Oblivious Random-Access Memory (ORAM) is becoming a fundamental component for modern outsourced storages as a cryptographic primitive to prevent information leakage from a user access pattern. The major obstacle to its proliferation has been its significant bandwidth overhead. Recently, several works proposed acceptable low-overhead constructions, but unfortunately they are only evaluated using algorithmic complexities which hide valuable constants that severely impact their practicality. Four of the most promising constructions are Path ORAM, Ring ORAM, XOR Ring ORAM, and Onion ORAM. However, they have never been thoroughly compared against each other and tested on the same experimental platform. To address this issue, we provide a thorough study and assessment of these recent ORAM constructions and implement them under the same testbed. We perform extensive experiments to provide insights into their performance characteristics, simplicity, and practicality in terms of processing time, server storage, client storage, and communication cost. Our extensive experiments show that despite the claimed algorithmic efficiency of Ring and Onion ORAMs and their judicious limited bandwidth requirements, Path ORAM stands out to be the simplest and most efficient ORAM construction.
Application of Data Mining on Web Usage Data for Security: WebSecuDMiner
