To defect or not to defect? National, institutional and party group pressures on MEPs and their consequences for party group cohesion in the European Parliament

2003 ◽  
Vol 42 (6) ◽  
pp. 841-866 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thorsten Faas
Keyword(s):  
Group Cohesion ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Party Group

Party group coordinators and rapporteurs: Discretion and agency loss along the European Parliament’s chains of delegation

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lukas Obholzer ◽  
Steffen Hurka ◽  
Michael Kaeding
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Ideal Point ◽  
Group Cohesion ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
National Party ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legislative Activities ◽  
Party Group

The European Parliament organizes its legislative activities along two chains of delegation to the rapporteurs – one institutional, one partisan. We analyze discretion and agency loss along these chains of delegation from the perspective of party group coordinators who select the rapporteur on behalf of the party group. Do coordinators minimize agency loss towards their national party, their European party group, the committee median or the plenary median when allocating reports? Data from the 2009–2014 legislative term demonstrate that coordinators tend to select rapporteurs who are close to their own national party’s ideal point on the integration dimension. This has important implications for intra-parliamentary and intra-party delegation, party group cohesion and broader policy-making in the European Union.

Tracing the selection bias in roll call votes: party group cohesion in the European Parliament

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 373-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikoleta Yordanova ◽  
Monika Mühlböck
Keyword(s):  
Selection Bias ◽  
Group Cohesion ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Legislative Politics ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Roll Call Vote ◽  
Rule Change ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Strategic Motives ◽  
Party Group

Legislative politics scholars rely heavily on roll call vote (RCV) data. However, it has been claimed that strategic motives behind RCV requests lead to overestimating party group cohesion and, thus, biased findings on legislative behaviour. To explore this claim, we distinguish between two types of bias, a ‘behavioural bias’ and a ‘selection bias’. A recent rule change in the European Parliament, making RCVs mandatory on all final legislative votes, presents the unique opportunity to evaluate the latter. We compare party group cohesion in requested and mandatory RCVs by examining final legislative votes before and after the rule adoption using amendment RCVs (which still need to be requested) as a benchmark. The analysis shows that group cohesion is higher whenever RCVs are not just requested on some but mandatory on all votes. Hence, there is indeed a ‘selection bias’ in RCV data. Yet, somewhat contrary to former claims, relying on requested RCVs leads to underestimation of the cohesion party groups would have had were all votes automatically roll called. We argue that this is mainly because requests occur on more contentious votes.

scholarly journals Party Politics or (Supra-)National Interest? External Relations Votes in the European Parliament

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 547-564 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tapio Raunio ◽  
Wolfgang Wagner
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Group Cohesion ◽  
National Interest ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Party Politics ◽  
Development Aid ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
External Relations ◽  
Foreign And Security Policy

Abstract Parliamentary votes on foreign and security policy have often been demonstrations of patriotism and unity. This resonates with the notion that external relations are exempted from party politics, or that politics stops at the water's edge. Its supranational character makes the European Parliament (EP) a particularly interesting laboratory for subjecting this thesis to empirical scrutiny. Analyzing roll-call votes from 1979 to 2014, this article shows that group cohesion and coalition patterns are no different in external relations votes than in other issue areas. Members of the EP (MEPs) do not rally around a European Union flag, nor do MEPs vote as national blocs in votes on foreign and security policy, trade, and development aid. Based on statistical analyses and interviews with parliamentary civil servants, it concludes that the EP stands out by having party politics dominate all business, including external relations.

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