On the Information Content of Bank Loan-loss Disclosures: A Theory and Evidence from Japan

2000 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-80
Author(s):  
Scott Gibson
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Mutua Mathuva ◽  
Moses Nyangu Nzuki

PurposeIn this paper, the authors investigate whether the systemic local banking crises (LBCs) and global financial crisis (GFC) impact the association between bank profit efficiency and earnings quality in developing economies.Design/methodology/approachUsing panel data spanning 29 years over the period 1991–2019 for 169 banks drawn from five East African countries, the authors perform difference-in-difference multivariate analyses using the generalised method of moments (GMM) system estimator on a sample consisting of 2,261 bank-year observations.FindingsThe results, which are robust for endogeneity and other checks, show that banks with higher profit efficiency consistently report higher quality earnings. The authors further establish that whereas systemic LBCs contribute negatively to bank earnings quality, the GFC tends to have a positive impact. These results are upheld when the joint impacts of both systemic LBCs, GFC and profit efficiency on earnings quality are considered. The positive influence of profit efficiency and GFC on earnings quality is pronounced under income-decreasing earnings management. The impacts of profit efficiency, LBCs and GFC on earnings quality appear to be non-monotonic and vary across the sampled countries.Research limitations/implicationsThe study's findings are based on banks in five developing countries within a regional economic bloc. Additional studies could focus on other economic blocs for enhanced generalisability of the findings. In addition, some of the variables examined are studied at bank-level, while other variables are at country-level. Finally, the study establishes an association between the variables of interest, and this does not necessarily imply causation.Practical implicationsThe results provide useful insights to bank regulatory and supervisory agencies on the need to exercise increased risk-based scrutiny over bank loan loss provisioning and minimum loan loss reserve requirements. From an audit perspective, auditors need to be cautious and apply an enhanced risk-based audit especially when auditing banks during and after a financial, banking or systemic crisis. Credit rating agencies need to pay closer attention to the LLPs of distressed banks. Finally, bank investors and customers should be cautious when using bank financial statements, since bank managers of poorly performing banks might engage in aggressive earnings management.Originality/valueThe study is perhaps the first to examine the joint effects of systemic LBCs on the association between bank profit efficiency and the quality of earnings in a larger dataset of banks in a developing regional economic bloc. The authors also employ the GMM system estimator in the modelling, which helps address some weaknesses in prior studies.


2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (10) ◽  
pp. 3700-3737 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cem Demiroglu ◽  
Christopher M. James

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (5) ◽  
pp. 474-492 ◽  
Author(s):  
Panayiotis C. Andreou ◽  
Ian Cooper ◽  
Christodoulos Louca ◽  
Dennis Philip
Keyword(s):  

1992 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1057-1071 ◽  
Author(s):  
Myron B. Slovin ◽  
Shane A. Johnson ◽  
John L. Glascock

Author(s):  
Saibal Ghosh

AbstractThe debate on bank capital regulation has in recent years devoted specific attention to the role that bank loan loss provisions play as a part of the overall minimum capital regulatory framework. Using data for 1996–2011, we find evidence in favor of both capital management and signaling behavior by GCC banks. Islamic banks appear to engage less in such behavior as compared to their non-Islamic counterparts.


Author(s):  
Justin Yiqiang Jin ◽  
Kiridaran (Giri) Kanagaretnam ◽  
Gerald J. Lobo

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert O. Edmister ◽  
Suresh C. Srivastava

The extent of managerial control over loan default risk is a significant policy issue for commercial banks and the public agencies which regulate them. The responsibility of bank management and the rationale for government regulation and deposit insurance rest in large measure on the fundamental issue of whether loan loss variances (over time and across banks) ensue from managerial decisions or macroeconomic conditions. Our time series models of large banks show systematic, bank dependent loss rates over time, the signs of the coefficients confirm a risk reinforcing rather than a risk adjusting management culture. Our cross sectional regressions reveal significant relationships between individual and group (all sample bank) loan losses for commercial and c consumer types of loans, indicating that significant unpredictable macroeconomic forces exist. Thus, we identify risks arising from macroeconomic conditions appropriate for government insurance and risks ensuing from managerial decisions appropriate free market discipline.


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