scholarly journals The impact of corporate governance mechanisms on real and accrual earnings management practices: evidence from Jordan

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (6) ◽  
pp. 1167-1186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lara Al-Haddad ◽  
Mark Whittington

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on real (REM), accrual-based earnings management (AEM) and REM/AEM interaction in Jordan following the 2009 Jordanian CG Code (JCGC). Design/methodology/approach The study used a sample of 108 Jordanian public firms covering 2010-2014. Hypotheses are tested using pooled OLS-regression models. Findings The authors find that both institutional and managerial ownership constrain the use of REM and AEM. In contrast, both independent directors and large shareholders are found to exaggerate such practices, and CEO-duality is found to exaggerate REM only. However, foreign ownership does not appear to have a significant impact. They further find that managers use REM and AEM jointly to obtain the greatest earnings impact. Practical implications The findings have important implications for policymakers, regulators, audit professionals and investors in their attempts to constrain earnings management (EM) practices and improve financial reporting quality in Jordan. Originality/value The authors believe this to be the first Jordanian study examining the relationship between CG mechanisms and both REM and AEM following the introduction of the 2009 JCGC, as well as the first in Jordan and the Middle East to examine board characteristics and REM. Moreover, it is the first to test for the potential substitution of REM and AEM since the 2009 JCGC enactment. As such, the findings draw attention to EM practices and the role of monitoring mechanisms in Jordan.

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kahkashan Mahmood ◽  
Yasser Barghathi ◽  
Alhashmi Aboubaker Lasyoud

Purpose For investors to wholeheartedly entrust their finances to the supposed executives, there is the need to set up policies to checkmate the excesses of such executives, hence clawback policy. This study aims to explore the perceptions of professionals regarding the impact of clawback provisions on earnings management (EM) and financial reporting quality in the context of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Design/methodology/approach The application of a qualitative approach in an EM is of great significance in this study. For convenience, perceptions of the professionals were collected through semi-structured face-to-face interviews, internet forums and telephone conversations from which the data were initially transcribed and analyzed using thematic analysis. Findings The findings of the study indicate that clawbacks will have a significant impact on EM and financial reporting quality, and apart from this, other firm-level factors have also been supporting clawbacks. Practical implications EM has been a widespread practice; this research may potentially assist directors and regulatory bodies to comprehend factors that should be considered to reduce it. It may also provide practical insights from professionals regarding clawbacks and their bearing on EM and the quality of financial information from an emerging economy perspective. Originality/value A significant gap in the contemporary literature regarding the impact of clawback provisions on EM and financial reporting quality has been filed by this work, in the context of the UAE economy. Consequently, it provides a great insight into the effect of clawback in a business setting and how it can help checkmate the excesses of company executives.


2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (10) ◽  
pp. 1137-1151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maryam Safari

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the corporate governance literature by examining the aggregate effect of board and audit committee characteristics on earnings management practices, particularly in the period following the introduction of the second edition of the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations. Design/methodology/approach This paper begins by embarking on an extensive review of extant empirical research on boards of directors and audit committees. Then, the paper reports on the use of a quantitative analysis approach to specify the relationship between board and audit committee characteristics (introduced by the ASX Corporate Governance Council) and the level of absolute discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. Findings The findings suggest that greater compliance with board and audit committee principles is linked to lower earnings management, indicating that deliberate structuring of boards and audit committees is an effective approach for enhancing a firm’s financial reporting quality and providing support for the efficacy of the second edition of principles and recommendations related to boards and audit committees suggested by the ASX Corporate Governance Council. Practical implications This study significantly extends the literature and has notable implications for financial reporting regulators, as the findings regarding the monitoring role of boards and audit committees should be beneficial for future revisions of corporate governance principles and recommendations. Originality/value This study focuses on the aggregate effect of board characteristics recommended by the Australian Corporate Governance Council on earnings management practices, and the results support the effectiveness of the board and audit committee characteristics recommended by the ASX Corporate Governance Council. New directions for future improvements to the principles and recommendations are identified.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bishnu Kumar Adhikary ◽  
Ranjan Kumar Mitra ◽  
Mohammad Rajon Meah

