Technological innovation, fuzzy grey evaluation and risk assessment: A perspective on Chinese enterprises

Author(s):  
Degui Zhu ◽  
Xinyu Wang
2013 ◽  
pp. 714-720
Author(s):  
Zhu Naixiao ◽  
Huang Chunhua

In the knowledge economy era enterprises experience extremely severe competition the intensity of which may be seen in the rate of technology innovation: finally technological innovation can result in the creation of intellectual property (Wu, 2006). “Even great technologies no longer can be relied upon to earn a satisfactory profit before they become commercialized” (Chesbrough, 2007). The effective ways to achieve the commercial value of intellectual property rights relies on the use of intellectual property. An in-depth study of this subject has important theoretical and practical significance for improving the international competitiveness of Chinese enterprises and for protecting their intellectual property rights.


2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 15-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Małgorzata Deptuła ◽  
Ryszard Knosala

Abstract The article presents the issue of risk assessment of innovations. Specificity of technological innovation realized in manufacturing companies has been particularly well described here. An original method of assessing the innovative projects risk has been presented. The elaborated method has been implemented in three enterprises, the business activity of which is not typical for electrical engineering, metal and mechanical engineering and companies which are going to carry out the innovative project simultaneously with already started innovative projects. Moreover, an example of the risk assessment of a chosen technological innovation has been presented.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiawei Liu ◽  
Guanghong Ma

PurposeThe high uncertainty of technological innovation in megaprojects brings great challenges to the R&D institution and also acts as a trigger for moral hazard. The incentive and supervision are effective means to improve the performance of innovation. The purpose of this paper is to propose appropriate incentive and supervision mechanisms to reduce information asymmetry and improve the efficiency of incentives. Suggestions on technological innovation are put forward to megaprojects management.Design/methodology/approachAccording to the principal-agent theory, the research develops incentive models under three states, i.e. information symmetry, information asymmetry and information asymmetry based on supervision mechanism. The Bayesian theory is employed to prove the effectiveness of the novel supervision method based on risk assessment.FindingsThe results indicate that under the information asymmetry, the incentive intensity is positively correlated with the social benefits coefficient, and negatively correlated with the patent benefits coefficient. The R&D effort and the owner's incentive intensity decline with the increase of information asymmetry. The supervision of risks can effectively reduce the degree of information asymmetry, and the higher the uncertainty of innovations, the more significant the effect of supervision is. As the supervision intensity increases, the incentive intensity, the R&D effort and the innovation output will increase. In addition, the R&D institutions with high innovation capability, low unit cost of R&D and low risk-aversion are more willing to make efforts to innovate.Originality/valueThis study fills the research gap on incentive and supervision of technological innovation in megaprojects. The externality of innovation benefits is considered in the model. The traditional incentive model is extended through the introduction of supervision. Furthermore, a novel supervision method based on risk assessment is proposed. The results validate the importance of risk management in technological innovation and provide a new insight for project management.


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