Capital Regulation and Risk-taking Behavior: Empirical Evidence for Islamic Banks

This paper investigates whether regulatory pressures have an impact on the relationship between change in capital and bank risk-taking. On the basis of a well developed theoretical background, capital regulation constitutes the core of prudential regulation within the banking sector. Several researches have investigated this relationship between capital and risk in conventional banks, and this subject has gained in interest since the last financial crisis. This study is one of the few studies that have attempted to provide empirical evidence on this issue for Islamic banks. We use data of Islamic banking sectors over the period 2010–2014. The results reveal that Islamic banks tend to behave differently at each level of capital adequacy. In addition, we provide some evidence that change in capital is positively related to the change in risk for highly capitalized Islamic banks.

Capital Regulation and Market Competition in the MENA Region: Policy Implications for Banking Sector Stability During COVID-19 Pandemic

This article investigates the impact of capital requirements and market competition on the stability of financial institutions in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region. We test the hypothesis that capital requirements significantly affect the risk behaviour of both Islamic and conventional banks in the MENA region. We also investigate the moderating effect of market power and concentration on the relationship between capital regulation and bank risk. We find that capital ratio has a strong positive impact on conventional banks’ credit risk, whereas this effect is insignificant in the sample of Islamic banks. Our analysis indicates that, for the conventional banking sector, the increase in the capitalization level is negatively linked to bank credit risk only when banks’ level of market power is high. Regarding the Islamic banks’ behaviour, we find that the relationship between capital and credit risk is weakly moderated by banking competition. This means that Islamic banks are less sensitive to the market’s competitive conditions in the MENA countries, as they still apply their theoretical models, based on prohibition of interest. Our findings inform regulatory authorities concerned with improving the banking sector’s financial stability in the MENA region to strengthen their policies and force banks to better align with regulatory capital requirements during the COVID-19 pandemic.

A Comprehensive Analysis of the Effects of Capital Regulation and Heterogeneity on Bank Efficiency

This article analyzes the impact of capital regulation on bank efficiency using panel data from 165 commercial banks in China from 2013 to 2019. The results indicate that cost efficiency changes slightly and profit efficiency fluctuates greatly. Under the pressure of capital regulation, the profit efficiency of commercial banks with sufficient capital improves, while profit efficiency of banks with insufficient capital decreases slightly, and the cost efficiency of all commercial banks increases. Based on the heterogeneity analysis of banks, it is found that the cost efficiency and profit efficiency of different types of commercial banks differ significantly in response to capital regulation.

Handle with Care: Regulatory Easing in Times of COVID-19

The policy response to the COVID-19 shock included regulatory easing across many jurisdictions to facilitate the flow of credit to the economy and mitigate a further amplification of the shock through tighter financial conditions. Using an intraday event study, this paper examines how stock prices – a key driver of financial conditions – reacted to regulatory easing announcements in a sample of 18 advanced economies and 8 emerging markets. It finds that regulatory easing announcements contributed to looser financial conditions but effects varied across sectors and tools. News about regulatory easing led to lower valuations for financial sector stocks, mainly in jurisdictions with relatively lower capital buffers. These results stand in stark contrast with valuations of non-financial sector stocks, which increased in response to regulatory relief announcements, particularly in industries that are more dependent on bank financing. The effects also differed across tools. Valuations declined and financial conditions tightened following announcements related to easier bank capital regulation while equity valuation rose and financial conditions loosened after those about liquidity regulation.

How do banks’ capital regulation and risk-taking respond to COVID-19? Empirical insights of ownership structure

Purpose This study aims to investigate the relationship between capital regulation and risk-taking behavior (financial stability) concerning the impacts of the recent global (COVID-19) crisis and diverse ownership structure. Design/methodology/approach The analysis uses an unbalanced panel data set from 32 commercial banks of Bangladesh for 2000–2020. The authors use the two-step system generalized method of moments and three-stage least squares to produce the study outcomes. Findings The robust results reveal that the relationship between capital regulation and risk (financial stability) is negative (positive) and bi-directional. More significantly, COVID-19 makes banks fragile and demands more capital to absorb risk. However, the effect of COVID-19 is heterogeneous when the authors consider ownership structure. Among the diverse ownership styles, Islamic and active shareholding show their controlling wheel on capital regulation and risk-taking aptitude (financial stability) during the global (COVID-19) crisis. In normal economic conditions, private banks and minority active shareholding can be a good determinant for capital regulation and risk (financial stability). On the other hand, state-owned and large banks have been found as less capitalized and highly risky. Originality/value This study is the pioneer in exploring capital regulation and risk toward the recent global (COVID-19) crisis.

Regulatory Forbearance in the U.S. Insurance Industry: The Effects of Removing Capital Requirements for an Asset Class

We analyze the effects of a reform of capital regulation for U.S. insurance companies in 2009. The reform eliminates capital buffers against unexpected losses associated with portfolio holdings of MBS, but not for other fixed-income assets. After the reform, insurance companies are much more likely to retain downgraded MBS compared to other downgraded assets. This pattern is more pronounced for financially constrained insurers. Exploiting discontinuities in the reform’s implementation, we can identify the relevance of the capital requirements channel. We also document that the insurance industry crowds outs other investors in the new issuance of (high-yield) MBS.

On the money creation approach to banking

We study today’s two-tier money creation and destruction system: Commercial banks create bank deposits (privately created money) through loans to firms or asset purchases from the private sector. Bank deposits are destroyed when households buy bank equity or when firms repay loans. Central banks create electronic central bank money (publicly created money or reserves) through loans to commercial banks. In a simple general equilibrium setting, we show that symmetric equilibria yield the first-best level of money creation and lending when prices are flexible, regardless of monetary policy and capital regulation. When prices are rigid, we identify the circumstances in which money creation is excessive or breaks down and the ones in which an adequate combination of monetary policy and capital regulation can restore efficiency. Finally, we provide a series of extensions and generalizations of the results.