Purpose This study aims to investigate the earnings management practices of the listed manufacturing firms in Bangladesh and assess the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on such earnings management behavior. Design/methodology/approach The study applies the real earnings management (REM) model developed by Dechow et al. (1998) and implemented by Roychowdhury (2006) and modified Jones model (1991) for the proxy of accrual-based earnings management (AEM). It uses a pooled ordinary least square regression model corrected with robust standard errors for empirical analysis. Findings The study finds that firms with small positive earnings per share are engaged in AEM to avoid losses. Also, firm managers craft discretionary expenses to manage real earnings. For governance factors, the institutional shareholders tend to play a significant role in limiting both REM and AEM embedded in generally accepted accounting principles or International Financial Reporting Standards. Also, factors such as foreign ownership and board size significantly restrict REM, whereas director ownership encourages the same. The paper does not reveal any significant monitoring role for other governance factors in curbing either REM or AEM practices by Bangladeshi firms. Research limitations/implications The paper studies the monitoring role of governance mechanisms on listed manufacturing firms’ earnings management. A study of separating the listed firms into family and non-family ones could be interesting for future research. Practical implications The paper unveils earning management techniques used by firms in Bangladesh and provides critical policy implications to the corporate governance mechanisms that effectively limit earnings management practice. Social implications The social significance is to aware constituents of financial reporting about the earnings management behavior by firms in emerging economies. Originality/value The study adds to evidence that the manufacturing firms in Bangladesh adopt both REM and AEM techniques to avoid losses. Simultaneously, the paper highlights some critical governance factors that can restrict misleading earnings management behavior by firms in an emerging economy to assist in policymaking.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristian Baú Dal Magro ◽  
Roberto Carlos Klann

Purpose Although board interlocking underlying forces are largely hidden, the purpose of this paper is to provide managers, auditors, analysts, regulators and other stakeholders with sociological board interlocking information considering the different backgrounds of their members. Design/methodology/approach The research sample gathered 1,606 observations from 2010 to 2017. For data analysis, the direct and indirect board interlocking linkages, considering the different backgrounds of board members, established the centrality indicators. Subsequently, the authors used these indicators according to each measured background in the regression models. Findings The results indicate that the political background of board interlocking members is positively related to real earnings management practices, while the financial background has a mitigating effect on such practices. Research limitations/implications The findings suggest that individual skills and interests conveyed across the corporate social network have shaped corporate governance, with distinct impacts on the quality of accounting information. Practical implications The authors conclude that both backgrounds could have implications on agency conflicts, increasing (policy) or reducing (financial) information asymmetry between the company and its various stakeholders, which indicates that the authors must consider sociological and not just economic aspects within corporate governance. Social implications The sociological background of individuals is necessary for the congruence of monitoring mechanisms, and consequently, the quality of accounting information. Originality/value This study examines the influence of the political and financial background of board interlocking members on real earnings management practices in Brazilian publicly traded companies in the International Financial Reporting Standards post-adoption period.


Author(s):  
Lars Helge Hass ◽  
Monika Tarsalewska

Financial intermediaries such as venture capitalists (VCs) not only provide financing, they also play an active role in firm governance and in financial practices before a firm goes public. Venture capitalists are actively engaged in monitoring and advising their portfolio firms. Thus, one also expects them to exert significant influence over the development of financial reporting practices. This chapter reviews recent literature and empirical evidence on VCs and financial reporting quality in newly public firms. It surveys the role of VCs in such activities as earnings management. In particular, it discusses how their monitoring activities and reputation can impact how their portfolio firms establish financial reporting practices. Subsequently, it also reviews the consequences of misreporting, and whether they affect VC behavior ex ante. Finally, the chapter uses recent data to provide empirical evidence on the effect of VCs on accrual and real earnings management.


2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 318-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hounaida Mersni ◽  
Hakim Ben Othman

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether corporate governance mechanisms affect the reporting of loan loss provisions by managers in Islamic banks in the Middle East region. Design/methodology/approach This empirical study uses balanced panel data from 20 Islamic banks, from seven Middle East countries for the period 2007 to 2011. The regression model is estimated using random effects specifications. Findings The empirical results show that discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP) are negatively related to board size and the existence of an audit committee. Results also report a positive relationship between sharia board size and DLLP. This indicates that small sharia supervisory boards are more effective than larger ones, which could be due to the higher costs and negative effects of large groups on decision-making. Results also highlight that the existence of scholars with accounting knowledge sitting on the sharia board reduces discretionary behavior. Additional results provide evidence that an external sharia audit committee is also found to reduce discretion in Islamic banks. The conclusions are found to be robust to endogeneity issues and potentially omitted variables. Practical implications The findings are potentially useful for regulators and shareholders. Regulators could use the findings to focus on corporate governance mechanisms that restrain earnings management practices in Islamic banks and implement regulations to strengthen them. Additionally, this study gives shareholders further insight which enables them to better monitor the actions of managers and thus increase their control over their investments. Originality/value This study provides two contributions to the literature on Islamic banking. First, to the authors’ knowledge, this study is only the second piece of research focused on the impact of corporate governance on earnings management in Islamic banks. Second, the authors have examined the effect of some new corporate governance mechanisms that have not been studied previously in the research literature.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 304-312
Author(s):  
MUHAMMAD TAHIR KHAN ◽  
IHTESHAM KHAN ◽  
SHAH RAZA KHAN

