AbstractThe most natural way to distinguish perception from cognition is by considering perception as stimulus-dependent. Perception is tethered to the senses in a way that cognition is not. Beck Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96(2): 319-334 (2018) has recently argued in this direction. He develops this idea by accommodating two potential counterexamples to his account: hallucinations and demonstrative thoughts. In this paper, I examine this view. First, I detect two general problems with movement to accommodate these awkward cases. Subsequently, I place two very common mental phenomena under the prism of the stimulus-dependence criterion: amodal completion and visual categorization. The result is that the stimulus-dependent criterion is too restrictive, it leaves the notion of perception extremely cramped. I conclude that even the criterion of stimulus-dependence fails to mark a clearly defined border between perception and cognition.
Collaboration in grant proposals and assessments in ageing research – justification or a quest for a collaborology?
