Intrahousehold Bargaining Power in Spain: An Empirical Test of the Collective Model

This paper analyzes the intrahousehold bargaining power of spouses in Spanish families, in a collective framework. We estimate household labor supply equations and, under certain testable restrictions, we obtain a theoretically derived sharing rule for household income, which characterizes intrahousehold bargaining power. Then, using unique data on decision-making in the household, we construct Pareto weights, and study the validity of the collective model by comparing the theoretical sharing rule and the constructed Pareto weight. The results reveal that both the observed Pareto weight and the theoretical sharing rule display qualitative similarities, thus providing direct empirical support to the collective model. Furthermore, the results suggest that Spanish wives behave more altruistically, while husbands behave more egoistically. This should be taken into account by policy makers and researchers when analyzing inequality in the household, and contemplating specific policies affecting the household.

Survivability of Suddenly Loaded Arrays of Micropillars

When a multicomponent system is suddenly loaded, its capability of bearing the load depends not only on the strength of components but also on how a load released by a failed component is distributed among the remaining intact ones. Specifically, we consider an array of pillars which are located on a flat substrate and subjected to an impulsive and compressive load. Immediately after the loading, the pillars whose strengths are below the load magnitude crash. Then, loads released by these crashed pillars are transferred to and assimilated by the intact ones according to a load-sharing rule which reflects the mechanical properties of the pillars and the substrate. A sequence of bursts involving crashes and load transfers either destroys all the pillars or drives the array to a stable configuration when a smaller number of pillars sustain the applied load. By employing a fibre bundle model framework, we numerically study how the array integrity depends on sudden loading amplitudes, randomly distributed pillar strength thresholds and varying ranges of load transfer. Based on the simulation, we estimate the survivability of arrays of pillars defined as the probability of sustaining the applied load despite numerous damaged pillars. It is found that the resulting survival functions are accurately fitted by the family of complementary cumulative skew-normal distributions.

Improved inference for areal unit count data using graph-based optimisation

Spatio-temporal count data relating to a set of non-overlapping areal units are prevalent in many fields, including epidemiology and social science. The spatial autocorrelation inherent in these data is typically modelled by a set of random effects that are assigned a conditional autoregressive prior distribution, which is a special case of a Gaussian Markov random field. The autocorrelation structure implied by this model depends on a binary neighbourhood matrix, where two random effects are assumed to be partially autocorrelated if their areal units share a common border, and are conditionally independent otherwise. This paper proposes a novel graph-based optimisation algorithm for estimating either a static or a temporally varying neighbourhood matrix for the data that better represents its spatial correlation structure, by viewing the areal units as the vertices of a graph and the neighbour relations as the set of edges. The improved estimation performance of our methodology compared to the commonly used border sharing rule is evidenced by simulation, before the method is applied to a new respiratory disease surveillance study in Scotland between 2011 and 2017.

Cost Sharing Models in Game Theory = Költségelosztási modellek a játékelméletben

In our thesis we examined economic situations modeled with rooted trees and directed, acyclic graphs. In the presented problems the collaboration of economic agents (players) incurred costs or created a profit, and we have sought answers to the question of \fairly" distributing this common cost or profit. We have formulated properties and axioms describing our expecta- tions of a \fair" allocation. We have utilized cooperative game theoretical methods for modeling. After the introduction, in Chapter 2 we analyzed a real-life problem and its possible solutions. These solution proposals, namely the average cost- sharing rule, the serial cost sharing rule, and the restricted average cost- sharing rule have been introduced by Aadland and Kolpin (2004). We have also presented two further water management problems that arose during the planning of the economic development of Tennessee Valley, and discussed solution proposals for them as well (Straffinn and Heaney, 1981). We analyzed if these allocations satisfied the properties we associated with the notion of \fairness". In Chapter 3 we introduced the fundamental notions and concepts of cooperative game theory. We defined the core (Shapley, 1955; Gillies, 1959) and the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), that play an important role in finding a \fair" allocation. In Chapter 4 we presented the class of fixed-tree game and relevant ap- plications from the domain of water management. In Chapter 5 we discussed the classes of airport and irrigation games, and the characterizations of these classes. We extended the results of Dubey (1982) and Moulin and Shenker (1992) on axiomatization of the Shapley value on the class of airport games to the class of irrigation games. We have \translated" the axioms used in cost allocation literature to the axioms corresponding to TU games, thereby providing two new versions of the results of Shapley (1953) and Young (1985). In Chapter 6 we introduced the upstream responsibility games and char- acterized the game class. We have shown that Shapley's and Young's char- acterizations are valid on this class as well. In Chapter 7 we discussed shortest path games and have shown that this game class is equal to the class of monotone games. We have shown that further axiomatizations of the Shapley value, namely Shapley (1953)'s, Young (1985)'s, Chun (1989)'s, and van den Brink (2001)'s characterizations are valid on the class of shortest path games.

