In order to encourage hybrid generation of multiple wind/solar/hydro power stakeholders, synergistic gains from hybrid generation should be allocated fairly, efficiently and reasonably to all power stakeholders. This paper explores how cooperative game theory resolves conflicts among multiple wind/solar/hydro power stakeholders. Elaborate allocation processes of the nucleolus, Shapley value and MCRS methods are presented in resolve synergistic gains allocation problems of wind–solar–hydro hybrid generation system with cascade hydropower. By analyzing properties such as existence, uniqueness and rationality, we find that both the Shapley value and MCRS methods are fair, efficient and rational allocation methods whereas the nucleolus method is limited by reservoir volume of hydro power stakeholders. Analyses on computational feasibility show that the Shapley value method may induce combinational explosion problem with the integration of more power stakeholders. A further application in Yalong River basin demonstrates that, compared with the Shapley value method, the MCRS method significantly simplifies allocating process and improves computational efficiency. Therefore, the MCRS method is recommend as a fair, efficient, rational and computational feasible allocation method for hybrid generation system with large number of wind/solar/hydro power stakeholders.
Incremental Benefit Allocation for Joint Operation of Multi-Stakeholder Wind-PV-Hydro Complementary Generation System With Cascade Hydro-Power: An Aumann-Shapley Value Method
