Crypto Terminal Based On Secure Element For Consumer Trusted Blockchain Transactions

Author(s):  
Pascal Urien
Keyword(s):  

NFC enabled mobile phones are equipped with SE combined with NFC infrastructure like readers and POS terminals. The actors in the NFC infrastructure are the pre requisites but not sufficient for the use of NFC payments. There has to be a secure way to download, install, personalize, upgrade and delete an application in SE without the need to go to the service provider or mobile operator stores. TSM solution provide means of managing the NFC service life cycle OTA by using built upon and emphasizes the role an importance in NFC ecosystem. Mobile device needs to have a trusted Execution environment a place where sensitive data can be stored in secure fashion. It is a piece of hardware called as SE.


2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (13) ◽  
pp. 1204-1209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Varun Deshpande ◽  
Laurent George ◽  
Hakim Badis

Author(s):  
Michael Roland ◽  
Josef Langer ◽  
Rene Mayrhofer

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to address the design, implementation, performance and limitations of an environment that emulates a secure element for rapid prototyping and debugging. Today, it is difficult for developers to get access to a near field communication (NFC)-secure element in current smartphones. Moreover, the security constraints of smartcards make in-circuit emulation and debugging of applications impractical. Therefore, an environment that emulates a secure element brings significant advantages for developers. Design/methodology/approach – The authors' approach to such an environment is the emulation of Java Card applets on top of non-Java Card virtual machines (e.g. Android Dalvik VM), as this would facilitate the use of existing debugging tools. As the operation principle of the Java Card VM is based on persistent memory technology, the VM and applications running on top of it have a significantly different life cycle compared to other Java VMs. The authors evaluate these differences and their impact on Java VM-based Java Card emulation. They compare possible strategies to overcome the problems caused by these differences, propose a possible solution and create a prototypical implementation to verify the practical feasibility of such an emulation environment. Findings – While the authors found that the Java Card inbuilt persistent memory management is not available on other Java VMs, they present a strategy to model this persistence mechanism on other VMs to build a complete Java Card run-time environment on top of a non-Java Card VM. Their analysis of the performance degradation in a prototypical implementation caused by additional effort put into maintaining persistent application state revealed that the implementation of such an emulation environment is practically feasible. Originality/value – This paper addresses the problem of emulating a complete Java Card run-time environment on top of non-Java Card virtual machines which could open and significantly ease the development of NFC secure element applications.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 79-84
Author(s):  
Мартынов ◽  
V. Martynov

The article considers an open innovative environment in which there is NFC and In-App Payments, their development prospects, the pros and cons of these systems, their place in the sixth technological way, gives concepts of NFC, In-App Payments, considers the technology of contactless payments, the principle of operation of the device with a Secure Element NFC and Host Card Emulation technology, sanctifies the issue of the security of NFC devices, methods of protection against attacks on the device, the use of NFC in other electronic media. Comparative characteristics depending on the situation, NFC and In-App Payments are given. The article shows the global Informatization of our society in the sixth technological way.


Author(s):  
Dominik Gruntz ◽  
Christof Arnosti ◽  
Marco Hauri

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to present a smartphone-based physical access control system in which the access points are not directly connected to a central authorization server, but rather use the connectivity of the mobile phone to authorize a user access request online by a central access server. The access points ask the mobile phone whether a particular user has access or not. The mobile phone then relays such a request to the access server or presents an offline ticket. One of the basic requirements of our solution is the independence from third parties like mobile network operators, trusted service managers and handset manufacturers. Design/methodology/approach The authentication of the smartphone is based on public key cryptography. This requires that the private key is stored in a secure element or in a trusted execution environment to prevent identity theft. However, due to the intended independence from third parties, subscriber identity module (SIM)-based secure elements and embedded secure elements (i.e. separate hardware chips on the handset) were not an option and only one of the remaining secure element architectures could be used: host card emulation (HCE) or a microSD-based secure element. Findings This paper describes the implementation of such a physical access control system and discusses its security properties. In particular, it is shown that the HCE approach cannot solve the relay attack under conservative security assumptions and an implementation based on a microSD secure element is presented and discussed. Moreover, the paper also describes an offline solution which can be used if the smartphone is not connected to the access server. In this case, an access token is sent to the access point in response to an access request. These tokens are renewed regularly and automatically whenever the smartphone is connected. Originality/value In this paper, a physical access control system is presented which operates as fast as existing card-based solutions. By using a microSD-based secure element (SE), the authors were able to prevent the software relay attack. This solution is not restricted to microSD-based SEs, it could also be implemented with SIM-based or embedded secure elements (with the consequence that the solution depends on third parties).


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