scholarly journals The global financial crisis: Causes, effects and issues to consider in the reform of financial regulation

Author(s):  
Folarin Akinbami
2011 ◽  
Vol 216 ◽  
pp. R1-R15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erland W. Nier

There is increasing recognition that prior to the global financial crisis financial regulation had lacked a macroprudential perspective. There has since been a strong effort to make a new macroprudential orientation operational, including through the establishment of new macroprudential authorities or ‘committees’ in a number of jurisdictions. These developments raise — and this paper explores — the following three questions. First, what distinguishes macroprudential policy from microprudential policy and what are its key tasks? Second, what powers should be given to macroprudential authorities and what should be their mandate? Third, how can governance arrangements ensure that macroprudential policies are pursued effectively? While arrangements for macroprudential policy will to some extent be country-specific, we identify three basic challenges in setting up an effective macroprudential policy framework and discuss options to address them.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 305-321
Author(s):  
Iris H-Y Chiu

In the wake of the global financial crisis, the trajectory of legal reforms is likely to turn towards more transparency regulation. This article argues that transparency regulation will take on a new role of surveillance as intelligence and data mining expand in the wholesale financial sector, supporting the creation of designated systemic risk oversight regulators.The role of market discipline, which has been acknowledged to be weak leading up to the financial crisis, is likely to be eclipsed by a more technocratic governance in the financial sector. In this article, however, concerns are raised about the expansion of technocratic surveillance and whether financial sector participants would internalise the discipline of regulatory control. Certain endemic features of the financial sector will pose challenges for financial regulation even in the surveillance age.


2020 ◽  
pp. 203-222
Author(s):  
Thomas Rixen ◽  
Lora Anne Viola

The global financial crisis led G20 states to conclude that stronger regulatory standards and improved compliance were needed to ensure global financial stability. To this end, the G20, as collective governor, granted an institutional intermediary, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), authority to develop and supervise financial market regulations. However, the G20 designed the FSB in ways that stymied its regulatory competence. Why did the G20 design the FSB in ways that were inadequate to meeting its own governance goal? Competence–control theory provides a compelling answer. The G20 faces a tradeoff between a competent intermediary and control over the intermediary; this tradeoff is exacerbated by the G20’s collective nature. While the G20 has a collective long-term interest in an intermediary with the expertise and capacity to promote stability-enhancing regulations, intense short-term distributive conflicts among member states yield strong incentives to control the intermediary. These internal distributive conflicts are more easily overcome during systemic economic crisis, when a competent intermediary is urgently needed. Once the crisis has passed, however, the governor reasserts control, again compromising the intermediary’s competence. The chapter illustrates this argument with an account of reforming the Financial Stability Forum into the FSB, and three case studies of policy reforms after the financial crisis.


Author(s):  
Erika Botha ◽  
Daniel Makina

This paper discusses the theory of financial regulation and practices in countries and South Africa in particular. One of the causes of the global financial crisis (2007-2009) often cited is inadequate or improper regulation and supervision of the financial sector. The global financial crisis revealed inadequacies of extant regulatory systems which arguably had not kept pace with financial innovation. Consequently, all major economies are reforming their regulatory systems in the aftermath. In the UK the Financial Services Authority (FSA) has devised a set of banking regulation while the USA enacted the Dodd-Frank Act to revamp the regulation of financial services. Historically, financial regulation and supervision has been premised on the silo (institutional) approach whereby institutions are regulated according to functional lines. However, in the past two decades many countries in advanced economies adopted a consolidated approach in response to the emergence of financial conglomerates whose regulation could not be adequately handled by the traditional silo approach. South Africa, a middle-income developing country, has had a regulatory and supervisory system that has been driven by the market and international trends. Having started as a institutional approach, it metamorphosed into a functional approach in the late 1980s. Since the 1990s the South African regulatory and supervisory system has had at its heart the central bank regulating the banking sector and a multi-sector regulatory approach for other non-banking financial services. Though the financial sector was largely unscathed by the global financial crisis, South Africa has also moved to reform its regulatory system to embrace the twin peak model in line with trends in related countries.


Author(s):  
Douglas W. Arner ◽  
Berry Fong Chung Hsu ◽  
A. M. Da Roza ◽  
Francisco A. Da Roza ◽  
Syren Johnstone ◽  
...  

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