Indirect Governance in Global Financial Regulation

2020 ◽  
pp. 203-222
Author(s):  
Thomas Rixen ◽  
Lora Anne Viola

The global financial crisis led G20 states to conclude that stronger regulatory standards and improved compliance were needed to ensure global financial stability. To this end, the G20, as collective governor, granted an institutional intermediary, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), authority to develop and supervise financial market regulations. However, the G20 designed the FSB in ways that stymied its regulatory competence. Why did the G20 design the FSB in ways that were inadequate to meeting its own governance goal? Competence–control theory provides a compelling answer. The G20 faces a tradeoff between a competent intermediary and control over the intermediary; this tradeoff is exacerbated by the G20’s collective nature. While the G20 has a collective long-term interest in an intermediary with the expertise and capacity to promote stability-enhancing regulations, intense short-term distributive conflicts among member states yield strong incentives to control the intermediary. These internal distributive conflicts are more easily overcome during systemic economic crisis, when a competent intermediary is urgently needed. Once the crisis has passed, however, the governor reasserts control, again compromising the intermediary’s competence. The chapter illustrates this argument with an account of reforming the Financial Stability Forum into the FSB, and three case studies of policy reforms after the financial crisis.

2019 ◽  
pp. 215-226
Author(s):  
János Kálmán

Prior to the Global Financial Crisis, financial innovation was driven by so many factors, but the Global Financial Crisis changed the regulatory pendulum, which has swung to deeper regulation and also changed the way we think about financial innovation. The financial innovation – with its bright and destructive outcomes – is an integral part of the competition in the financial market. But the race is such that the regulatory authorities are in a rather disadvantaged position if we just think of the old fashioned regulatory paradigm. In this context, the question is what – new – legal institutions – such as the regulatory sandbox – could provide financial stability and a proper legal regulation to unregulated financial products and services.


Author(s):  
Michael Abendschein ◽  
Harry Gölz

AbstractAt the latest the global financial crisis has raised the awareness of the need for a globally coordinated financial market regulation. Even though the necessity to cooperate is widely acknowledged, cooperation is often limited in practice. This article characterizes the formation of self-enforcing international financial regulation agreements. Our analysis allows to evaluate the desirability and feasibility of cooperative solutions and explains the challenges associated with the process of cooperation. We model the cooperation of national financial regulators in a game-theoretical framework that considers financial stability to be an impure public good. Joint national supervisory effort is supposed to increase aggregate welfare in terms of a more stable financial system both on a global and on a local level by simultaneously generating incentives to free-ride. Our analysis in general indicates the difficulty of reaching a fully cooperative solution. In our basic version of the model we show that partial cooperation of two or three countries is stable and improves the welfare of all countries relative to the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Further analyses highlight the role of additional club benefits. When signatory countries of a coalition gain benefits over and above the joint welfare maximization, stable coalitions of any size become feasible.


Author(s):  
Felipe Carvalho de Rezende

Among the lessons that can be drawn from the global financial crisis is that private financial institutions have failed to promote the capital development of the affected economies, and to dampen financial fragility. This chapter analyses the macroeconomic role that development banks can play in this context, not only providing long-term funding necessary to promote economic development, but also fostering financial stability. The chapter discusses, in particular, the need for public financial institutions to provide support for infrastructure and sustainable development projects. It concludes that development banks play a strategic role by funding infrastructure projects in particular, and outlines the lessons for enhancing their role as catalysts for mitigating risks associated with such projects.


2011 ◽  
Vol 216 ◽  
pp. R1-R15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erland W. Nier

There is increasing recognition that prior to the global financial crisis financial regulation had lacked a macroprudential perspective. There has since been a strong effort to make a new macroprudential orientation operational, including through the establishment of new macroprudential authorities or ‘committees’ in a number of jurisdictions. These developments raise — and this paper explores — the following three questions. First, what distinguishes macroprudential policy from microprudential policy and what are its key tasks? Second, what powers should be given to macroprudential authorities and what should be their mandate? Third, how can governance arrangements ensure that macroprudential policies are pursued effectively? While arrangements for macroprudential policy will to some extent be country-specific, we identify three basic challenges in setting up an effective macroprudential policy framework and discuss options to address them.


Agriculture ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 93
Author(s):  
Pavel Kotyza ◽  
Katarzyna Czech ◽  
Michał Wielechowski ◽  
Luboš Smutka ◽  
Petr Procházka

Securitization of the agricultural commodity market has accelerated since the beginning of the 21st century, particularly in the times of financial market uncertainty and crisis. Sugar belongs to the group of important agricultural commodities. The global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic has caused a substantial increase in the stock market volatility. Moreover, the novel coronavirus hit both the sugar market’s supply and demand side, resulting in sugar stock changes. The paper aims to assess potential structural changes in the relationship between sugar prices and the financial market uncertainty in a crisis time. In more detail, using sequential Bai–Perron tests for structural breaks, we check whether the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic have induced structural breaks in that relationship. Sugar prices are represented by the S&P GSCI Sugar Index, while the S&P 500 option-implied volatility index (VIX) is used to show stock market uncertainty. To investigate the changes in the relationship between sugar prices and stock market uncertainty, a regression model with a sequential Bai–Perron test for structural breaks is applied for the daily data from 2000–2020. We reveal the existence of two structural breaks in the analysed relationship. The first breakpoint was linked to the global financial crisis outbreak, and the second occurred in December 2011. Surprisingly, the COVID-19 pandemic has not induced the statistically significant structural change. Based on the regression model with Bai–Perron structural changes, we show that from 2000 until the beginning of the global financial crisis, the relationship between the sugar prices and the financial market uncertainty was insignificant. The global financial crisis led to a structural change in the relationship. Since August 2008, we observe a significant and negative relationship between the S&P GSCI Sugar Index and the S&P 500 option-implied volatility index (VIX). Sensitivity analysis conducted for the different financial market uncertainty measures, i.e., the S&P 500 Realized Volatility Index confirms our findings.


2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-92
Author(s):  
Hasan Tekin ◽  
Ali Yavuz Polat

We investigate the change in adjustment speed of debt maturity for East Asian firms between 1990 and 2017 by including two exogenous shocks: the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998 (AFC) and the Global Financial Crisis 2007-2009 (GFC). We employ the least square dummy variable correction and find that East Asian firms have a slower adjustment of long-term debt over time. Besides, the decrease in adjustment speed of long-term debt after the GFC is more compared to the decrease after the AFC. Further analysis shows the optimal debt maturity differs across countries and industries. Another important implication of our results is that firms in high governance countries are more likely to close the gap between the actual and target debt maturity in time. Overall, debt holders and investors should consider financial uncertainties.


Author(s):  
Meng Kui Hu ◽  
Daisy Mui Hung Kee

The world has been struck by multiple crises that crippled the socio-economy of nations in the past. The impact of these crises was so significant that they initiated numerous policy changes worldwide. The radical crises in this context refer to the Spanish flu, the Asian financial crisis, the global financial crisis, and the current COVID-19 pandemic. Due to their small capital structure with limited resources and fragile nature, SMEs were severely impacted by these crises. Many SMEs were forced to close down their business operations. Somehow, the remaining SMEs managed to persist and survive through the crises. Moving forward, SMEs can better prepare for future crises by understanding and learning from the predicaments of these past crises. Consequently, SMEs must also be adaptive to new business environments and responding promptly to crises by realigning their strategies to achieve business sustainability in the long term.


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