Application of incentive based scoring rule deciding pricing for smart houses

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shantanu Chakraborty ◽  
Takayuki Ito ◽  
Ryo Kanamori ◽  
Tomonobu Senjyu
Keyword(s):  
Scoring Rule

scholarly journals Incumbent and Entrant Bidding in Scoring Rule Auctions: A Study on Italian Canteen Services

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Riccardo Camboni ◽  
Paola Valbonesi
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Production Cost ◽  
Specific Information ◽  
Scoring Rule ◽  
The Public ◽  
Simple Theoretical Model ◽  
Original Dataset

AbstractWe empirically investigate incumbents’ and entrants’ bids on an original dataset of 192 scoring rule auctions for canteen services in Italy. Our findings show that winning rebates are lower (i.e., prices paid by the public buyer are higher) when the contract is awarded to the incumbent supplier. This result is not explained by the observable characteristics of the auction or the service awarded. We develop a simple theoretical model showing that the result is consistent with a setting in which the buyer exploits specific information on the incumbent supplier’s production cost.

scholarly journals Evaluating probabilistic forecasts of football matches: the case against the ranked probability score

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Wheatcroft
Keyword(s):  
Scoring Rules ◽  
Brier Score ◽  
Sporting Events ◽  
Forecast Performance ◽  
Scoring Rule ◽  
Probability Score ◽  
Probabilistic Forecasts ◽  
Non Local ◽  
Evaluating Forecasts ◽  
Non Locality

Abstract A scoring rule is a function of a probabilistic forecast and a corresponding outcome used to evaluate forecast performance. There is some debate as to which scoring rules are most appropriate for evaluating forecasts of sporting events. This paper focuses on forecasts of the outcomes of football matches. The ranked probability score (RPS) is often recommended since it is ‘sensitive to distance’, that is it takes into account the ordering in the outcomes (a home win is ‘closer’ to a draw than it is to an away win). In this paper, this reasoning is disputed on the basis that it adds nothing in terms of the usual aims of using scoring rules. A local scoring rule is one that only takes the probability placed on the outcome into consideration. Two simulation experiments are carried out to compare the performance of the RPS, which is non-local and sensitive to distance, the Brier score, which is non-local and insensitive to distance, and the Ignorance score, which is local and insensitive to distance. The Ignorance score outperforms both the RPS and the Brier score, casting doubt on the value of non-locality and sensitivity to distance as properties of scoring rules in this context.

scholarly journals Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Basteck
Keyword(s):  
Monotonicity Property ◽  
Scoring Rules ◽  
The Other ◽  
Approval Voting ◽  
Property A ◽  
Borda Rule ◽  
Scoring Rule ◽  
Direct Mechanism ◽  
Social Choice Correspondence ◽  
Choice Correspondence

AbstractWe characterize voting procedures according to the social choice correspondence they implement when voters cast ballots strategically, applying iteratively undominated strategies. In elections with three candidates, the Borda Rule is the unique positional scoring rule that satisfies unanimity (U) (i.e., elects a candidate whenever it is unanimously preferred) and is majoritarian after eliminating a worst candidate (MEW)(i.e., if there is a unanimously disliked candidate, the majority-preferred among the other two is elected). In a larger class of rules, Approval Voting is characterized by a single axiom that implies both U and MEW but is weaker than Condorcet-consistency (CON)—it is the only direct mechanism scoring rule that is majoritarian after eliminating a Pareto-dominated candidate (MEPD)(i.e., if there is a Pareto-dominated candidate, the majority-preferred among the other two is elected); among all finite scoring rules that satisfy MEPD, Approval Voting is the most decisive. However, it fails a desirable monotonicity property: a candidate that is elected for some preference profile, may lose the election once she gains further in popularity. In contrast, the Borda Rule is the unique direct mechanism scoring rule that satisfies U, MEW and monotonicity (MON). There exists no direct mechanism scoring rule that satisfies both MEPD and MON and no finite scoring rule satisfying CON.

scholarly journals The Hyvärinen scoring rule in Gaussian linear time series models

2021 ◽  
Vol 212 ◽  
pp. 126-140
Author(s):  
Silvia Columbu ◽  
Valentina Mameli ◽  
Monica Musio ◽  
Philip Dawid
Keyword(s):  
Time Series ◽  
Linear Time ◽  
Time Series Models ◽  
Scoring Rule

scholarly journals When does risk outweigh reward? Identifying potential scoring strategies with netballs new two-point rule

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Fox ◽  
Lyndell Bruce
Keyword(s):  
Scoring Rule ◽  
Potential Use

This preprint examines a series of questions surrounding the implementation and potential use of the new two-point scoring rule in the upcoming 2020 season of Australia's national netball competition (i.e. Suncorp Super Netball).

scholarly journals The socially acceptable scoring rule

2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Mahajne ◽  
Oscar Volij
Keyword(s):  
Scoring Rule

Which Scoring Rule Maximizes Condorcet Efficiency Under Iac?

2005 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide P. Cervone ◽  
William V. Gehrlein ◽  
William S. Zwicker
Keyword(s):  
Scoring Rule ◽  
Condorcet Efficiency

Weak undominance in scoring rule elections

2010 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 110-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnaud Dellis
Keyword(s):  
Scoring Rule

A Probability Scoring Rule for Simultaneous Events

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 301-313
Author(s):  
Andrew Grant ◽  
David Johnstone ◽  
Oh Kang Kwon
Keyword(s):  
Economic Benefit ◽  
Score Function ◽  
Interesting Property ◽  
Usual Sense ◽  
Power Utility ◽  
Scoring Rule ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Individual Scores ◽  
The Given ◽  
Special Case

We develop a scoring rule tailored to a decision maker who makes simultaneous bets on events that occur at times that require bets to be placed together. The rule proposed captures the economic benefit to a well-defined bettor who acts on one set of probabilities p against a baseline or rival set q. To allow for simultaneous bets, we assume a myopic power utility function with a risk aversion parameter tailored to suit the given user or application. Our score function is “proper” in the usual sense of motivating honesty. Apart from a special case of power utility, namely, log utility, the score is not “local,” which we excuse because a local scoring rule cannot capture the economic result that our score reflects. An interesting property of our rule is that the individual scores from individual events are multiplicative, rather than additive. Probability scores are often added to give a measure of aggregate performance over a set of trials. Our rule is unique in that scores must be multiplied to reach a meaningful aggregate.

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