scholarly journals Help thine enemy: the evolution of short ranging signals

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Szabolcs Számadó

AbstractThe proximity risk model offers one possible explanation of honest signalling of aggressive intent in biology. This model assumes that the probability of successful attack is a function of the distance between the contestants and that this distance can be correctly estimated. This later assumption may not hold in nature where contestants have to estimate this distance under noisy conditions. Here I investigate with the help of a game theoretical model whether short-range ranging signals can be evolutionarily stable under such conditions. These signals can help the opponent to estimate the correct distance, thus they can promote honest signalling of intentions. Here I show that ranging signals that help the estimation of distance between opponents can be evolutionarily stable. However, such help only benefits those individuals who are able and willing to attack. As a result, ranging signals in themselves are an honest cue of proximity and in turn they are honest cues of aggressive intent. I give an example: “soft-song” in birds, and I discuss the predictions of the model.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quan-Hoang Vuong

What described below is a just some initial idea on how a game-theoretical model can be structured, with the purpose of considering a head-on competition for talent in the marketplace. The solutions, albeit carefully checked, are not complete either.



2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Collins ◽  
Philip Thomas ◽  
Mark Broom ◽  
Trung Hieu Vu




Risk Analysis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lifang Li ◽  
Qingpeng Zhang ◽  
Jun Zhuang


1983 ◽  
Vol 100 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans J. Bremermann ◽  
John Pickering


2001 ◽  
Vol 157 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anders Brodin ◽  
Ken Lundborg ◽  
Colin W. Clark


2016 ◽  
Vol 07 (09) ◽  
pp. 852-860 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Broom ◽  
Jan Rychtář ◽  
Tracy Spears-Gill


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yifan Jiao ◽  
Christopher S. Tang ◽  
Jingqi Wang

The market for online games is huge, but research on the economics of online game operations remains nascent. In this paper, we focus on “free-to-play” online games in which a game provider offers players an option to purchase game-specific virtual goods (items) for improving their winning chances before the game begins. Because selling virtual items is the main revenue stream in free-to-play games, it is important for game providers to find ways to entice players to purchase virtual items. We observe that some game providers disclose the opponent’s skill level before the game begins by using a “transparent selling” mechanism to sell virtual items, whereas others conceal this information from the players. This observation motivates us to examine whether and when game providers should adopt transparent selling. By analyzing a game-theoretical model that involves one game provider and two competitive players, we obtain the following results. First, when the price of the virtual goods is endogenously determined by the game provider, we find that transparent selling is not effective: it is optimal for the provider to adopt “opaque selling” by concealing the opponent’s skill level information from players. However, opaque selling hurts the player’s welfare. Second, when the selling price is exogenously given, transparent selling dominates opaque selling when the given price is high. Our results identify the conditions under which transparent selling dominates opaque selling.



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