scholarly journals Contributing to Historical-Structural Injustice via Morally Wrong Acts

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer M. Page
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Structural Effects ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
Structural Patterns ◽  
Structural Injustice ◽  
Moral Ignorance ◽  
Past Injustice ◽  
Group Agents ◽  
Powerful Group

AbstractAlasia Nuti’s important recent book, Injustice and the Reproduction of History: Structural Inequalities, Gender and Redress (2019), makes many persuasive interventions. Nuti shows how structural injustice theory is enriched by being explicitly historical; in theorizing historical-structural injustice, she lays bare the mechanisms of how the injustices of history reproduce themselves. For Nuti, historical-structural patterns are not only shaped by habitual behaviors that are or appear to be morally permissible, but also by individual wrongdoing and wrongdoing by powerful group agents like states. In this article, I extend Nuti’s rich analysis, focusing on two questions that arise from her theory of historical-structural injustice: (1) Beyond being blameworthy for wrongful acts themselves, are culpable wrongdoers blameworthy for contributing to structural injustice? (2) Does historical moral ignorance mitigate moral responsibility for past injustice? Regarding (1), I distinguish between the local and societal structural effects of wrongdoing. Though I think this distinction is well-founded, it ultimately leads to tensions with structural injustice theory’s idea of ordinary individuals being blameless for reproducing unjust structures. Regarding (2), I argue that even though it is natural for the question of historical moral ignorance to arise in considering past wrongdoing, at least in the case of powerful group agents, we should not overlook forms of cruelty which present-day moral concepts are not needed to condemn.

Excuse without Exculpation

2020 ◽  
pp. 72-95
Author(s):  
Paulina Sliwa
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Middle Ground ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Moral Ignorance ◽  
Mistaken Assumption ◽  
The Relationship

Can moral ignorance excuse? This chapter argues that philosophical debate of this question has been based on a mistaken assumption: namely that excuses are all-or-nothing affairs; to have an excuse is to be blameless. The chapter argues that we should reject this assumption. Excuses are not binary but gradable: they can be weaker or stronger, mitigating blame to greater or lesser extent. This chapter explores the notions of strength of excuses, blame mitigation and the relationship between excuses and moral responsibility. These ideas open up some principled middle-ground between the two positions staked out in the literature. Moral ignorance may well excuse but it does not exculpate.

Free Will and Open Alternatives

Disputatio ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (45) ◽  
pp. 167-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos J. Moya
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Test Cases ◽  
Frankfurt Cases ◽  
Causal History ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
History Of ◽  
Actual Sequence

Abstract In her recent book Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio develops a distinctive version of an actual-sequence account of free will, according to which, when agents choose and act freely, their freedom is exclusively grounded in, and supervenes on, the actual causal history of such choices or actions. Against this proposal, I argue for an alternative- possibilities account, according to which agents’ freedom is partly grounded in their ability to choose or act otherwise. Actual-sequence accounts of freedom (and moral responsibility) are motivated by a reflection on so-called Frankfurt cases. Instead, other cases, such as two pairs of examples originally designed by van Inwagen, threaten actual-sequence accounts, including Sartorio’s. On the basis of her (rather complex) view of causation, Sartorio contends, however, that the two members of each pair have different causal histories, so that her view is not undermined by those cases after all. I discuss these test cases further and defend my alternative-possibilities account of freedom.

Moral Beliefs and Blameworthiness

Philosophy ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 69 (270) ◽  
pp. 397-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lloyd Fields
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Ignorance ◽  
Moral Principles

It is a commonly-held belief that ignorance excuses. But what of moral ignorance? Is a person blameless who acts from “false” moral principles? In this paper I shall try to show that such a person is blameworthy. I shall produce an argument that connects the acceptance of moral principles with character, character with moral responsibility, and moral responsibility with the justifiability of blame.

scholarly journals Burjánzó implicit előítéleteink – Michael Brownstein – Jennifer Saul (szerk.): Implicit Bias and Philosophy

KÜLÖNBSÉG ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Virág Véber
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Implicit Bias ◽  
Structural Injustice ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Oxford University Press

Recenzió Michael Brownstein – Jennifer Saul (szerk.): Implicit Bias and Philosophy című kétkötetes antológiájáról. Brownstein, Michael – Saul, Jennifer (szerk.): Implicit Bias and Philosophy. 1. köt. Metaphysics and Epistemology. 2. köt. Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics. New York, Oxford University Press, 2016.

scholarly journals Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
High Time ◽  
Epistemic Condition ◽  
Quality Of Will ◽  
Independent Condition ◽  
Moral Ignorance ◽  
Full Volume

