meanwhile, one of the most important Socialist leaders, Raúl Ampuero, created a new political movement in 1968, the Popular Socialist Union (USOPO), generously funded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The only party that had not endured any transformative crisis or substantial change in the years after the election of 1964 was the best organized and most united of all, the Communist Party.

Time of Trouble, 1967–1969

This chapter details how, despite the seemingly favorable situation for the Chilean government, in 1967 things would begin to go in a very different direction. After the first two successful years of the Frei administration, the attitude of the opposition stiffened noticeably, and even within the Christian Democratic Party some leaders began to voice their disagreement with the character and the pace of some of the reforms implemented by the government. Eduardo Frei himself was still a popular figure, a condition he would continue to enjoy for most of his tenure and beyond. In addition, his positive international standing reinforced his image in Chile. However, his own personal popularity would not translate into a continuation of the success of the first two years of his administration. The changing winds of Chilean politics and the declining fortunes of the Lyndon B. Johnson administration would get in the way, and it was, in fact, a situation connected to the close relationship between the Frei administration and the United States that marked the beginning of the end of the Revolution in Liberty.