The main objective of the firm is to maximize the shareholder’s wealth; to achieve this objective the management indulge the earnings information by manipulation practices such practices reduce investors’ confidence. Furthermore, a hypothetical dispute recommends that a better quality of financial reporting reduce the information asymmetry, by refining the corporate governance compliance, result in reducing earnings management practices. Thus the main aim of this study is to explore the impact of corporate governance on earnings management by using panel data sample of 257 non-financial firms listed in Pakistan stock exchange for the period of 2012 to 2019 through Fixed effect model along with control variables. The results disclose that the CG system of Pakistan negatively and significantly impacts the EM activities of the companies registered in Pakistan stock exchange. Hence, concludes that the CG system is more effective to prevent the EM process. The entire results are seamless with prior research work that the effective CG scheme of the firms controls the EM and collapse of businesses. Keywords: Earnings Management, Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance Index.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 178-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qaiser Rafique Yasser ◽  
Abdullah Al Mamun ◽  
Margurite Hook

Purpose This paper aims to focus mainly on the relationship between ownership structure and earnings management of a developed and two developing economies, and is distinct from prior research. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of firms from three countries (Australia, Malaysia and Pakistan), the detailed ownership evolutions for the period 2011-2013 were observed. Findings Overall, the authors find that in the East, ownership concentration is negatively associated with financial reporting quality. Individual ownership and group ownership were negatively associated with earnings management in Pakistan, however, not in Malaysia where the same were positively associated. Further, the result of this study indicated that state ownership is negatively associated with firm performance. Among the control variables, it was found that larger firms were negatively correlated with financial reporting, while firms with a larger board size and mature in the maneuver were coupled positively with earnings management. Originality/value The results highlight the highly individualized effects of blockholders and the need for research to further understand the mechanisms through which shareholders impact financial reporting quality.


SAGE Open ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 215824402094953
Author(s):  
Mengyun Wu ◽  
Martha Coleman ◽  
Jonas Bawuah

This study investigates the long-run effect of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management of listed companies in Nigeria and Ghana. The study uses Ant Colony Optimization (ACO) and K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) in establishing a long-run effect of good corporate mechanisms in reducing earnings management practice by corporate managers. ACO selected four major corporate governance mechanisms: Board Procedure Index, Board Disclosure Index, Ownership Structure Index, and Shareholders’ Rights Index; these were the key corporate governance mechanisms that influence the reduction in earnings management activities. KNN produced a strong significant longitudinal effect of implementing good corporate governance mechanisms in decreasing the manipulating behavior of managers. Quality corporate governance mechanisms’ implementation reduces the opportunistic behavior of corporate managers in manipulating earnings. Therefore, the study alert policymakers the urgency in setting up appropriate policies to enhance the reduction in earnings management practices to provide accurate financial information for stakeholders’ financial decision-making. The use of ACO and KNN in the study is a great novelty, which presents a calibration and prediction of the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management showing the rate of reduction.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vahab Rostami ◽  
Leyla Rezaei

Purpose This study aims to trace the impact of corporate governance and its mechanisms in preventing companies from turning to fraudulent financial reporting. Design/methodology/approach For this purpose, using the systematic elimination pattern, the information of 187 listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange over six years from 2013 to 2019 were collected, and the hypotheses were examined using a linear regression model. To measure fraudulent financial reporting, the adjusted model of Beneish (1999) was used to evaluate corporate governance. Its mechanisms based on nine corporate governance mechanisms, including board independence, board remuneration, CEO financial expertise, expertise in CEO industry, board financial expertise, board industry expertise, board effort, CEO duality and managerial ownership, have been examined. These mechanisms are calculated as a combined index of corporate governance. Findings The findings indicate that robust corporate governance significantly reduces companies’ intention toward fraudulent financial reporting. In the same way, a negative and significant relationship was observed between each of the nine corporate governance mechanisms, except for board compensation and fraudulent financial reporting. Originality/value This study’s findings provide valuable insight into the importance of strengthening companies to prevent companies’ managers from engaging in fraudulent financial reporting activities. Hence, it is suggested that professional references bodies more seriously follow the rules to dictate to companies for using and empowering their corporate governance.


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