Philosophers have long agreed that moral responsibility might not only have a freedom condition, but also an epistemic condition. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. Ignorance might constitute an excuse, but the question is exactly when. Surprisingly enough, the epistemic condition has only recently attracted the attention of scholars, and it is high time for a full volume on the topic. The chapters in this volume address the following central questions. Does the epistemic condition require akrasia? Why does blameless ignorance excuse? Does moral ignorance sustained by one’s culture excuse? Does the epistemic condition involve knowledge of the wrongness or wrongmaking features of one’s action? Is the epistemic condition an independent condition, or is it derivative from one’s quality of will or intentions? Is the epistemic condition sensitive to degrees of difficulty? Are there different kinds of moral responsibility and thus multiple epistemic conditions? Is the epistemic condition revisionary? What is the basic structure of the epistemic condition?

Moral Progress: Improvement of Moral Concepts, Refinements of Moral Motivation

2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-190
Author(s):  
Gertrud Nunner-Winkler
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Data ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Moral Progress ◽  
Moral Understanding ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
Moral Intuitionism ◽  
Explanatory Factors ◽  
Ethics Of Responsibility

AbstractIn their recent book Buchanan and Powell claim that there is moral progress. Their analysis focuses on increasing inclusiveness, yet they also suggest other dimensions as possible indicators-improvements in the concept of morality and refinements in moral motivation. In the following I present empirical data on changes in moral understanding that occurred during the second half of the 20th century in Germany. These changes concern an increasing delimitation of the moral realm, the rise of an ethics of responsibility, the displacement of an orientation to super ego dictates by a more ego-syntonic type of moral motivation. This research largely follows the ‘cognitivist’ paradigm which I start off defending against Haidt’s counter proposal of moral intuitionism. Feasible explanatory factors for the changes documented are put forward-processes of secularization and changes in socialization styles-and their interpretation as indicators of moral progress is discussed. The paper ends with brief speculations concerning possible reasons for current moral regressions.

scholarly journals La comprensión de la violencia de género como injusticia estructural = Understanding gender violence as structural injustice

2019 ◽  
pp. 9
Author(s):  
Rubén Merino Obregón
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Personal Responsibility ◽  
Gender Violence ◽  
Social Structures ◽  
Philosophical Theory ◽  
Structural Injustice ◽  
Iris Marion Young ◽  
The One

<p><strong> </strong></p><p align="left"><strong>Resumen</strong></p><p>La violencia de género es un fenómeno que requiere ser examinado desde un modelo de injusticia que no se reduzca a la identificación y condena del agresor. La teoría filosófica de las “injusticias estructurales” desarrollada por Iris Marion Young sirve para considerar formas de daño que no se reducen a la interacción agresor-víctima, sino que dependen de estructuras sociales en las que algunas personas se encuentran en situación de desigualdad o vulnerabilidad. Así mismo, tal modelo nos permite comprender que hace falta distinguir la responsabilidad directa y personal de quien comete la agresión, de la responsabilidad moral de los muchos que colaboramos activamente con la subsistencia de las condiciones normalizadas y toleradas de desigualdad.</p><p><strong>Abstract</strong></p><p>Gender violence is a phenomenon that should be examined as a form of injustice which cannot be reduced to the identification and condemnation of the aggressor. The philosophical theory of "structural injustices" developed by Iris Marion Young considers forms of harm that are not reduced to the aggressor-victim interaction, but depend on social structures in which some people find themselves in situations of inequality or vulnerability. Likewise, such a model allows us to understand that it is necessary to distinguish the direct and personal responsibility of the one who commits the aggression, from the moral responsibility of many of us who collaborate actively with the subsistence of the normalized and tolerated conditions of inequality.</p>

On Knowing What’s Right and Being Responsible for It

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Philosophy Of Action ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Epistemic Condition ◽  
Moral Ignorance ◽  
Wrong Thing ◽  
The Right ◽  
Central Claim

The debate about whether moral responsibility has an epistemic condition has traditionally focused on whether and, if so, when moral ignorance can provide an excuse for wrong actions. This chapter takes up the question of moral responsibility for right actions. Its central claim is that whether an agent is morally responsible for her right action depends on whether she knows what the right thing is to do. The chapter’s argument for this appeals to considerations from the philosophy of action. It argues that moral knowledge matters to moral evaluations because it is a central ingredient in intentional action. Our knowledge of what the right and wrong thing is to do partly determines whether we do the right or wrong thing intentionally. Moral responsibility inherits its epistemic condition from the epistemic condition on intentional action.

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