scholarly journals Profit-Sharing Rule for Networked Microgrids based on Myerson Value in Cooperative Game

IEEE Access ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-1
Author(s):  
Jeongmeen Suh ◽  
Sung-Guk Yoon
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Sharing Rule ◽  
Myerson Value ◽  
Networked Microgrids

scholarly journals Bounds on the Cost of Stabilizing a Cooperative Game

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 ◽  
pp. 987-1023 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoram Bachrach ◽  
Edith Elkind ◽  
Enrico Malizia ◽  
Reshef Meir ◽  
Dmitrii Pasechnik ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Coalition Structure ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Coalitional Games ◽  
Weighted Voting ◽  
Voting Games ◽  
Least Core ◽  
Coalitional Values ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Relationship

A key issue in cooperative game theory is coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the core---the set of outcomes that are resistant to group deviations. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable. We investigate the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional game by using subsidies. We consider scenarios where an external party that is interested in having the players work together offers a supplemental payment to the grand coalition, or, more generally, a particular coalition structure. This payment is conditional on players not deviating from this coalition structure, and may be divided among the players in any way they wish. We define the cost of stability as the minimum external payment that stabilizes the game. We provide tight bounds on the cost of stability, both for games where the coalitional values are nonnegative (profit-sharing games) and for games where the coalitional values are nonpositive (cost-sharing games), under natural assumptions on the characteristic function, such as superadditivity, anonymity, or both. We also investigate the relationship between the cost of stability and several variants of the least core. Finally, we study the computational complexity of problems related to the cost of stability, with a focus on weighted voting games.

scholarly journals The profit-sharing rule that maximizes sustainability of cartel agreements

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
João Correia-da-Silva ◽  
Joana Pinho
Keyword(s):  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Sharing Rule

scholarly journals Demand Allocation and Profit Sharing to Improve Salt Farmer’s Revenue: A Cooperative Game Approach

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iffan Maflahah ◽  
Budi Santoso Wirjodirdjo ◽  
Putu Dana Karningsih
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Savings And Loans ◽  
Chain System

Abstract The main problem of the salt supply chain system is the oligopoly market structure dominated by middlemen which reduces the bargaining power of farmers. It has, however, been discovered that vertical collaboration (farmers to cooperatives) and horizontal collaboration (farmers to farmers) models have the ability to increase farmers' revenue. Therefore, this research was conducted to determine the effect of both horizontal and vertical collaboration models on the salt supply chain system with the expectation to increase farmers' revenue. This involved the application of the cooperative game theory with Shapley's value used as the basis for decision making. The result showed that the collaboration of stakeholders in the salt supply chain system has the ability to increase farmers' revenue, especially when they sell a maximum of 20% of their products through cooperatives and the rest through middlemen. This means the existence of farmers as cooperative members has a positive impact as observed in the revenue increment. Therefore, it is recommended that cooperatives improve their functions and roles as providers of savings and loans and market seekers, determine the appropriate prices for salt, and improve the quality of the products produced by their members. Moreover, a collaboration between farmers is mutually beneficial and this means efforts should be made to ensure cooperation, especially for small farmers.

scholarly journals ON COOPERATIVE GAME APPROACH TO PROFIT SHARING IN A FEW PROJECTS MANAGEMENT PROBLEM

2019 ◽  
pp. 15-22
Author(s):  
N. Boyko ◽  
S. Dotsenko
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Management Problem ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
Common Resource

The article is consider three different mechanisms of project’s profit sharing, assuming that the projects have common resource pool and both resources and profit may be distributed at arbitrary way without losses. The resources and profit distribution mechanisms are based on cooperative game theory thesis. As three different alternatives, such cooperative game solutions, as Shapley value, nucleolus ant τ-value are proposed. The calculation routine is delivered by easy typical example.

CONTRIBUTION-BASED PROFIT-SHARING SCHEME FOR JOINT VENTURES / PELNO PASIDALIJIMO TARP ĮMONIŲ SCHEMA, PAGRĮSTA PATIRTOMIS IŠLAIDOMIS

2011 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 445-458 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sung-Lin Hsueh ◽  
Min-Ren Yan
Keyword(s):  
Joint Ventures ◽  
Production Efficiency ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Sharing Rule ◽  
Construction Firms ◽  
Domestic Markets ◽  
Construction Market ◽  
International Construction ◽  
Local Construction ◽  
Cooperative Relationship

Along with globalization of the construction market, international construction firms often choose to cooperate with local construction firms in the form of Joint Ventures (JV) when they enter into the domestic markets of different countries. In this way, they cannot only reduce investment risks, but also enhance production efficiency, reduce costs and generate more profits. The conventional method of profit-sharing between JV firms is based on ratio of investment. However, as the firms make different contributions to the project, the rationality of such a profit-sharing method is often doubtful and thus is difficult to maintain a stable cooperative relationship for a JV team. Based on the concept of the cooperative game theory, this paper proposes a contribution-based profit-sharing model using Shapley Value. A case study is used to describe how firms can use this model to reach decisions of participation, and determine a fair profit-sharing rule after cooperation to enhance mutual trust and create the advantages of cooperation. Santrauka Vykstant statybos rinkos globalizacijai, tarptautinės statybos įmonės, patekusios į vietinę kitos šalies rinką, dažnai linkusios bendradarbiauti su vietos statybos įmonėmis. Jos gali ne tik sumažinti investicijos riziką, bet ir padidinti gamybos efektyvumą, sumažinti išlaidas ir gauti didesnį pelną. Tradicinis pelno pasidalijimo metodas tarp įmonių grindžiamas investicijų santykiu. Tačiau kai įmonių įnašas į projektą skirtingas, toks pelno metodo racionalumas dažnai abejotinas, todėl tokiu atveju yra sunku palaikyti stabilų įmonių bendradarbiavimą. Remiantis lošimų teorijos koncepcija, šiame darbe siūlomas pelno pasidalijimo modelis naudojant Shapley reikšmę. Skaitmeniniu pavyzdžiu rodoma, kaip įmonės gali taikyti šį modelį priimdamos sprendimus dėl dalyvavimo bendroje veikloje ir teisingo pelno pasidalijimo. Taip sustiprinamas tarpusavio pasitikėjimas ir sukuriamos bendradarbiavimo prielaidos.

A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bertrand Crettez ◽  
Régis Deloche
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Cost Allocation ◽  
Law And Economics ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Sharing Rule ◽  
Sharing Rules ◽  
The Cost

Abstract How to enhance the maintenance, repair and improvement of condo buildings? We address this issue by focusing on the case of an elevator installation whose benefits are not uniform across units. We examine the link between majority approval and cost sharing. Relying on a cooperative game theory approach, we prove the coalitional stability of any cost allocation which is such that the unit shares are a non-decreasing function of the floor level. Second, we show that the two surplus allocations induced, respectively, by the de facto cost-sharing rule used in France and the equal cost-sharing rule may fail to be coalitionally stable. By insisting that the cost sharing must depend on the relative individual advantages provided by an improvement, French law increases the risk of disputes between neighbors, compared to other sharing rules.

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