Delete or Not: A Game‐Theoretical Model for Soft Censorship of Rumor

Risk Analysis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lifang Li ◽  
Qingpeng Zhang ◽  
Jun Zhuang
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Game Theoretical Model

A Compensation Game: MNC vs. SME

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quan-Hoang Vuong
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Game Theoretical Model ◽  
Initial Idea

What described below is a just some initial idea on how a game-theoretical model can be structured, with the purpose of considering a head-on competition for talent in the marketplace. The solutions, albeit carefully checked, are not complete either.

A Game-Theoretical Model of Investment Treaty Arbitration

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Collins ◽  
Philip Thomas ◽  
Mark Broom ◽  
Trung Hieu Vu
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Investment Treaty ◽  
Game Theoretical Model ◽  
Investment Treaty Arbitration

A Game Theoretical Model of the Evolution of Food Hoarding: Applications to the Paridae

1998 ◽  
Vol 151 (4) ◽  
pp. 356
Author(s):  
Smulders
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Food Hoarding ◽  
Game Theoretical Model

A game-theoretical model of parasite virulence

1983 ◽  
Vol 100 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans J. Bremermann ◽  
John Pickering
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Game Theoretical Model

scholarly journals The Effect of Dominance on Food Hoarding: A Game Theoretical Model

2001 ◽  
Vol 157 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anders Brodin ◽  
Ken Lundborg ◽  
Colin W. Clark
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Food Hoarding ◽  
Game Theoretical Model

scholarly journals The Game-Theoretical Model of Using Insecticide-Treated Bed-Nets to Fight Malaria

2016 ◽  
Vol 07 (09) ◽  
pp. 852-860 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Broom ◽  
Jan Rychtář ◽  
Tracy Spears-Gill
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Bed Nets ◽  
Game Theoretical Model ◽  
Insecticide Treated Bed Nets

Selling Virtual Items in Free-to-Play Games: Transparent Selling vs. Opaque Selling

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yifan Jiao ◽  
Christopher S. Tang ◽  
Jingqi Wang
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Online Games ◽  
Skill Level ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Online Game ◽  
Game Theoretical Model ◽  
Level Information ◽  
The Given

The market for online games is huge, but research on the economics of online game operations remains nascent. In this paper, we focus on “free-to-play” online games in which a game provider offers players an option to purchase game-specific virtual goods (items) for improving their winning chances before the game begins. Because selling virtual items is the main revenue stream in free-to-play games, it is important for game providers to find ways to entice players to purchase virtual items. We observe that some game providers disclose the opponent’s skill level before the game begins by using a “transparent selling” mechanism to sell virtual items, whereas others conceal this information from the players. This observation motivates us to examine whether and when game providers should adopt transparent selling. By analyzing a game-theoretical model that involves one game provider and two competitive players, we obtain the following results. First, when the price of the virtual goods is endogenously determined by the game provider, we find that transparent selling is not effective: it is optimal for the provider to adopt “opaque selling” by concealing the opponent’s skill level information from players. However, opaque selling hurts the player’s welfare. Second, when the selling price is exogenously given, transparent selling dominates opaque selling when the given price is high. Our results identify the conditions under which transparent selling dominates opaque selling.

Game Theoretical Model for Adaptive Intrusion Detection System

2014 ◽  
pp. 133-163
Author(s):  
Jan Stiborek ◽  
Martin Grill ◽  
Martin Rehak ◽  
Karel Bartos ◽  
Jan Jusko
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Intrusion Detection ◽  
Intrusion Detection System ◽  
Detection System ◽  
Game Theoretical Model
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