Environmental migrants, structural injustice, and moral responsibility

Bioethics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (6) ◽  
pp. 562-569
Author(s):  
James Dwyer
KÜLÖNBSÉG ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Virág Véber

Recenzió Michael Brownstein – Jennifer Saul (szerk.): Implicit Bias and Philosophy című kétkötetes antológiájáról. Brownstein, Michael – Saul, Jennifer (szerk.): Implicit Bias and Philosophy. 1. köt. Metaphysics and Epistemology. 2. köt. Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics. New York, Oxford University Press, 2016.


Author(s):  
Rubén Merino Obregón

<p><strong> </strong></p><p align="left"><strong>Resumen</strong></p><p>La violencia de género es un fenómeno que requiere ser examinado desde un modelo de injusticia que no se reduzca a la identificación y condena del agresor. La teoría filosófica de las “injusticias estructurales” desarrollada por Iris Marion Young sirve para considerar formas de daño que no se reducen a la interacción agresor-víctima, sino que dependen de estructuras sociales en las que algunas personas se encuentran en situación de desigualdad o vulnerabilidad. Así mismo, tal modelo nos permite comprender que hace falta distinguir la responsabilidad directa y personal de quien comete la agresión, de la responsabilidad moral de los muchos que colaboramos activamente con la subsistencia de las condiciones normalizadas y toleradas de desigualdad.</p><p><strong>Abstract</strong></p><p>Gender violence is a phenomenon that should be examined as a form of injustice which cannot be reduced to the identification and condemnation of the aggressor. The philosophical theory of "structural injustices" developed by Iris Marion Young considers forms of harm that are not reduced to the aggressor-victim interaction, but depend on social structures in which some people find themselves in situations of inequality or vulnerability. Likewise, such a model allows us to understand that it is necessary to distinguish the direct and personal responsibility of the one who commits the aggression, from the moral responsibility of many of us who collaborate actively with the subsistence of the normalized and tolerated conditions of inequality.</p>


2021 ◽  
pp. 1470594X2110033
Author(s):  
Dorothea Gädeke

Who is responsible for fighting domination? Answering this question, I argue, requires taking the structural dimension of domination seriously to avoid unwillingly reproducing domination in the name of justice. Having cast domination as a structural injustice that refers to structurally constituted positions of power and disempowerment, I show that the outcome-based, the capacity-based and the social connection model suggested in literature on responsibility, fail to fully meet this challenge. Drawing on insights from all of them, I propose an account that proves more sensitive towards the power dynamics at play in fighting domination. It is based on a fundamental duty of justice, which gives rise to two kinds of responsibility. Dominators, dominated and peripheral agents share political responsibility for domination in virtue of reproducing domination by occupying a position within structures of dominating power; they are required to acknowledge and undermine their position of power or disempowerment rather than simply using and thus tacitly reaffirming it. Political responsibility for domination is distinct from moral responsibility for acting within contexts of domination; in fact, ignoring this difference risks reproducing rather than transforming relations of domination. Bystanders who are not implicated in reproducing domination bear limited remedial responsibility to support this struggle.


Author(s):  
Jennifer M. Page

AbstractAlasia Nuti’s important recent book, Injustice and the Reproduction of History: Structural Inequalities, Gender and Redress (2019), makes many persuasive interventions. Nuti shows how structural injustice theory is enriched by being explicitly historical; in theorizing historical-structural injustice, she lays bare the mechanisms of how the injustices of history reproduce themselves. For Nuti, historical-structural patterns are not only shaped by habitual behaviors that are or appear to be morally permissible, but also by individual wrongdoing and wrongdoing by powerful group agents like states. In this article, I extend Nuti’s rich analysis, focusing on two questions that arise from her theory of historical-structural injustice: (1) Beyond being blameworthy for wrongful acts themselves, are culpable wrongdoers blameworthy for contributing to structural injustice? (2) Does historical moral ignorance mitigate moral responsibility for past injustice? Regarding (1), I distinguish between the local and societal structural effects of wrongdoing. Though I think this distinction is well-founded, it ultimately leads to tensions with structural injustice theory’s idea of ordinary individuals being blameless for reproducing unjust structures. Regarding (2), I argue that even though it is natural for the question of historical moral ignorance to arise in considering past wrongdoing, at least in the case of powerful group agents, we should not overlook forms of cruelty which present-day moral concepts are not needed to condemn.


2011 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 154-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matt Zwolinski

AbstractIt is commonly claimed that workers in sweatshops are wrongfully exploited by their employers. The economist's standard response to this claim is to point out that sweatshops provide their workers with tremendous benefits, more than most workers elsewhere in the economy receive and more than most of those who complain about sweatshop exploitation provide. Perhaps, though, the wrongfulness of sweatshop exploitation is to be found not in the discrete interaction between a sweatshop and its employees, but in the unjust political and economic institutions against which that interaction takes place. This paper tries to assess what role, if any, consideration of background injustice should play in the correct understanding of exploitation. Its answer, in brief, is that it should play fairly little. Structural injustice matters, of course, but it does not typically matter for determining whether a sweatshop is acting exploitatively, and it does not typically matter in a way that grounds any kind of special moral responsibility or fault on the part of sweatshops or the Multinational Enterprises with which they contract.


DeKaVe ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arief Agung Suwasono

Television is a medium that delivers meaning through various type of text television conveys information that promotes moral responsibility and social solidarity. In spite of the fact that television is one of capitalism product, its programs can generate social commitment and solidarity reflecting human moral values.Keyword : Television, Fetisme


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