scholarly journals ESTIMATING MARKET POWER IN HOMOGENOUS PRODUCT MARKETS USING A COMPOSED ERROR MODEL: APPLICATION TO THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY MARKET

2017 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 1296-1321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis Orea ◽  
Jevgenijs Steinbuks
Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (24) ◽  
pp. 6741
Author(s):  
Dzikri Firmansyah Hakam ◽  
Sudarso Kaderi Wiyono ◽  
Nanang Hariyanto

This research optimises the mix and structure of Generation Companies (GenCos) in the Sumatra power system, Indonesia. Market power, indicating the ability to raise prices profitably above the competitive level, tends to be a significant problem in the aftermath of electricity market restructuring. In the process of regulatory reform and the development of competitive electricity markets, it is desirable and practical to establish an efficient number of competitor GenCos. Simulations of a power system account for multi-plant mergers of GenCos subject to a regulatory measure of the Residual Supply Index and the influence of direct current load flow and the topology of the system. This study simulates the Sumatra power system in order to determine the following: optimal market structure, efficient GenCo generation mix, and the optimal number of competitive GenCos. Further, this study seeks to empirically optimise the electricity generation mix and electricity market structure of the Sumatra power system using DC load flow optimisation, market power index, and multi-plant monopoly analysis. The simulations include generation and transmission constraints to represent network constraints. This research is the first to analyse the Sumatra power system using imperfect (Cournot) competition modelling. Furthermore, this study is the first kind to optimise the mix and structure of the Sumatra generation power market. The guidelines and methodology in this research can be implemented in other countries characterised by a monopoly electricity utility company.


Author(s):  
K. Shafeeque Ahmed ◽  
Fini Fathima ◽  
Ramesh Ananthavijayan ◽  
Prabhakar Karthikeyan Shanmugam ◽  
Sarat Kumar Sahoo ◽  
...  

2018 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 904-941 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas P. Tangerås ◽  
Johannes Mauritzen

Energy Policy ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 37 (8) ◽  
pp. 3235-3241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Hellmer ◽  
Linda Wårell

Energies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Debin Fang ◽  
Qiyu Ren ◽  
Qian Yu

The deepening of electricity reform results in increasingly frequent auctions and the surge of generators, making it difficult to analyze generators’ behaviors. With the difficulties to find analytical market equilibriums, approximate equilibriums were obtained instead in previous studies by market simulations, where in some cases the results are strictly bound to the initial estimations and the results are chaotic. In this paper, a multi-unit power bidding model is proposed to reveal the bidding mechanism under clearing pricing rules by employing an auction approach, for which initial estimations are non-essential. Normalized bidding price is introduced to construct generators’ price-related bidding strategy. Nash equilibriums are derived depending on the marginal cost and the winning probability which are computed from bidding quantity, transmission cost and demand distribution. Furthermore, we propose a comparative analysis to explore the impact of uncertain elastic demand on the performance of the electricity market. The result indicates that, there exists market power among generators, which lead to social welfare decreases even under competitive conditions but elastic demand is an effective way to restrain generators’ market power. The feasibility of the models is verified by a case study. Our work provides decision support for generators and a direction for improving market efficiency.


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