A collective investment problem in a stochastic volatility environment: The impact of sharing rules

It is typical in collectively administered pension funds that employees delegate fund managers to invest their contributions. In addition, many pension funds still need to sustain guarantees (prescribed by law) in spite of the current low interest environment. In this paper, we consider an optimal collective investment problem for a pool of investors who (implicitly) demand minimum guarantees by deriving utility from the wealth exceeding their guarantees in two financial market settings, one with a stochastic and one with a constant volatility. We find that individual investors’ well-being will not be worsened through the collective investment in both financial markets, as individual optimal solutions are attainable if a financially fair state-dependent sharing rule is applied. When more prevailing sharing rules like linear rules are applied, this holds no longer. Furthermore, the degree of sub-optimality imposed by linear sharing rules is more pronounced in the stochastic volatility market than in the constant volatility market.

Usage of Energy Management System in Chemical Process Industry

Primarily based trendy account energy the board and cycle robotization for a industry with proportion controls is projected. The energy the board is finished by 2 calculations particularly Energy potency rule and cargo Sharing rule. Varied siphons run in no heap or faithfully low burden condition, simply to forestall over-burdening. Utilizing the energy productivity calculation, No heap running of siphons is determined and killed once a amount delay. Every machine has its own restricted running life. In business to possess high dependableness reserve machines area unit likewise introduced nevertheless not used adequately. The heap sharing calculation plans equivalent running hours to order and first siphons. The cycle management is accomplished by mistreatment the inputs of transducers like stream, weight and temperature sensors to the framework, the signs area unit shipped off regulator and therefore the regulator cycle the signs and impel the elemental transfers to figure the cycle. The entire framework is incorporated and controlled through a SCADA framework .

Household consumption allocation and the collective household model: Children share of household resources in The Gambia

This paper applies the collective household model to allocate household resources among household members. With a Collective Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (CQUAIDS) estimated by a Feasible Generalized Nonlinear Least Squares (FGNLS) method, it studies the household demand for six categories of household goods using household income and expenditure survey data from The Gambia, directed to studying the allocation of resources among young and adult members of households in The Gambia. It establishes the sharing rule for children and adult members of the household and shows the effect of demographic, distributive factor, price and income elasticities on the shares of household resources. The results establish that a higher share of resources goes for children while the sharing rule varies for different household types. Also, the findings show significant effects of demographic, distributive factor, price and income on the allocation of the household resources of consumption goods by the household.

Transaction Costs: Economies of Scale, Optimum, Equilibrium and Efficiency – A Game Theory-Based Model of Transaction Costs

The aim of this article is to propose a core game theory model of transaction costs wherein it is indicated how direct costs determine the probability of loss and subsequent transaction costs. The existence of optimum is proven, and the way in which exposure influences the location of the optimum is demonstrated. The decisions are described as a two-player game and it is discussed how the transaction cost sharing rule determines whether the optimum point of transaction costs is the same as the equilibrium of the game. The dispute between actors regarding changing the share of transaction costs to be paid by each party is modeled by a non-cooperative bargaining game. Requirements of efficient transaction cost sharing rules are defined, and it is posited that solution exists which is not unique. Policy conclusions are also devised based on principles of design of institutions to influence the nature of transaction costs.

An Entropy-Based Information Sharing Rule for Asymmetric Information Economies

The possibility to compare information partitions is investigated for economies with asymmetric information. First, we focus on two potentially suitable instruments, the Boylan distance and the entropy, and show that the former does not fit the purpose. Then, we use the entropy associated with the information partition of each trader to construct a partially endogenous rule which regulates the information sharing process among traders. Finally, we apply this rule to some examples and analyze its impact on two cooperative solutions: the core and the coalition structure value.

Combining Egalitarian and Proportional Sharing Rules in Team Tournaments to Incentivize Energy-Efficient Behavior in a Principal-Agent Context

Triggering the energy-efficient behavior of agents in firms simultaneously decreases costs and mitigates CO2 emissions. If firms use team tournaments to increase energy-efficient behavior and thus employee performance, they may face unintended consequences, like a bifurcation effect: Individuals drop out if they believe that they cannot win the contest. By contrast, high-performing employees may overexert themselves. Additionally, some individuals might be tempted to free-ride. In a field experiment with truck drivers, we analyze whether proportional sharing of the bonus within teams based on individual effort instead of egalitarian sharing reduces both bifurcation and free-riding during team tournaments. Our results reveal that (1) the team contest improves performance; (2) this increase in performance is overall slightly stronger under the proportional than under the egalitarian sharing rule, using ceteris paribus comparisons; and (3) the performance increase is mainly driven by the team member performing worse.