An Incentive-Compatible Energy Pricing Mechanism for Electricity-Gas Interconnected System Using Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism Design Theory

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chao Guo ◽  
Jun Xie ◽  
Xingying Chen ◽  
Mingtao Liu
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Design Theory ◽  
Interconnected System ◽  
Pricing Mechanism ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Energy Pricing ◽  
Groves Mechanism

scholarly journals Study on the Pricing Mechanism of Deductive Right License Transfer Based on Mechanism Design Theory

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ting Tang
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Design Theory ◽  
Incentive Compatibility ◽  
Reference Value ◽  
Quantitative Model ◽  
Pricing Mechanism ◽  
Laws And Regulations

The relevant laws and regulations in our country only provide in principle for the license transfer of deductive right. In practice, we often encounter two major problems: First, there is information asymmetry between the original author and the deductive author, and there is a large transaction cost. The second is how to give consideration to the interests of the original author and the deductive author to achieve incentive compatibility. To solve these two problems, build a quantitative model. It has a certain reference value to the practice of deduction right license transfer.

Understanding Mechanism Design—Part 2 of 3: The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 80-81
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Rosenschein ◽  
Michael Wooldridge
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Groves Mechanism

scholarly journals Deterministic, Strategyproof, and Fair Cake Cutting

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vijay Menon ◽  
Kate Larson
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Impossibility Result ◽  
Restricted Class ◽  
Piecewise Constant ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Negative Results ◽  
Cake Cutting ◽  
Design Perspective ◽  
A Minor ◽  
Cutting Problem

We study the classic cake cutting problem from a mechanism design perspective, in particular focusing on deterministic mechanisms that are strategyproof and fair. We begin by looking at mechanisms that are non-wasteful and primarily show that for even the restricted class of piecewise constant valuations there exists no direct-revelation mechanism that is strategyproof and even approximately proportional. Subsequently, we remove the non-wasteful constraint and show another impossibility result stating that there is no strategyproof and approximately proportional direct-revelation mechanism that outputs contiguous allocations, again, for even the restricted class of piecewise constant valuations. In addition to the above results, we also present some negative results when considering an approximate notion of strategyproofness, show a connection between direct-revelation mechanisms and mechanisms in the Robertson-Webb model when agents have piecewise constant valuations, and finally also present a (minor) modification to the well-known Even-Paz algorithm that has better incentive-compatible properties for the cases when there are two or three agents.

Agent-based mechanism design – investigating bounded rationality concepts in a budgeting context

2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (1/2) ◽  
pp. 13-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iris Lorscheid ◽  
Matthias Meyer
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Human Behavior ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Decision Context ◽  
Agent Learning ◽  
Groves Mechanism ◽  
Research Questions

Purpose This study aims to demonstrate how agent-based simulation (ABS) may provide a computational testbed for mechanism design using concepts of bounded rationality (BR). ABS can be used to systematically derive and formalize different models of BR. This allows us to identify the cognitive preconditions for behavior intended by the mechanism and thereby to derive implications for the design of mechanisms. Design/methodology/approach Based on an analysis of the requirements of the decision context, the authors describe a systematic way of incorporating different BR concepts into an agent learning model. The approach is illustrated by analyzing an incentive scheme suggested for truthful reporting in budgeting contexts, which is an adapted Groves mechanism scheme. Findings The study describes systematic ways in which to derive BR agents for research questions where behavioral aspects might matter. The authors show that BR concepts may lead to other outcomes than the intended truth-inducing effect. A modification of the mechanism to more distinguishable levels of payments improves the results in terms of the intended effect. Research limitations/implications The presented BR concepts as simulated by agent models cannot model human behavior in its full complexity. The simplification of complex human behavior is a useful analytical construct for the controlled analysis of a few aspects and an understanding of the potential consequences of those aspects of human behavior for mechanism design. Originality/value The paper specifies the idea of a computational testbed for mechanism design based on BR concepts. Beyond this, a systematic and stepwise approach is shown to formalize bounded rational behavior by agents based on a requirements analysis, including benchmark models for the comparison and evaluation of BR concepts.

scholarly journals QUANTUM MECHANISM HELPS AGENTS COMBAT "BAD" SOCIAL CHOICE RULES

2011 ◽  
Vol 09 (01) ◽  
pp. 615-623 ◽  
Author(s):  
HAOYANG WU
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Design Theory ◽  
Reverse Problem ◽  
Quantum Domain ◽  
Quantum Mechanism ◽  
Social Choice Rules ◽  
Quantum Strategies

Quantum strategies have been successfully applied to game theory for years. However, as a reverse problem of game theory, the theory of mechanism design is ignored by physicists. In this paper, the theory of mechanism design is generalized to a quantum domain. The main result is that by virtue of a quantum mechanism, agents who satisfy a certain condition can combat "bad" social choice rules instead of being restricted by the traditional mechanism design theory.

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